

Agenda

Start	End	Sunday, June 8, 2014 (Sheraton Palo Alto Hotel)			
7:30	8:30	<b>ACM conf. on Economics and Computation (ACM EC)</b> Continental Breakfast Location: Piazza Courtyard & Justines			<b>NBER – Market Design</b>  8:30 am – 9:00 am Continental Breakfast
8:30	10:30	<b>EC Workshop 1</b>  <b>The 10<sup>th</sup> Ad Auction Workshop</b> Organizers: Patrick Jordan (Microsoft), Renato Paes Leme (Google), De Liu (University of Kentucky), Chris Wilkens (Yahoo!) & Itai Ashlagi (MIT)  8:30 - 9:30: Session 1 <b>Online Allocation with Submodular Valuations: Greedy beats 1/2 in Random Order</b> Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni & Morteza Zadimoghaddam  <b>Advertising on Maps</b> Mohammad Mahdian & Sergei Vassilvitskii	<b>EC Tutorial 1</b>  <b>Recent Progress in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design</b> Tutors: Yang Cai (UC Berkeley), Constantinos Daskalakis (MIT) & Matt Weinberg (MIT)  Session 1  8:30 - 9:30 <b>Optimal Multi-Item Auctions</b> Constantinos Daskalakis (MIT)  9:30 – 10:30 <b>Revenue-Optimal Mechanisms</b> Yang Cai (UC Berkeley & McGill University)	<b>EC Tutorial 2</b>  <b>Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: from Arrow's Impossibility to Fishburn's Maximal Lotteries</b> Tutor: Felix Brandt (TU München)  8:30 – 10:30	Location: Piazza Courtyard & Justines  9:00 am – 9:45 am  <b>Living-Donor Labor Liver/Lung Exchange</b> Haluk Ergin (Duke University), Tayfun Sonmez (Boston College) & Utku Unver (Boston College)  Location: Sequoia & Oak
		<b>Quantal Response Equilibrium for Sponsored Search Auctions: Computation and Inference</b> Jiang Rong, Tao Qin & Bo An  9:40 - 10:40: Session 2 <b>Dynamic Reserves For Repeated Second-Price Auctions</b> Yash Kanoria & Hamid Nazerzadeh  <b>Competing Ad-Intermediaries and Welfare Implications</b> Thanh Nguyen & Karthik Kannan  <b>Auctions for Cannibalistic Ads</b> Kane Sweeney  Location: Cypress 1 & 2	Location: Juniper & Spruce	Location: Maple	9:45 am – 10:30 am  <b>Stable Matching in Large Economies</b> Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University), Jinwoo Kim (Seoul National University) & Fuhito Kojima (Stanford University)  Location: Sequoia & Oak
10:30	11:00	<b>Coffee Break</b> Location: Piazza Courtyard & Justines			

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11:00	12:30	<p><b>EC Workshop 1</b></p> <p><b>11:00 - 12:00: Keynote 1</b> <i>Paul Milgrom</i></p> <p><b>12:00 - 12:40: Session 3</b></p> <p><b>Do Online Social Networks Increase Welfare?</b> <i>Manuel Mueller-Frank &amp; Malleesh Pai</i></p> <p><b>Multi-Score Position Auctions</b> <i>Denis Charles, Nikhil R. Devanur &amp; Balasubramanian Sivan</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress 1 &amp; 2</i></p>	<p><b>EC Tutorial 1</b></p> <p><b>11:00 – 12:30</b> <b>Session 2</b></p> <p><b>Beyond Revenue: Optimal Mechanisms for Non-linear Objectives</b> <i>Matt Weinberg (MIT)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Juniper &amp; Spruce</i></p>	<p><b>EC Tutorial 2</b></p> <p><b>11:00 – 12:30</b></p> <p><b>Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: from Arrow's Impossibility to Fishburn's Maximal Lotteries</b> <i>Tutor: Felix Brandt (TU München)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Maple</i></p>	<p><b>11:00 am – 11:45 am</b></p> <p><b>Strategic Trading in Informationally Complex Environments</b> <i>Nicolas Lambert (Stanford University), Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford University, Google, &amp; NBER) &amp; Mikhail Panov (Stanford University)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>
		<p><b>11:45 am – 12:30 pm</b></p> <p><b>Reverse Mechanism Design</b> <i>Nima Haghpanah (Northwestern University) &amp; Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>			
12:30	2:00	<p><b>Lunch</b> <i>Location: Justines &amp; Poolside</i></p>			
2:00	3:30	<p><b>EC Workshop 1</b></p> <p><b>2:00 - 3:00: Keynote 2</b> <i>Hal Varian</i></p> <p><b>3:00 - 3:40: Session 4</b></p> <p><b>Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition</b> <i>Negin Golrezaei &amp; Hamid Nazerzadeh</i></p> <p><b>Value of Targeting</b> <i>Kshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel &amp; Sergei Vassilvitskii</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress 1 &amp; 2</i></p>	<p><b>EC Workshop 2</b></p> <p><b>The 4th Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content – part 1</b> <i>Organizers: Yan Chen (University of Michigan), Yiling Chen (Harvard), Arpita Ghosh (Cornell), Ashish Goel (Stanford) &amp; Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research)</i></p> <p><b>On Manipulation in Prediction Markets When Participants Influence Outcomes Directly</b> <i>Mithun Chakraborty &amp; Sanmay Das</i></p> <p><b>Social Status and Badge Design</b> <i>Nicole Immorlica, Greg Stoddard &amp; Vasilis Syrgkanis</i></p> <p><b>New Website Social Network Advertising: What Works and What Doesn't</b> <i>Rui Wu &amp; Yi Zhang</i></p> <p><b>Crowdsourcing for Participatory Democracies: Efficient Elicitation of Social Choice Functions</b> <i>David T. Lee, Ashish Goel, Tanja Aitamurto &amp; Helene Landemore</i></p> <p><i>Location: Juniper &amp; Spruce</i></p>	<p><b>2:00 pm – 2:45 pm</b></p> <p><b>The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice</b> <i>Umut Dur (North Carolina State University), Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University), Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology &amp; NBER) &amp; Tayfun Sonmez (Boston College)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	
		<p><b>2:45 pm – 3:30 pm</b></p> <p><b>Identification and Estimation in Manipulable Assignment Mechanisms</b> <i>Nikhil Agarwal (Yale University &amp; NBER) &amp; Paulo Somaini (Massachusetts Institute of Technology &amp; NBER)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>			

Agenda

3:30	4:00	<p><b>Coffee Break</b>                  Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</p>		
		<p><b>EC Workshop 3</b></p> <p><b>The 2nd Workshop on Crowdsourcing and Online Behavioral Experiments</b>                  Organizers: Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research), Winter A. Mason (Facebook) &amp; Daniel G. Goldstein (Microsoft Research)</p>	<p><b>EC Tutorial 3</b></p> <p><b>Bitcoin: The First Decentralized Digital Currency</b>                  Tutor: Aviv Zohar (Hebrew University)</p>	<p><b>4:00 pm – 4:45 pm</b></p> <p><b>Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation</b>                  Paul Milgrom (Stanford University) &amp; Ilya Segal (Stanford University)</p> <p>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</p>
		<p><b>4:00 – 4:20: Herding in Markets: A Randomized Field Experiment</b>                  Nicolas Della Penna, Peter Krafft &amp; Alex Pentland</p> <p><b>4:20 – 4:40: Asymmetric Effects of Personalized Social Cues: Evidence from Advertising Experiment</b>                  Sean Taylor, Eytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles &amp; Sinan Aral</p>		<p><b>4:45 pm – 5:30 pm</b></p> <p><b>Designing Large Advertising Markets When Agents Have Heterogeneous Objectives</b>                  Susan Athey (Stanford University &amp; NBER) &amp; Denis Nekipelov (University of Virginia)</p> <p>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</p>
4:00	6:00	<p><b>4:40 – 5:00: The Cooperative Phenotype</b>, Alexander Peysakhovich, Martin Nowak &amp; David Rand</p> <p><b>5:00 – 5:20: Validity of Crowdsourced Ratings of Disordered Speech</b>                  Tara Mcallister Byun, Peter Halpin &amp; Daniel Szeredi.</p> <p><b>5:20 – 5:40: Testing the Validity of Mechanical Turk Data Beyond Simple One-Shot Experiments</b>                  Mona Kleinberg &amp; Richard Lau.</p> <p><b>5:40 – 6:00: Crowdsourcing for Democracy: Pitfalls and Possibilities of using MTurk in Political Contexts</b>                  Yanna Krupnikov &amp; Adam Levine.</p> <p>Location: Cypress 1 &amp; 2</p>	<p>Location: Juniper &amp; Spruce</p>	

Agenda

Start	End		
<b>Monday, June 9, 2014 (Sheraton Palo Alto Hotel)</b>			
7:30	8:30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>ACM conf. on Economics and Computation (ACM EC)</b>                      Continental Breakfast</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>	
8:30	10:30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC Workshop 2</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>The 4th Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content – part 2</b>                      Organizers: Yan Chen (University of Michigan), Yiling Chen (Harvard), Arpita Ghosh (Cornell), Ashish Goel (Stanford) &amp; Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>9:00 – 10:00: Invited Talk User-Propagated Content</b>                      Lada Adamic</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>10:00 – 10:45 Minimum Truth Serums with Optional Predictions</b>                      Blake Riley</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Competing Openly or Blindly in Crowdsourcing Contests?</b>                      Lian Jian, Zheng Li &amp; Tracy Xiao Liu</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Juniper &amp; Spruce</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC Tutorial 4</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>8:30 – 12:30 Privacy, Information Economics, and Mechanism Design</b>                      Tutors: Cynthia Dwork (Microsoft Research), Malleesh Pai (UPenn) &amp; Aaron Roth (UPenn)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress 1 &amp; 2</i></p>
		<p style="text-align: center;"><b>8:30 am – 9:00 am</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>NBER – Market Design</b>                      Continental Breakfast</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>	
		<p style="text-align: center;"><b>9:00 am – 9:45 am</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Sales Mechanisms in Online Markets: What Happened to Internet Auctions?</b>                      Liran Einav (Stanford University &amp; NBER), Chiara Farronato (Stanford University), Jonathan Levin (Stanford University &amp; NBER) &amp; Neel Sundaresan (eBay Research Labs)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	
10:30	11:00	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Coffee Break</b>  <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>	
11:00	12:30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC Workshop 2</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>11:15 – 12:30: Panel: Social Computing in the Real World</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Experiences from oDesk</b>                      Ramesh Johari</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Experiences from Quora</b>                      Yair Livne</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Q&amp;A in Online Education-- Analyses of MOOC Forums</b>                      Bjoern Hartmann</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Juniper &amp; Spruce</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC Tutorial 4</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Privacy, Information Economics, and Mechanism Design</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Tutors: Cynthia Dwork (Microsoft Research), Malleesh Pai (UPenn) &amp; Aaron Roth (UPenn)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress 1 &amp; 2</i></p>
		<p style="text-align: center;"><b>11:00 am – 11:45 am</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>The Efficiency of Dynamic, Post-Auction Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions</b>                      Bradley Larsen (Stanford University &amp; NBER)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	
12:30	2:00	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>11:45 am – 12:30 pm</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton</b>                      Eric Budish (University of Chicago) &amp; Judd Kessler (University of Pennsylvania)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	
		<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Lunch</b>  <i>Location: Justines &amp; Poolside</i></p>	

## Agenda

2:00	3:30	<p><b>A joint session for EC, NBER and Decentralization on CS and Economics</b> <i>Organized by the Events Chairs: Susan Athey (Stanford) , Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft), Vincent Conitzer (Duke) , David Easley (Cornell), Fuhito Kojima (Stanford), Scott Page (Univ. of Michigan) &amp; Parag Pathak (MIT)</i></p> <p><i>Chair: Moshe Babaioff</i></p> <p><u>Invited Speakers:</u> <i>Jon Kleinberg (Cornell), <b>Computational Problems for Designed Social Systems</b></i> <i>Joaquin Candela (Facebook), <b>Machine Learning and the Facebook Ads Auction</b></i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>
3:30	4:00	<p><b>Coffee Break</b> <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>
4:00	5:30	<p><b>A joint session for EC, NBER and Decentralization on CS and Economics</b></p> <p><i>Chair: Parag Pathak</i></p> <p><u>Invited Speakers:</u> <i>Susan Athey (Stanford), <b>The Economics of Crypto-currencies</b></i> <i>Tim Roughgarden (Stanford), <b>Approximately Optimal Mechanisms Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned</b></i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>
5:30	6:00	<p><b>Break</b></p>
6:00	8:00	<p><b>EC Reception</b> <i>Location: Justines</i></p>

Agenda

Start	End			
<b>Tuesday, June 10, 2014 (Sheraton Palo Alto Hotel)</b>				
8:00	9:00	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>ACM EC and Decentralization</b>  <i>Light Breakfast Provided</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>		
9:00	10:15	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>A joint session for EC, NBER and Decentralization</b>  <i>Chair: David Easley</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Opening</b>  <b>9:00 am - 9:15 am</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Keynote talk 1:</b>  <b>Centrality, Gossip and Diffusion of Information in Networks</b>  <i>Matthew Jackson</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>		
10:15	11:00	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Coffee Break and Poster Session</b>  <i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>		
11:00	12:20	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>A joint session for EC, NBER and Decentralization</b>  <b>EC - Session 1</b>  <i>Chair: Itai Ashlagi</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Strategic Trading in Informationally Complex Environments</b>  <i>Nicolas Lambert, Michael Ostrovsky &amp; Mikhail Panov</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Incentivizing Exploration</b>  <i>Peter Frazier, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg &amp; Robert Kleinberg</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Optimal Auctions for Correlated Bidders with Sampling</b>  <i>Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline &amp; Robert Kleinberg</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness of One-sided Matching Mechanisms</b>  <i>Timo Mennle &amp; Sven Seuken</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>		
12:20	1:50	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Lunch</b>  <i>Location: Justines &amp; Poolside</i></p>		
1:50	3:10	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 2a</b>  <i>Chair: Shuchi Chawla</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Generalized Second Price Auction with Probabilistic Broad Match</b>  <i>Wei Chen, Di He, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin, Yixin Tao &amp; Liwei Wang</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions</b>  <i>Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer &amp; David Parkes</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Optimising Trade-offs Among Stakeholders in Ad Auctions</b>  <i>Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian Kash, Peter Key &amp; David Kurokaw</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 2b</b>  <i>Chair: Siddharth Suri</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>A Dynamic Network Game for the Adoption of New Technologies</b>  <i>Matt Leduc</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Characterizing Strategic Cascades on Networks</b>  <i>Travis Martin, Grant Schoenebeck, Michael Wellman</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>The Polarizing Effect of Network Influences</b>  <i>MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, Hamid Mahini &amp; David Malec</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Decentralization (DEC) Conference</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>1:50 – 2:00</b>  <b>Welcome</b>  <i>Location: Reception Room</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>2:00 – 2:50</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Job Security, Stability and Production Efficiency</b>  <i>Ron Lavi (joint with Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, &amp; Rann Smorodinsky)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>

Agenda

		<p><b>Optimizing Prices in Descending Clock Auctions</b>  <i>Tri-Dung Nguyen &amp; Tuomas Sandholm</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>Re-incentivizing Discovery: Mechanisms for Partial-Progress Sharing in Research</b>  <i>Siddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel &amp; Anilesh Krishnaswamy</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>2:50 – 3:40</b></p> <p><b>Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition</b>  <i>Itai Ashlagi (joint with Yash Kanoria &amp; Jacob D. Leshno)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
3:10	3:30	<p><b>Coffee Break</b>  <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>		<p><b>3:40 – 3:50 Coffee Break</b>  <i>Location: Piazza &amp; Justines</i></p>
3:30	4:30	<p><b>EC - Session 3a</b>  <i>Chair: Michal Feldman</i></p> <p><b>Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints</b>  <i>Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni &amp; Renato Paes Leme</i></p> <p><b>Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation</b>  <i>Paul Milgrom &amp; Ilya Segal</i></p> <p><b>The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions</b>  <i>Paul Duetting, Vasilis Gkatzelis &amp; Tim Roughgarden</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>EC - Session 3b</b>  <i>Chair: Yiling Chen</i></p> <p><b>Individual Security and Network Design</b>  <i>Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski &amp; Sanjeev Goyal</i></p> <p><b>Cryptographically Blinded Games: Leveraging Players' Limitations for Equilibria and Profit</b>  <i>Pavel Hubacek &amp; Sunoo Park</i></p> <p><b>The Complexity of Fairness through Equilibrium</b>  <i>Abraham Othman, Christos Papadimitriou &amp; Aviad Rubinstein</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>3:50 – 4:40</b></p> <p><b>Weak Cartels and Collusion-Proof Auctions</b>  <i>Jinwoo Kim (joint with Yeon-Koo Che &amp; Daniele Condorelli)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
4:40	6:00	<p><b>EC - Session 4a</b>  <i>Chair: Jason Hartline</i></p> <p><b>Optimal Mechanisms with Simple Menus</b>  <i>Zihe Wang &amp; Pingzhong Tang</i></p> <p><b>Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions</b>  <i>Paul Duetting, Tim Roughgarden &amp; Inbal Talgam-Cohen</i></p> <p><b>Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions</b>  <i>Yiannis Giannakopoulos &amp; Elias Koutsoupas</i></p> <p><b>Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings</b>  <i>Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu &amp; Anna Karlin</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>EC - Session 4b</b>  <i>Chair: Ariel Procaccia</i></p> <p><b>Efficient Voting via The Top-k Elicitation Scheme: A Probabilistic Approach</b>  <i>Yuval Filmus &amp; Joel Oren</i></p> <p><b>A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria</b>  <i>Reshef Meir, Omer Lev &amp; Jeff Rosenschein</i></p> <p><b>Universal Dominance and Welfare for Plausible Utility Functions</b>  <i>Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl &amp; Felix Brandt</i></p> <p><b>Neutrality and Geometry of Mean Voting</b>  <i>Sébastien Lahaie &amp; Nisarg Shah</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>4:40 – 5:30</b></p> <p><b>One-Sided Matching with Limited Complementarities</b>  <i>Thanh Nguyen (joint with Ahmad Peivandi &amp; Rakesh Vohra)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
6:10	7:00	<p><b>Business Meeting</b>  <i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>		

Agenda

Start	End			
<b>Wednesday, June 11, 2014 (Sheraton Palo Alto Hotel)</b>				
7:30	8:30	<p><b>EC - Open discussion about the CS job market for EC people</b>                      Chair: David Parkes</p> <p><i>Light breakfast provided.</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>		
8:40	10:00	<p><b>EC - Session 5a</b>                      Chair: Scott Kominers</p> <p><b>Optimal Allocation without Money: an Engineering Approach</b>                      Itai Ashlagi &amp; Peng Shi</p> <p><b>Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences</b>                      Guillaume Haeringer &amp; Vincent Iehlé</p> <p><b>Dynamic Matching Market Design</b>                      Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li &amp; Shayan Oveis Gharan</p> <p><b>Misdirected Search Effort in a Matching Market: Causes, Consequences and a Partial Solution</b>                      John Horton</p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>EC - Session 5b</b>                      Chair: Boi Faltings</p> <p><b>Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems</b>                      Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins &amp; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan</p> <p><b>Removing Arbitrage from Wagering Mechanisms</b>                      Yiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David Pennock &amp; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan</p> <p><b>Information Aggregation in Exponential Family Markets</b>                      Jacob Abernethy, Sindhu Kutty, Sébastien Lahaie &amp; Rahul Sami</p> <p><b>A General Volume- Parameterized Market Making Framework</b>                      Jacob Abernethy, Rafael Frongillo, Xiaolong Li &amp; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan</p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>DEC Conference</b></p> <p><b>8:50 – 9:40</b>  <b>Bargaining over Multiple Items</b>                      Hugo Sonnenschein (joint with Matthew O. Jackson &amp; Yiqing Xing)</p> <p><b>9:40 – 10:30</b>  <b>On Designing an Efficient Spot Market System: From Myerson, Selten and Harsanyi to Walras via Warehousing and Demand Revelation</b>                      Peter Hammond</p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
10:00	10:30	<p><b>Coffee Break</b>                      Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</p>		
			<p><b>10:30 – 10:50 Coffee Break</b>                      Location: Piazza &amp; Justines</p>	



Agenda

10:30	11:50	<p><b>EC - Session 6a</b>  <i>Chair: Felix Brandt</i></p> <p><b>Reasoning about Optimal Stable Matchings under Partial Information</b>  <i>Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving &amp; Kevin Leyton-Brown</i></p> <p><b>Manipulation of Stable Matchings using Minimal Blacklists</b>  <i>Yannai Gonczarowski</i></p> <p><b>Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets</b>  <i>Nick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari &amp; Yash Kanoria</i></p> <p><b>Size Versus Truthfulness in the House Allocation Problem</b>  <i>Piotr Krysta, David Manlove, Baharak Rastegari &amp; Jinshan Zhang</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>EC -Session 6b</b>  <i>Chair: Vahab Mirrokni</i></p> <p><b>The Wisdom of Smaller, Smarter Crowds</b>  <i>Daniel Goldstein, Preston McAfee &amp; Siddharth Suri</i></p> <p><b>Revealing and Incorporating Implicit Communities to Improve Recommender Systems</b>  <i>Euijin Choo, Ting Yu, Min Chi &amp; Yan Sun</i></p> <p><b>Trick or Treat: Putting Peer Prediction to the Test</b>  <i>Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen &amp; Ryan P. Adams</i></p> <p><b>Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X</b>  <i>Bo Cowgill &amp; Eric Zitzewitz</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>10:50 – 11:40</b></p> <p><b>Efficient Bilateral Trade</b>  <i>Marek Pycia (joint with Rod Garratt)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
12:00	12:30	<p><b>ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award Talk</b>  <i>By Balasubramanian Sivan</i></p> <p><i>Chair: Eva Tardos</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>		<p><b>11:40 – 12:30</b></p> <p><b>"Optimal Two-stage Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition"</b>  <i>Lixin Ye (joint with Jingfeng Lu)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
12:30	2:10	<p><b>Lunch</b>  <i>(at local restaurants, on your own)</i></p>		<p><b>12:30-2:10 Lunch</b>  <i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>
2:10	3:10	<p><b>EC - Session 7a</b>  <i>Chair: Craig Boutilier</i></p> <p><b>Incentivized Optimal Advert Assignment via Utility Decomposition</b>  <i>Frank Kelly, Peter Key &amp; Neil Walton</i></p> <p><b>Strategyproof Allocation of Discrete Jobs on Multiple Machines</b>  <i>Eric Friedman, Ali Ghodsi &amp; Christos-Alexandros Psomas</i></p> <p><b>Time-Inconsistent Planning: A Computational Problem in Behavioral Economics</b>  <i>Jon Kleinberg &amp; Sigal Oren</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>EC - Session 7b</b>  <i>Chair: Jacob Abernethy</i></p> <p><b>Towards A Better Measure of Business Proximity: Topic Modeling for Analyzing M&amp;As</b>  <i>Zhan Shi, Gene Moo Lee &amp; Andrew B. Whinston</i></p> <p><b>Why Marketplace Experimentation is Harder than it Seems: The Role of Test-Control Interference</b>  <i>Dominic Coey &amp; Thomas Blake</i></p> <p><b>Whole Page Optimization: How Page Elements Interact with the Position Auction</b>  <i>Pavel Metrikov, Fernando Diaz, Sébastien Lahaie &amp; Justin Rao</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>2:10 – 3:00</b></p> <p><b>Does Team Competition Increase Pro-Social Lending? Evidence from Online Microfinance</b>  <i>Yan Chen (joint with Roy Chen, Yang Liu &amp; Qiaozhu Mei)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>

**Agenda**

3:20	4:20	<p><b>EC - Session 8a</b>  <i>Chair: Ron Lavi</i></p> <p><b>Local Computation Mechanism Design</b>  <i>Shai Vardi, Avinatan Hassidim &amp; Yishay Mansour</i></p> <p><b>Reallocation Mechanisms</b>  <i>Liad Blumrosen &amp; Shahar Dobzinski</i></p> <p><b>Knightian Self Uncertainty in the VCG Mechanism for Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions</b>  <i>Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali &amp; Zeyuan Allen Zhu</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>EC - Session 8b</b>  <i>Chair: Michael Wellman</i></p> <p><b>Extensive-Form Game Abstraction With Bounds</b>  <i>Christian Kroer &amp; Tuomas Sandholm</i></p> <p><b>Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria</b>  <i>Paul Goldberg &amp; Aaron Roth</i></p> <p><b>Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries</b>  <i>John Fearnley &amp; Rahul Savani</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>	<p><b>3:00 – 3:50</b></p> <p><b>Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems</b>  <i>Peter Biro (joint with Ian McBride)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>	
4:20	4:40	<p><b>Coffee Break</b>  <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>		<p><b>3:50 – 4:10 Coffee Break</b>  <i>Location: Piazza &amp; Justines</i></p>	
4:40	5:40	<p><b>EC - Session 9</b>  <i>Chair: Tuomas Sandholm</i></p> <p><b>Fair Enough: Guaranteeing Approximate Maximin Shares</b>  <i>Ariel Procaccia &amp; Junxing Wang</i></p> <p><b>Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue</b>  <i>Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy &amp; Sam Taggart</i></p> <p><b>Mechanism Design for Data Science</b>  <i>Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline &amp; Denis Nekipelov</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>	<p><b>4:10 – 5:00</b></p> <p><b>Fairness in Tiebreak Mechanisms: A Market Design Approach for Penalty Shootouts</b>  <i>Utku Unver (joint with Nejat Anbarci &amp; Ching-Jen Sun)</i></p> <p><i>Location: Reception Room</i></p>		
6:00	9:00	<p><b>EC Banquet hosted by Google</b>  <i>(Included in EC Registration)</i>  <i>Busses will leave the Sheraton Hotel at 6:00 pm</i></p> <p><i>Location: Google</i></p>			

Agenda

Start	End		
<b>Thursday, June 12, 2014 (Sheraton Palo Alto Hotel)</b>			
7:40	8:40	<b>Light Breakfast</b> <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i>	
8:40	9:40	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 10a</b> <i>Chair: Angelina Vidali</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Routing and Staffing when Servers are Strategic</b> <i>Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Sherwin Doroudi, Amy Ward &amp; Adam Wierman</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising</b> <i>MohammadHossein Bateni, Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni &amp; Sam Chiu-wai Wong</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Cournot Competition in Networked Markets</b> <i>Kostas Bimpikis, Ehsani Shayan &amp; Rahmi Ilkilic</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 10b</b> <i>Chair: Felix Fischer</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Network Formation Games with Heterogeneous Players and the Internet Structure</b> <i>Eli Meirom, Shie Mannor &amp; Ariel Orda</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Simple Approximate Equilibria in Large Games</b> <i>Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman &amp; Ron Peretz</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games</b> <i>Ryan Rogers &amp; Aaron Roth</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>
9:40	10:10	<b>Coffee Break</b> <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i>	
10:10	11:10	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 11a</b> <i>Chair: Robert Kleinberg</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism</b> <i>Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan &amp; Renato Paes Leme</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence</b> <i>John Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima &amp; Scott Kominers</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Optimal Impartial Selection</b> <i>Felix Fischer &amp; Max Klimm</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 11b</b> <i>Chair: Arpita Ghosh</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Long-run Learning in Games of Cooperation</b> <i>Winter Mason, Siddharth Suri &amp; Duncan Watts</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Strategic Information Platforms - Selective Disclosure and The Price of "Free"</b> <i>Chen Hajaj &amp; David Sarne</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Level-0 Meta-Models for Predicting Human Behavior in Games</b> <i>James Wright &amp; Kevin Leyton-Brown</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>
11:20	12:20	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Keynote Talk 2</b> <i>Chair: Vincent Conitzer</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Pragmatic Algorithmic Game Theory</b> <i>Kevin Leyton-Brown</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>	
12:20	2:10	<b>Lunch</b> <i>(at local restaurants, on your own)</i>	
2:10	3:30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC -Session 12a</b> <i>Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria</b> <i>Paul Duetting, Thomas Kesselheim &amp; Eva Tardos</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>EC - Session 12b</b> <i>Chair: Preston McAfee</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Buying Private Data without Verification</b> <i>Arpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett, Aaron Roth &amp; Grant Schoenebeck</i></p>

**Agenda**

		<p><b>Simultaneous Bayesian Auctions and Computational Complexity</b>  <i>Yang Cai &amp; Christos Papadimitriou</i></p> <p><b>Contract Complexity</b>  <i>Moshe Babaioff &amp; Eyal Winter</i></p> <p><b>Optimal Contest Design for Simple Agents</b>  <i>Arpita Ghosh &amp; Robert Kleinberg</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress</i></p>	<p><b>Differentially Private and Incentive Compatible Recommendation System for Adoption of Network Goods</b>  <i>Kevin He &amp; Xiaosheng Mu</i></p> <p><b>A Dynamic Model of Certification and Reputation</b>  <i>Simpson Zhang &amp; Mihaela van der Schaar</i></p> <p><b>The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice</b>  <i>Rachel Cummings, Federico Echenique &amp; Adam Wierman</i></p> <p><i>Location: Sequoia &amp; Oak</i></p>
3:30	4:00	<p><b>Coffee Break</b>  <i>Location: Piazza Courtyard &amp; Justines</i></p>	
4:00	5:00	<p><b>EC - Session 13</b>  <i>Chair: Nicole Immorlica</i></p> <p><b>Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem</b>  <i>Alexander Peysakhovich &amp; Drew Fudenberg</i></p> <p><b>Dynamically Eliciting Unobservable Information</b>  <i>Christopher Chambers &amp; Nicolas Lambert</i></p> <p><b>Bandits with Concave Rewards and Convex Knapsacks</b>  <i>Shipra Agrawal &amp; Nikhil R. Devanur</i></p> <p><i>Location: Cypress Ballroom</i></p>	
5:00		<p><b>End of Program</b>  <b>See you at EC 2015!</b></p>	