Please note: the following schedule is tentative and subject to change.

Tuesday, June 27, 2017
6:00 - 8:00 PM
Reception and Poster Session
 
Wednesday, June 28, 2017
8:00 - 9:00 AM
Breakfast
9:00 - 9:15 AM
Opening Remarks
9:15 - 10:15 AM
Plenary Session

Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania)
Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

10:15 - 10:40 AM
Coffee
10:40 - 12:00 PM

Session 1a
Static Revenue Maximization 1

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao (Tsinghua University)

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service
Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: the General Case
Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton)

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Nima Haghpanah (Penn State University); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (University of California, Berkeley)

Session 1b
Peer Predictions

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering
Rupert Freeman (Duke University); David M. Pennock (Microsoft Research); Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Microsoft Research)

Forecast Aggregation
Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion)

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction
Yang Liu (Harvard University); Yiling Chen (Harvard University)

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users
Arpit Agarwal (University of Pennsylvania); Debmalya Mandal (Harvard University); David C. Parkes (Harvard University); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University)

12:00 - 1:30 PM
Lunch
1:10 - 2:30 PM
Business Meeting
2:40 - 4:00 PM

Session 2a
Matching 1

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm
Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania); Sanjeev Khanna (University of Pennsylvania); Yang Li (University of Pennsylvania)

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions
Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Daniela Saban (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

Matching while Learning
Ramesh Johari (Stanford University); Vijay Kamble (Stanford University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia University)

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match
Avinatan Hassidim (Bar-Ilan University); Assaf Romm (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Ran I. Shorrer (Penn State University)

Session 2b
Predictions and Queries

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games
Noam Nisan (Hebrew University and Microsoft Research); Gali Noti (Hebrew University)

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete? An Application to Human Perception of Randomness
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Annie Liang (Microsoft Research); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University)

Comparison-based Choices
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University); Johan Ugander (Stanford University)

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction
Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania)

4:00 - 4:30 PM
Coffee
4:30 - 5:50 PM

Session 3a
Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Francisco Castro (Columbia University); Gabriel Weintraub (Stanford University and AppNexus)

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
Santiago R. Balseiro (Duke University); Vahab Mirrokni (Google Research); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research)

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers
Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research); Brendan Lucier (Microsoft Research); Emmanouil Pountourakis (University of Texas, Austin); Sam Taggart (Northwestern University)

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers
José Correa (Universidad de Chile); Patricio Foncea (Universidad de Chile); Ruben Hoeksma (Universidad de Chile); Tim Oosterwijk (Maastricht University); Tjark Vredeveld (Maastricht University)

Session 3b
Economic Equilibrium

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation
Frank Cheng (University of Michigan); Michael P. Wellman (University of Michigan)

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets
Erik Brinkman (University of Michigan); Michael P. Wellman (University of Michigan)

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation
Pieter Kleer (CWI); Guido Schaefer (CWI and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase
Juan Camilo Castillo (Stanford University); Dan Knoepfle (Uber Technologies); Glen Weyl (Microsoft Research and Yale University)

Thursday, June 29, 2017
8:00 - 9:00 AM
Breakfast
9:00 - 10:20 PM

Session 4a
Matching 2

Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Yuval Emek (Technion); Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University); Boaz Patt-Shamir (Tel Aviv University); Ron Peretz (Bar-Ilan University); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion)

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
Saeed Alaei (Google); Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University); Mark Braverman (Princeton University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia University); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research)

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks
Ravi Jagadeesan (Harvard University)

Session 4b
Voting

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions
Gerdus Benade (Carnegie Mellon University); Anson Kahng (Carnegie Mellon University); Ariel D. Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University)

Voting in the Limelight
Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University)

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules
Ashish Goel (Stanford University); Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy (Stanford University); Kamesh Munagala (Duke University)

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates
Yu Cheng (University of Southern California); Shaddin Dughmi (University of Southern California); David Kempe (University of Southern California)

10:20 - 10:50 AM
Coffee
10:50 - 12:10 PM

Session 5a
Static Revenue Maximization 2

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden (Tel-Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University); Ophir Friedler (Tel-Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing
Elliot Anshelevich (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Shreyas Sekar (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden (Tel-Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University); Ophir Friedler (Tel-Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments
Gerardo Berbeglia (Melbourne Business School, The University of Melbourne); Gwenaël Joret (Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Session 5b
Information Games

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers
David Lingenbrink (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University)

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks
Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University)

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
Shaddin Dughmi (University of Southern California); Haifeng Xu (University of Southern California)

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents
Sampath Kannan (University of Pennsylvania); Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania); Jamie Morgenstern (University of Pennsylvania); Mallesh Pai (Rice University); Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)

12:10 - 1:40 PM
Lunch
1:40 - 2:40 PM
Best paper and Best Dissertation presentations

Combinatorial Cost Sharing
Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann Institute of Science); Shahar Ovadia (Weizmann Institute of Science)

SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation by Peng Shi

2:50 - 3:50 PM

Session 6a
Scheduling

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University); Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University); Alan Roytman (University of Copenhagen)

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling
Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin - Madison); Nikhil R. Devanur (MSR); Janardhan Kulkarni (MSR); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University)

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty
Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Alkmini Sgouritsa (University of Liverpool)

Session 6b
Fair Division 1

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
Richard Cole (New York University); Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Kamal Jain (Faira); Tung Mai (Georgia Institute of Technology); Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology); Sadra Yazdanbod (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division
Eric Friedman (ICSI and University of California, Berkeley); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (University of California, Berkeley); Shai Vardi (California Institute of Technology)

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting
Ariel D. Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University); Junxing Wang (Carnegie Mellon University)

3:50 - 4:20 PM
Coffee
4:20 - 5:40 PM

Session 7a
Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning
Sebastien Bubeck (Microsoft Research); Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Zhiyi Huang (The University of Hong Kong); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University)

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers
Yiwei Chen (Singapore University of Technology and Design); Cong Shi (University of Michigan)

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework
Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Daniel Freund (Cornell Unviersity); Thodoris Lykouris (Cornell University)

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization
Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research); Jonathan Ullman (Northeastern University); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)

Session 7b
Experiments

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?
Filippas Apostolos (New York University, Stern School of Business); John Joseph Horton (New York University, Stern School of Business)

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews
Shrabastee Banerjee (Questrom School of Business, Boston University); Chris Dellarocas (Questrom School of Business, Boston University); Georgios Zervas (Questrom School of Business, Boston University)

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem
Daniel G. Goldstein (Microsoft Reserach); R. Preston McAfee (Microsoft Corporation); Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research); James R. Wright (Microsoft Research)

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness
Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University); Matthew Jackson; (Stanford University)

6:00 - 9:00 PM
Conference Dinner
Friday, June 30, 2017
8:00 - 9:00 AM
Breakfast
9:00 - 10:00 AM

Session 8a
Mechanism Design: General

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Georgios Birmpas (Athens University of Economics and Business); Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business)

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies
Artur Gorokh (Cornell University); Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University)

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
Sophie Bade (Royal Holloway, University of London & Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Yannai A. Gonczarowski (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & Microsoft Research)

Session 8b
Decision Making and Learning

Planning with Multiple Biases
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Manish Raghavan (Cornell University)

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making
Ilan Lobel (New York University); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research NY); Adrian Vladu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments
Ger Yang (University of Texas at Austin); Georgios Piliouras (Singapore University of Technology and Design); David Basanta (H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute)

10:00 - 10:20 AM
Coffee
10:20 - 11:20 PM

Session 9a
Auctions: Equilibrium

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
Johannes Brustle (McGill University); Yang Cai (McGill University); Fa Wu (McGill University and Zhejiang University); Mingfei Zhao (Mcgill University)

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi (LUISS); Paul W. Goldberg (University of Oxford); Bart de Keijzer (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI)); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University); Stefano Turchetta (KPMG Italy and University of Oxford)

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
Santiago R. Balseiro (Duke University); Yonatan Gur (Stanford University)

Session 9b
Fair Division 2

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
Simina Branzei (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Ruta Mehta (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Fair Public Decision Making
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University); Rupert Freeman (Duke University); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University)

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division
Siddharth Barman (Indian Institute of Science); Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy (Chennai Mathematical Institute)

11:30 - 12:30 AM
Plenary Session

Jennifer Chayes (Microsoft Research)
Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

12:30 - 2:00 PM
Lunch
2:00 - 3:20 PM

Session 10a
Matching 3

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
John William Hatfield (University of Texas at Austin); Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University); Alexander Westkamp (University of Cologne)

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
Thanh Nguyen (Purdue University); Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
Benjamin N. Roth (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Ran I. Shorrer (The ennsylvania State University)

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing
Nick Arnosti (Columbia University); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research)

Session 10b
Strategic Games

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players
Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion)

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games
Christian Kroer (Carnegie Mellon University); Kevin Waugh (University of Alberta); Fatma Kilinc-Karzan (Carnegie Mellon University); Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic
Zhigang Cao (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Bo Chen (University of Warwick); Xujin Chen (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Changjun Wang (Beijing University of Technology)

A Polynomial Time Algorithm For Spatio-Temporal Security Games
Soheil Behnezhad (University of Maryland); Mahsa Derakhshan (University of Maryland); MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi (University of Maryland); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research)

3:20 - 3:45 PM
Coffee
3:45 - 4:30 PM

ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award Talk