EC '17- Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: Plenary session

Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

SESSION: 1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

SESSION: 1b: Peer Predictions

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering

Forecast Aggregation

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users

SESSION: 2a: Matching 1

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions

Matching while Learning

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

SESSION: 2b: Predictions and Queries

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness

Comparison-based Choices

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction

SESSION: 3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers

SESSION: 3b: Economic Equilibrium

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase

SESSION: 4a: Matching 2

Stable Secretaries

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks

SESSION: 4b: Voting

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions

Voting in the Limelight

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

SESSION: 5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments

SESSION: 5b: Information Games

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations

Combinatorial Cost Sharing

SESSION: 6a: Scheduling

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty

SESSION: 6b: Fair Division 1

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting

SESSION: 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization

SESSION: 7b: Experiments

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness

SESSION: 8a: Mechanism Design -- General

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness

SESSION: 8b: Decision Making and Learning

Planning with Multiple Biases

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments

SESSION: 9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

SESSION: 9b: Fair Division 2

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

Fair Public Decision Making

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division

SESSION: Plenary session

Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

SESSION: 10a: Matching 3

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing

SESSION: 10b: Strategic Games

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games