Workshops and Tutorial schedule has been announced.

The list of accepted papers has been announced.

The EC program is also available in pdf format here.

Monday, June 18, 2018
6:00 - 8:00 PM

Reception in Gates Hall

Tuesday, June 19, 2018
8:15 - 9:00 AM
Breakfast Breakfast
9:00 - 9:15 AM
Opening Plenary
9:15 - 10:15 AM

Invited talk: Sendhil Mullainathan
Algorithmic Fairness and the Social Welfare Function

10:15 - 10:45 AM
Coffee Coffee
10:45 - 11:45 AM

The effect of dynamic pricing on Uber's driver-partners
Alice Lu, Peter Frazier and Oren Kislev

The sharing economy and housing affordability: Evidence from Airbnb
Barron, Edward Kung and Davide Proserpio

Advertising strategy in the presence of reviews: an empirical analysis
Brett Hollenbeck, Sridhar Moorthy and Davide Proserpio

Strategyproof linear regression in high dimensions
Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah

Optimal data acquisition for statistical estimation
Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Juba Ziani

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition
Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis

11:45 - 11:55 AM
10 minute break 10 minute break
11:55 AM - 12:55 PM

Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron

Social choice with non-quasi linear utilities
Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir and David C. Parkes

Optimal pricing and Introduction timing of new virtual machines
Ian Kash, Peter Key and Spyros Zoumpoulis

Learnability and models of decision making under uncertainty
Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique

Strategic classification from revealed preferences
Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner and Zhiwei Steven Wu

Overabundant information and learning traps
Annie Liang and Xiaosheng Mu

12:55 - 2:25 PM
2:25 - 3:45 PM

Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski and Sigal Oren

The Combinatorial clock auction: the effects of strategic behaviour and the price increment rule on social welfare
Max Dupre La Tour and Adrian Vetta

Designing core-selecting payment rules: A computational search approach
Benjamin Lubin, Benedikt Bunz and Sven Seuken

Fast core pricing for rich advertising auctions
Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier and Rad Niazadeh

Computational complexity of proper equilibrium
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and Troels Bjerre Lund

Computing a subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential matching game
Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi and Yu Yokoi

The Big Match with a clock and a bit of memory
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen and Abraham Neyman

Incremental strategy generation for Stackelberg equilibria in extensive-form Games
Jakub Cerny, Branislav Bosansky and Christopher Kiekintveld

3:45 - 4:15 PM
Coffee Coffee
4:15 - 5:35 PM

Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism design
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo

Robust repeated auctions under heterogeneous buyer behavior
Shipra Agrawal, Constantinos Daskalakis, Vahab Mirrokni and Balasubramanian Sivan

A general theory of sample complexity for multi-item profit maximization
Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm and Ellen Vitercik

Are two (samples) really better than one? On the non-asymptotic performance of empirical revenue maximization
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour and Shay Moran

Water from two rocks: maximizing the mutual information
Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck

Eliciting expertise without verification
Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck

The one-shot crowdfunding game.
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky

Dancing pigs or externalities? Measuring the rationality of security decisions
Elissa M. Redmiles, Michelle L. Mazurek and John P. Dickerson

6:00 PM

Invited Talk: Vitalik Buterin

Wednesday, June 20, 2018
8:15 - 9:00 AM
Breakfast Breakfast
9:00 - 10:00 AM

Invited talk: Eric Budish
Will the Market Fix the Market?

10:00 - 10:30 AM
Coffee Coffee
10:30 - 11:30 AM

Almost optimal stochastic weighted matching with few queries
Soheil Behnezhad and Nima Reyhani

First-choice maximal and first-choice stable school choice mechanisms
Umut Dur, Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken

Stable marriage with multi-modal preferences
Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier and Piotr Skowron

Delegated search approximates efficient search
Jon Kleinberg and Robert Kleinberg

Prophet secretary: surpassing the 1-1/e barrier
Yossi Azar, Ashish Chiplunkar and Haim Kaplan

Prophets and secretaries with overbooking
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama

11:30 - 11:40 AM
10 minute break 10 minute break
11:40 AM - 12:30 PM
Test of Time award Plenary
12:30 - 2:00 PM
2:00 - 3:30 PM
Business meeting Business meeting
3:30 - 4.30 PM

Multiplicative weights update in zero-sum games
James Bailey and Georgios Piliouras

Cycles in zero sum differential games and biological diversity
Tung Mai, Milena Mihail, Ioannis Panageas, Vijay Vazirani, Will Ratcliff and Peter Yunker

Dynamics of distributed updating in Fisher markets
Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole and Yixin Tao

Interdependent values without single-crossing
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner

Credible mechanisms
Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li

The best of both worlds: asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains-from-trade
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Mingfei Zhao

11:30 - 11:40 AM
Coffee Coffee
5:00 - 6:00 PM

Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators
Jose Correa, Cristobal Guzman, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova and Marc Schroder

Polynomial time equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
Costas Busch and Rajgopal Kannan

Spatio-temporal security games beyond one dimension
Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Saeed Seddighin

Optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan and Aviad Rubinstein

Revenue loss in shrinking markets
Shahar Dobzinski and Nitzan Uziely

Competition-efficient approximation schemes
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein

6:30 PM
Conference Dinner
Thursday, June 21, 2018
8:15 - 9:00 AM
Breakfast Breakfast
9:00 - 10:00 AM
Sibling conferences Plenary
10:00 - 10:30 AM
Coffee Coffee
10:30 - 11:50 AM

Glen Weyl. A/B testing
Eduardo Azevedo, Alex Deng, Jose Montiel Olea, Justin Rao and E

A personalized BDM mechanism for efficient market intervention experiments
Imanol Arrieta Ibarra and Johan Ugander

The costs of entering through tying: experimental evidence
Hyunjin Kim and Michael Luca

Reputation in the long-run
Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton and Joseph Golden

The price of prior dependence in auctions
Pingzhong Tang and Yulong Zeng

Prior-independent optimal auctions
Omar Besbes and Amine Allouah

Learning to bid without knowing your value
Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata and Vasilis Syrgkanis

Selling to a no-regret buyer
Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider and S. Matthew Weinberg

11:50 AM - 12:00 PM
10 minutes break 10 minutes break
12:00 - 12:40 PM
Dissertation Award Plenary
12:40 - 2:10 PM
2:10 - 3:30 PM

Fair allocation of indivisible goods: improvements and Generalizations
Masood Seddighin, Mohammad Ghodsi, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin and Hadi Yami

Finding fair and efficient allocations
Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy and Rohit Vaish

Fair allocation of indivisible public goods
Brandon Fain, Kamesh Munagala and Nisarg Shah

How to make envy vanish over time
Gerdus Benade, Aleksandr Kazachkov, Ariel Procaccia and Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Redistribution through markets
Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers and Mohammad Akbarpour

Optimal commissions and subscriptions in networked markets
John Birge, Ozan Candogan, Hongfan Chen and Daniela Saban

Trading networks with frictions
Tamas Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Janko and Alexander Teytelboym

Chain stability in trading networks
John Hatfield, Scott Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp

3:30 - 4:00 PM
Coffee Coffee
4:00 - 5:20 PM

Naive Bayesian learning in social networks
Jerry Anunrojwong and Nat Sothanaphan

Bayesian social learning in a dynamic environment
Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub and Nir Hak

Social learning equilibria
Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller Frank, Allan Sly and Omer Tamuz

Diffusion, seeding, and the value of network information
Mohammad Akbarpour, Suraj Malladi and Amin Saberi

On the construction of substitutes
Eric Balkanski and Renato Paes Leme

Frugal auction design for set systems: vertex cover and knapsack
Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammadreza Khani and Saeed Seddighin

Matching auctions for search and native ads
Ruggiero Cavallo, Maxim Sviridenko and Christopher Wilkens

The efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget-constrained users
Ioannis Caragiannis and Alexandros Voudouris

5:20 PM
Main EC program ends