

# Editor's Introduction

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This issue of SIGEcom Exchanges has two articles coming from the First Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good, which took place at EC in 2017. A survey by Scott Kominers is based on the keynote he gave there, which overviews recent examples of market design in the realm of social good improvement. The workshop's organizers, Rediet Abebe and Kira Goldner, contributed a report that summarizes each keynote and contributed talk at the workshop.

We then have four research letters, demonstrating some very exciting progress on various fronts at the intersection between economics and computation. Among these, the letter by Bergemann, Brooks and Morris summarizes a characterization of equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction with very general common-prior information structures; the one by Dobzinski and Ovadia describes their work on combinatorial cost sharing that won the best paper award at EC 2017; the one by Gravin and Lu explains the framework of correlation-robust mechanism design, first proposed by Carroll and then further developed by the two authors of the letter; and finally the one by Papadimitriou and Piliouras overviews a new solution concept for game theory that is based on game dynamics, using tools from dynamical systems and topology.

I'd like to warmly thank all the contributors, and I hope you, the readers, would enjoy this issue.

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