Tutorial: Auctions with Correlated and Interdependent Values

Presenters: Piotr Dworczak, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Brendan Lucier

In this tutorial we will cover classic models and results related to auctions for buyers with interdependent and/or correlated values.  The content is targeted at graduate students and advanced undergrads, with significant overlap with a first-year economics graduate class on auction design.

The first half of the tutorial will introduce common-value auctions, the interdependent value setting, analysis of English (ascending) auctions, and the optimal mechanism of Cremer and McLean [1985, 1988].  The second part will explore connections to robust auction design, including interim vs ex post solution concepts, the lookahead auction of Ronen [2001], and the single-crossing condition for interdependent values.

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