Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: Invited talk

Algorithmic Fairness and the Social Welfare Function

• Sendhil Mullainathan

SESSION: 1a: Sharing Economy

Surge Pricing Moves Uber's Driver-Partners

• Alice Lu
• Peter I. Frazier
• Oren Kislev

The Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb

• Kyle Barron
• Edward Kung
• Davide Proserpio

Advertising Strategy in the Presence of Reviews: An Empirical Analysis

• Brett Hollenbeck
• Sridhar Moorthy
• Davide Proserpio

SESSION: 1b: Information Acquisition I

Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions

• Yiling Chen
• Chara Podimata
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Nisarg Shah

Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation

• Yiling Chen
• Nicole Immorlica
• Brendan Lucier
• Vasilis Syrgkanis
• Juba Ziani

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition

• Annie Liang
• Xiaosheng Mu
• Vasilis Syrgkanis

SESSION: 2a: Social Choice and Pricing

Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules

• Martin Lackner
• Piotr Skowron

Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities

• Hongyao Ma
• Reshef Meir
• David C. Parkes

Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of New Virtual Machines

• Ian A. Kash
• Peter B. Key
• Spyros I. Zoumpoulis

SESSION: 2b: Information Acquisition II

Learnability and Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty

• Pathikrit Basu
• Federico Echenique

Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences

• Jinshuo Dong
• Aaron Roth
• Zachary Schutzman
• Bo Waggoner
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

Overabundant Information and Learning Traps

• Annie Liang
• Xiaosheng Mu

SESSION: 3a: Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect

• Moshe Babaioff
• Shahar Dobzinski
• Sigal Oren

The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social Welfare

• Max Dupre la Tour
• Adrian Vetta

Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach

• Benedikt Bünz
• Benjamin Lubin
• Sven Seuken

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

• Jason Hartline
• Nicole Immorlica
• Mohammad Reza Khani
• Brendan Lucier
• Rad Niazadeh

SESSION: 3b: Equilibrium Computation

Computational Complexity of Proper Equilibrium

• Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
• Troels Bjerre Lund

Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game

• Yasushi Kawase
• Yutaro Yamaguchi
• Yu Yokoi

The Big Match with a Clock and a Bit of Memory

• Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
• Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen
• Abraham Neyman

Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games

• Jakub Černý
• Branislav Boýanský
• Christopher Kiekintveld

SESSION: 4a: Mechanism Design I

Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

• Vahab Mirrokni
• Renato Paes Leme
• Pingzhong Tang
• Song Zuo

Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior

• Shipra Agrawal
• Constantinos Daskalakis
• Vahab S. Mirrokni
• Balasubramanian Sivan

A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization

• Maria-Florina Balcan
• Tuomas Sandholm
• Ellen Vitercik

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?

• Moshe Babaioff
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Yishay Mansour
• Shay Moran

SESSION: 4b: Information Acquisition and Rationality

Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual Information

• Yuqing Kong
• Grant Schoenebeck

Eliciting Expertise without Verification

• Yuqing Kong
• Grant Schoenebeck

The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game.

• Itai Arieli
• Moran Koren
• Rann Smorodinsky

Dancing Pigs or Externalities?: Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions

• Elissa M. Redmiles
• Michelle L. Mazurek
• John P. Dickerson

SESSION: Invited Talk

Keynote Talk: High-Frequency Trading and the Design of Financial Exchanges: Will the Market Fix the Market?

• Eric Budish

SESSION: 5a: Matching

Almost Optimal Stochastic Weighted Matching with Few Queries

• Soheil Behnezhad
• Nima Reyhani

First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms

• Umut Dur
• Timo Mennle
• Sven Seuken

Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences

• Jiehua Chen
• Rolf Niedermeier
• Piotr Skowron

SESSION: 5b: Prophet Inequalities

Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search

• Jon Kleinberg
• Robert Kleinberg

Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e Barrier

• Yossi Azar
• Ashish Chiplunkar
• Haim Kaplan

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking

• Tomer Ezra
• Michal Feldman
• Ilan Nehama

SESSION: 6a: Equilibrium Dynamics

Multiplicative Weights Update in Zero-Sum Games

• James P. Bailey
• Georgios Piliouras

Cycles in Zero-Sum Differential Games and Biological Diversity

• Tung Mai
• Milena Mihail
• Ioannis Panageas
• Will Ratcliff
• Vijay Vazirani
• Peter Yunker

Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher Markets

• Yun Kuen Cheung
• Richard Cole
• Yixin Tao

SESSION: 6b: Mechanism Design II

Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing

• Alon Eden
• Michal Feldman
• Amos Fiat
• Kira Goldner

Credible Mechanisms

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Shengwu Li

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade

• Moshe Babaioff
• Yang Cai
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Mingfei Zhao

SESSION: 7a: Equilibrium Analysis

Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

• José Correa
• Cristóbal Guzmán
• Thanasis Lianeas
• Evdokia Nikolova
• Marc Schröder

Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games

• Costas Busch
• Rajgopal Kannan

Spatio-Temporal Games Beyond One Dimension

• Soheil Behnezhad
• Mahsa Derakhshan
• Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
• Saeed Seddighin

SESSION: 7b: Mechanism Design III

Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer

• Moshe Babaioff
• Noam Nisan
• Aviad Rubinstein

Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets

• Shahar Dobzinski
• Nitzan Uziely

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition

• Michal Feldman
• Ophir Friedler
• Aviad Rubinstein

SESSION: 8a: Market Experiments

The A/B Testing Problem

• Eduardo M. Azevedo
• Alex Deng
• Jose Luis Montiel Olea
• Justin Rao
• E. Glen Weyl

A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments

• Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra
• Johan Ugander

The Costs of Entering through Tying: Experimental Evidence

• Hyunjin Kim
• Michael Luca

Reputation Inflation

• Apostolos Filippas
• John Joseph Horton
• Joseph Golden

SESSION: 8b: Mechanism Design IV

The Price of Prior Dependence in Auctions

• Pingzhong Tang
• Yulong Zeng

Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions

• Amine Allouah
• Omar Besbes

Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Value

• Zhe Feng
• Chara Podimata
• Vasilis Syrgkanis

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer

• Mark Braverman
• Jieming Mao
• Jon Schneider
• Matt Weinberg

SESSION: 9a: Fair Allocation

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations

• Mohammad Ghodsi
• Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
• Masoud Seddighin
• Saeed Seddighin
• Hadi Yami

Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations

• Siddharth Barman
• Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy
• Rohit Vaish

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods

• Brandon Fain
• Kamesh Munagala
• Nisarg Shah

How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time

• Gerdus Benade
• Aleksandr M. Kazachkov
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas

SESSION: 9b: Markets and Networks

Redistribution through Markets

• Piotr Dworczak
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Mohammad Akbarpour

Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked Markets

• John Birge
• Ozan Candogan
• Hongfan Chen
• Daniela Saban

Trading Networks with Frictions

• Tamás Fleiner
• Ravi Jagadeesan
• Zsuzsanna Jankó
• Alexander Teytelboym

Chain Stability in Trading Networks

• John William Hatfield
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Alexandru Nichifor
• Michael Ostrovsky
• Alexander Westkamp

SESSION: 10a: Learning and Social Networks

Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks

• Jerry Anunrojwong
• Nat Sothanaphan

Bayesian Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment

• Krishna Dasaratha
• Benjamin Golub
• Nir Hak

Social Learning Equilibria

• Elchanan Mossel
• Manuel Mueller-Frank
• Allan Sly
• Omer Tamuz

Diffusion, Seeding, and the Value of Network Information

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Suraj Malladi
• Amin Saberi

SESSION: 10b: Mechanism Design V

On the Construction of Substitutes

• Eric Balkanski
• Renato Paes Leme

Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack

• Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
• Mohammad Reza Khani
• Saeed Seddighin

Matching Auctions for Search and Native Ads

• Ruggiero Cavallo
• Maxim Sviridenko
• Christopher A. Wilkens

The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

• Ioannis Caragiannis
• Alexandros A. Voudouris