Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

Keynote talks

Cascading behavior in social and economic networks

• Jon Kleinberg

Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from here

• Alvin E. Roth

Technical presentations

Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information

• Ittai Abraham
• Susan Athey
• Moshe Babaioff
• Michael Grubb

Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks

• Noga Alon
• Yishay Mansour
• Moshe Tenneholtz

Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools

• Itai Ashlagi
• Patrick Jaillet
• Vahideh H. Manshadi

Unbalanced random matching markets

• Itai Ashlagi
• Yashodhan Kanoria
• Jacob Leshno

Super-efficient rational proofs

• Pablo Daniel Azar
• Silvio Micali

Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementarities

• Eduardo M. Azevedo
• John W. Hatfield

Bertrand networks

• Moshe Babaioff
• Brendan Lucier
• Noam Nisan

Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation

• Moshe Babaioff
• Robert Kleinberg
• Aleksandrs Slivkins

Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: approximations and design

• Santiago R. Balseiro
• Omar Besbes
• Gabriel Y. Weintraub

The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games

• Siddharth Barman
• Umang Bhaskar
• Federico Echenique
• Adam Wierman

Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method

• Anand Bhalgat
• Sreenivas Gollapudi
• Kamesh Munagala

Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders

• Sayan Bhattacharya
• Elias Koutsoupias
• Janardhan Kulkarni
• Stefano Leonardi
• Tim Roughgarden
• Xiaoming Xu

A markov chain approximation to choice modeling

• Jose Blanchet
• Guillermo Gallego
• Vineet Goyal

Optimizing password composition policies

• Jeremiah Blocki
• Saranga Komanduri
• Ariel Procaccia
• Or Sheffet

Harnessing the power of two crossmatches

• Avrim Blum
• Anupam Gupta
• Ariel Procaccia
• Ankit Sharma

Primary-market auctions for event tickets: eliminating the rents of "Bob the broker"

• Aditya Bhave
• Eric Budish

When do noisy votes reveal the truth?

• Ioannis Caragiannis
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Nisarg Shah

Robust incentives for information acquisition

• Gabriel Carroll

Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions: a game theoretic approach

• Denis Charles
• Deeparnab Chakrabarty
• Max Chickering
• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Lei Wang

Auctions with unique equilibria

• Shuchi Chawla
• Jason D. Hartline

Sybil-proof mechanisms in query incentive networks

• Wei Chen
• Yajun Wang
• Dongxiao Yu
• Li Zhang

Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy

• Yiling Chen
• Stephen Chong
• Ian A. Kash
• Tal Moran
• Salil Vadhan

On discrete preferences and coordination

• Flavio Chierichetti
• Jon Kleinberg
• Sigal Oren

Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments

• Richard Cole
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Gagan Goel

Mechanism design via optimal transport

• Constantinos Daskalakis
• Alan Deckelbaum
• Christos Tzamos

Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents

• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Bach Q. Ha
• Jason D. Hartline

Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online bidders

• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Zhiyi Huang
• Nitish Korula
• Vahab S. Mirrokni
• Qiqi Yan

Failure-aware kidney exchange

• John P. Dickerson
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Tuomas Sandholm

A combinatorial prediction market for the U.S. elections

• Miroslav Dudik
• Sebastien Lahaie
• David M. Pennock
• David Rothschild

Incentives, gamification, and game theory: an economic approach to badge design

• David Easley
• Arpita Ghosh

A network approach to public goods

• Matthew Elliott
• Benjamin Golub

Best-response dynamics out of sync: complexity and characterization

• Roee Engelberg
• Alex Fabrikant
• Michael Schapira
• David Wajc

Learning equilibria of games via payoff queries

• John Fearnley
• Martin Gairing
• Paul Goldberg
• Rahul Savani

Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply

• Uriel Feige
• Ron Lavi
• Moshe Tennenholtz

Pricing public goods for private sale

• Michal Feldman
• David Kempe
• Brendan Lucier
• Renato Paes Leme

Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions

• Dimitris Fotakis
• Christos Tzamos

Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design

• Hu Fu
• Brendan Lucier
• Balasubramanian Sivan
• Vasilis Syrgkanis

Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents

• Hu Fu
• Jason Hartline
• Darrell Hoy

What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets

• Xi Alice Gao
• Jie Zhang
• Yiling Chen

Complex contagion and the weakness of long ties in social networks: revisited

• Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh
• Roozbeh Ebrahimi
• Jie Gao

Incentivizing participation in online forums for education

• Arpita Ghosh
• Jon Kleinberg

Privacy and coordination: computing on databases with endogenous participation

• Arpita Ghosh
• Katrina Ligett

Real-time optimization of personalized assortments

• Negin Golrezaei
• Hamid Nazerzadeh
• Paat Rusmevichientong

Potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games

• Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan
• Jason R. Marden
• Adam Wierman

The menu-size complexity of auctions

• Sergiu Hart
• Noam Nisan

Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers

• Martin Hoefer
• Thomas Kesselheim
• Berthold Vöcking

A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions

• Darrell Hoy
• Kamal Jain
• Christopher A. Wilkens

Selection and influence in cultural dynamics

• David Kempe
• Jon Kleinberg
• Sigal Oren
• Aleksandrs Slivkins

Measuring the performance of large-scale combinatorial auctions: a structural estimation approach

• Sang Won Kim
• Marcelo Olivares
• Gabriel Weintraub

On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design

• Robert Kleinberg
• Yang Yuan

Designing for diversity in matching: extended abstract

• Scott Duke Kominers
• Tayfun Sönmez

Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"

• Ilan Kremer
• Yishay Mansour
• Motty Perry

Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games

• Euiwoong Lee
• Katrina Ligett

Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmacies

• Nektarios Leontiadis
• Tyler Moore
• Nicolas Christin

Down-to-the-minute effects of super bowl advertising on online search behavior

• Randall A. Lewis
• David H. Reiley

An axiomatic characterization of adaptive-liquidity market makers

• Xiaolong Li
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values

• Yunan Li

Social learning and aggregate network uncertainty

• Ilan Lobel
• Evan Sadler

Accounting for price dependencies in simultaneous sealed-bid auctions

• Brandon A. Mayer
• Eric Sodomka
• Amy Greenwald
• Michael Wellman

Loss calibrated methods for bipartite rationing: bipartite rationing

• Herve Moulin
• Jay Sethuraman

Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty

• Georgios Piliouras
• Evdokia Nikolova
• Jeff S. Shamma

Two-sided matching with partial information

• Baharak Rastegari
• Anne Condon
• Nicole Immorlica
• Kevin Leyton-Brown

Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions

• Bem Roberts
• Dinan Gunawardena
• Ian A. Kash
• Peter Key

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values

• Tim Roughgarden
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Cost function market makers for measurable spaces

• Yiling Chen
• Mike Ruberry
• Jenn Wortman Vaughan

House allocation with indifferences: a generalization and a unified view

• Daniela Saban
• Jay Sethuraman

Selection effects in online sharing: consequences for peer adoption

• Sean J. Taylor
• Eytan Bakshy
• Sinan Aral

Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction

• David R.M. Thompson
• Kevin Leyton-Brown

Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problem

• Rodrigo A. Velez

Latency arbitrage, market fragmentation, and efficiency: a two-market model

• Elaine Wah
• Michael P. Wellman

Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective

• Michal Feldman
• Yoav Wilf

Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games

• Michael Wunder
• Siddharth Suri
• Duncan J. Watts