Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: Session 1

Econometrics for Learning Agents

  • Denis Nekipelov
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Eva Tardos

Why Prices Need Algorithms

  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen

SESSION: Session 2A

Hidden Substitutes

  • John William Hatfield
  • Scott Duke Kominers

Full Substitutability in Trading Networks

  • John William Hatfield
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Alexandru Nichifor
  • Michael Ostrovsky
  • Alexander Westkamp

Near Feasible Stable Matchings

  • Thanh Nguyen
  • Rakesh Vohra

SESSION: Session 2B

Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended Abstract

  • Bary S.R. Pradelski

Making the Most of Your Samples

  • Zhiyi Huang
  • Yishay Mansour
  • Tim Roughgarden

Commitment Without Regrets: Online Learning in Stackelberg Security Games

  • Maria-Florina Balcan
  • Avrim Blum
  • Nika Haghtalab
  • Ariel D. Procaccia

SESSION: Session 3A

Online Reputation Management: Estimating the Impact of Management Responses on Consumer Reviews

  • Davide Proserpio
  • Georgios Zervas

Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages

  • Dimitriy V. Masterov
  • Uwe F. Mayer
  • Steven Tadelis

Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective

  • Nicolas Bousquet
  • Zhentao Li
  • Adrian Vetta

Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations

  • Gil Kalai
  • Reshef Meir
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

SESSION: Session 3B

Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted Advertising

  • Joseph (Seffi) Naor
  • David Wajc

Core-competitive Auctions

  • Gagan Goel
  • Mohammad Reza Khani
  • Renato Paes Leme

Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising

  • Nick Arnosti
  • Marissa Beck
  • Paul Milgrom

Online Allocation with Traffic Spikes: Mixing Adversarial and Stochastic Models

  • Hossein Esfandiari
  • Nitish Korula
  • Vahab Mirrokni

SESSION: Session 4A

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round

  • Paul Dütting
  • Thomas Kesselheim
  • Eva Tardos

Smooth Online Mechanisms: A Game-Theoretic Problem in Renewable Energy Markets

  • Thomas Kesselheim
  • Robert Kleinberg
  • Eva Tardos

Greedy Algorithms Make Efficient Mechanisms

  • Brendan Lucier
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis

Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms

  • Paul Dütting
  • Thomas Kesselheim

SESSION: Session 4B

A Non-asymptotic Approach to Analyzing Kidney Exchange Graphs

  • Yichuan Ding
  • Dongdong Ge
  • Simai He
  • Christopher Thomas Ryan

Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints

  • Masahiro Goto
  • Fuhiko Kojima
  • Ryoji Kurata
  • Akihisa Tamura
  • Makoto Yokoo

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange

  • Sampath Kannan
  • Jamie Morgenstern
  • Ryan Rogers
  • Aaron Roth

An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games

  • Assaf Romm
  • Avinatan Hassidim

SESSION: Session 5A

Designing Dynamic Contests

  • Kosts Bimpikis
  • Shayan Ehsani
  • Mohamed Mostagir

Managing Innovation in a Crowd

  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Mohamed Mostagir
  • Asuman Ozdaglar

Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design

  • Panos Toulis
  • David C. Parkes
  • Elery Pfeffer
  • James Zou

SESSION: Session 5B

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals

  • Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • David Kempe
  • Eva Tardos

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies

  • Nikhil Devanur
  • Jamie Morgenstern
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction

  • Hu Fu
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Philipp Strack

SESSION: Session 6A

Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries

  • Avrim Blum
  • John P. Dickerson
  • Nika Haghtalab
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • Ankit Sharma

Matching with Stochastic Arrival

  • Neil Thakral

Leximin Allocations in the Real World

  • David Kurokawa
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Nisarg Shah

SESSION: Session 6B

Competitive Analysis via Benchmark Decomposition

  • Ning Chen
  • Nikolai Gravin
  • Pinyan Lu

Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity

  • Aviad Rubinstein
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem

  • Parikshit Gopalan
  • Noam Nisan
  • Tim Roughgarden

SESSION: Session 7A

Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets

  • Pinyan Lu
  • Tao Xiao

Truthful Mechanism Design via Correlated Tree Rounding

  • Yossi Azar
  • Martin Hoefer
  • Idan Maor
  • Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
  • Berthold Vöcking

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Nikhil Devanur
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist

  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Alan Deckelbaum
  • Christos Tzamos

SESSION: Session 7B

Customer Referral Incentives and Social Media

  • Ilan Lobel
  • Evan Sadler
  • Lav R. Varshney

Estimating the Causal Impact of Recommendation Systems from Observational Data

  • Amit Sharma
  • Jake M. Hofman
  • Duncan J. Watts

Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful Mediators

  • Ryan Rogers
  • Aaron Roth
  • Jonathan Ullman
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish Routing

  • Evdokia Nikolova
  • Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

SESSION: Session 8A

At What Quality and What Price?: Eliciting Buyer Preferences as a Market Design Problem

  • John Joseph Horton
  • Ramesh Johari

Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated Products

  • Daniela Saban
  • Gabriel Weintraub

Team Performance with Test Scores

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Maithra Raghu

SESSION: Session 8B

Mechanisms for Fair Attribution

  • Eric Balkanski
  • Yaron Singer

Sound Auction Specification and Implementation

  • Marco B. Caminati
  • Manfred Kerber
  • Christoph Lange
  • Colin Rowat

Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration

  • Yishay Mansour
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis

SESSION: Session 9A

Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets

  • Hoda Heidari
  • Sebastien Lahaie
  • David M. Pennock
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Learning What's Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions

  • Avrim Blum
  • Yishay Mansour
  • Jamie Morgenstern

Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement

  • Jacob Abernethy
  • Yiling Chen
  • Chien-Ju Ho
  • Bo Waggoner

SESSION: Session 9B

The Impact of the Sharing Economy on the Hotel Industry: Evidence from Airbnb's Entry Into the Texas Market

  • Georgios Zervas
  • Davide Proserpio
  • John W. Byers

Pricing in Ride-Sharing Platforms: A Queueing-Theoretic Approach

  • Siddhartha Banerjee
  • Ramesh Johari
  • Carlos Riquelme

Bias and Reciprocity in Online Reviews: Evidence From Field Experiments on Airbnb

  • Andrey Fradkin
  • Elena Grewal
  • Dave Holtz
  • Matthew Pearson

SESSION: Session 10A

The Wisdom of Multiple Guesses

  • Johan Ugander
  • Ryan Drapeau
  • Carlos Guestrin

Generalized Decision Scoring Rules: Statistical, Computational, and Axiomatic Properties

  • Lirong Xia

Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory

  • David Easley
  • Arpita Ghosh

SESSION: Session 10B

Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal Disruptions

  • Eric Friedman
  • Christos-Alexandros Psomas
  • Shai Vardi

Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments

  • Yossi Azar
  • Inna Kalp-Shaltiel
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Ishai Menache
  • Joseph (Seffi) Naor
  • Jonathan Yaniv

Markets with Production: A Polynomial Time Algorithm and a Reduction to Pure Exchange

  • Jugal Garg
  • Ravi Kannan

SESSION: Session 11A

Short Lists in Centralized Clearinghouses

  • Nick Arnosti

Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match

  • Slava Bronfman
  • Noga Alon
  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Assaf Romm

Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Afshin Nikzad
  • Assaf Romm

SESSION: Session 11B

Reverse Mechanism Design

  • Nima Haghpanah
  • Jason Hartline

Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Balasubramanian Sivan

Robust Dynamic Pricing With Strategic Customers

  • Yiwei Chen
  • Vivek F. Farias

SESSION: Session 12A

Combining Traditional Marketing and Viral Marketing with Amphibious Influence Maximization

  • Wei Chen
  • Fu Li
  • Tian Lin
  • Aviad Rubinstein

Approximability of Adaptive Seeding under Knapsack Constraints

  • Aviad Rubinstein
  • Lior Seeman
  • Yaron Singer

SESSION: Session 12B

Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard

  • Siddharth Barman
  • Katrina Ligett

Faster First-Order Methods for Extensive-Form Game Solving

  • Christian Kroer
  • Kevin Waugh
  • Fatma Kilinç-Karzan
  • Tuomas Sandholm