Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: Session 1

Econometrics for Learning Agents

• Denis Nekipelov
• Vasilis Syrgkanis
• Eva Tardos

Why Prices Need Algorithms

• Tim Roughgarden
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

SESSION: Session 2A

Hidden Substitutes

• John William Hatfield
• Scott Duke Kominers

Full Substitutability in Trading Networks

• John William Hatfield
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Alexandru Nichifor
• Michael Ostrovsky
• Alexander Westkamp

Near Feasible Stable Matchings

• Thanh Nguyen
• Rakesh Vohra

SESSION: Session 2B

Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended Abstract

• Bary S.R. Pradelski

Making the Most of Your Samples

• Zhiyi Huang
• Yishay Mansour
• Tim Roughgarden

Commitment Without Regrets: Online Learning in Stackelberg Security Games

• Maria-Florina Balcan
• Avrim Blum
• Nika Haghtalab
• Ariel D. Procaccia

SESSION: Session 3A

Online Reputation Management: Estimating the Impact of Management Responses on Consumer Reviews

• Davide Proserpio
• Georgios Zervas

Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages

• Dimitriy V. Masterov
• Uwe F. Mayer
• Steven Tadelis

Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective

• Nicolas Bousquet
• Zhentao Li
• Adrian Vetta

Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations

• Gil Kalai
• Reshef Meir
• Moshe Tennenholtz

SESSION: Session 3B

Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted Advertising

• Joseph (Seffi) Naor
• David Wajc

Core-competitive Auctions

• Gagan Goel
• Mohammad Reza Khani
• Renato Paes Leme

Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising

• Nick Arnosti
• Marissa Beck
• Paul Milgrom

Online Allocation with Traffic Spikes: Mixing Adversarial and Stochastic Models

• Hossein Esfandiari
• Nitish Korula
• Vahab Mirrokni

SESSION: Session 4A

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round

• Paul Dütting
• Thomas Kesselheim
• Eva Tardos

Smooth Online Mechanisms: A Game-Theoretic Problem in Renewable Energy Markets

• Thomas Kesselheim
• Robert Kleinberg
• Eva Tardos

Greedy Algorithms Make Efficient Mechanisms

• Brendan Lucier
• Vasilis Syrgkanis

Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms

• Paul Dütting
• Thomas Kesselheim

SESSION: Session 4B

A Non-asymptotic Approach to Analyzing Kidney Exchange Graphs

• Yichuan Ding
• Dongdong Ge
• Simai He
• Christopher Thomas Ryan

Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints

• Masahiro Goto
• Fuhiko Kojima
• Ryoji Kurata
• Akihisa Tamura
• Makoto Yokoo

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange

• Sampath Kannan
• Jamie Morgenstern
• Ryan Rogers
• Aaron Roth

An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games

• Assaf Romm
• Avinatan Hassidim

SESSION: Session 5A

Designing Dynamic Contests

• Kosts Bimpikis
• Shayan Ehsani
• Mohamed Mostagir

Managing Innovation in a Crowd

• Daron Acemoglu
• Mohamed Mostagir
• Asuman Ozdaglar

Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design

• Panos Toulis
• David C. Parkes
• Elery Pfeffer
• James Zou

SESSION: Session 5B

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals

• Vasilis Syrgkanis
• David Kempe
• Eva Tardos

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies

• Nikhil Devanur
• Jamie Morgenstern
• Vasilis Syrgkanis
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction

• Hu Fu
• Nicole Immorlica
• Brendan Lucier
• Philipp Strack

SESSION: Session 6A

Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries

• Avrim Blum
• John P. Dickerson
• Nika Haghtalab
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Tuomas Sandholm
• Ankit Sharma

Matching with Stochastic Arrival

• Neil Thakral

Leximin Allocations in the Real World

• David Kurokawa
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Nisarg Shah

SESSION: Session 6B

Competitive Analysis via Benchmark Decomposition

• Ning Chen
• Nikolai Gravin
• Pinyan Lu

Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity

• Aviad Rubinstein
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem

• Parikshit Gopalan
• Noam Nisan
• Tim Roughgarden

SESSION: Session 7A

Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets

• Pinyan Lu
• Tao Xiao

Truthful Mechanism Design via Correlated Tree Rounding

• Yossi Azar
• Martin Hoefer
• Idan Maor
• Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
• Berthold Vöcking

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

• Constantinos Daskalakis
• Nikhil Devanur
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist

• Constantinos Daskalakis
• Alan Deckelbaum
• Christos Tzamos

SESSION: Session 7B

Customer Referral Incentives and Social Media

• Ilan Lobel
• Evan Sadler
• Lav R. Varshney

Estimating the Causal Impact of Recommendation Systems from Observational Data

• Amit Sharma
• Jake M. Hofman
• Duncan J. Watts

Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful Mediators

• Ryan Rogers
• Aaron Roth
• Jonathan Ullman
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish Routing

• Evdokia Nikolova
• Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

SESSION: Session 8A

At What Quality and What Price?: Eliciting Buyer Preferences as a Market Design Problem

• John Joseph Horton
• Ramesh Johari

Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated Products

• Daniela Saban
• Gabriel Weintraub

Team Performance with Test Scores

• Jon Kleinberg
• Maithra Raghu

SESSION: Session 8B

Mechanisms for Fair Attribution

• Eric Balkanski
• Yaron Singer

Sound Auction Specification and Implementation

• Marco B. Caminati
• Manfred Kerber
• Christoph Lange
• Colin Rowat

Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration

• Yishay Mansour
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
• Vasilis Syrgkanis

SESSION: Session 9A

Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets

• Hoda Heidari
• Sebastien Lahaie
• David M. Pennock
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Learning What's Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions

• Avrim Blum
• Yishay Mansour
• Jamie Morgenstern

Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement

• Jacob Abernethy
• Yiling Chen
• Chien-Ju Ho
• Bo Waggoner

SESSION: Session 9B

The Impact of the Sharing Economy on the Hotel Industry: Evidence from Airbnb's Entry Into the Texas Market

• Georgios Zervas
• Davide Proserpio
• John W. Byers

Pricing in Ride-Sharing Platforms: A Queueing-Theoretic Approach

• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Ramesh Johari
• Carlos Riquelme

Bias and Reciprocity in Online Reviews: Evidence From Field Experiments on Airbnb

• Andrey Fradkin
• Elena Grewal
• Dave Holtz
• Matthew Pearson

SESSION: Session 10A

The Wisdom of Multiple Guesses

• Johan Ugander
• Ryan Drapeau
• Carlos Guestrin

Generalized Decision Scoring Rules: Statistical, Computational, and Axiomatic Properties

• Lirong Xia

Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory

• David Easley
• Arpita Ghosh

SESSION: Session 10B

Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal Disruptions

• Eric Friedman
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas
• Shai Vardi

Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments

• Yossi Azar
• Inna Kalp-Shaltiel
• Brendan Lucier
• Ishai Menache
• Joseph (Seffi) Naor
• Jonathan Yaniv

Markets with Production: A Polynomial Time Algorithm and a Reduction to Pure Exchange

• Jugal Garg
• Ravi Kannan

SESSION: Session 11A

Short Lists in Centralized Clearinghouses

• Nick Arnosti

Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match

• Slava Bronfman
• Noga Alon
• Avinatan Hassidim
• Assaf Romm

Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison

• Itai Ashlagi
• Afshin Nikzad
• Assaf Romm

SESSION: Session 11B

Reverse Mechanism Design

• Nima Haghpanah
• Jason Hartline

Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees

• Moshe Babaioff
• Renato Paes Leme
• Balasubramanian Sivan

Robust Dynamic Pricing With Strategic Customers

• Yiwei Chen
• Vivek F. Farias

SESSION: Session 12A

Combining Traditional Marketing and Viral Marketing with Amphibious Influence Maximization

• Wei Chen
• Fu Li
• Tian Lin
• Aviad Rubinstein

Approximability of Adaptive Seeding under Knapsack Constraints

• Aviad Rubinstein
• Lior Seeman
• Yaron Singer

SESSION: Session 12B

Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard

• Siddharth Barman
• Katrina Ligett

Faster First-Order Methods for Extensive-Form Game Solving

• Christian Kroer
• Kevin Waugh
• Fatma Kilinç-Karzan
• Tuomas Sandholm