Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: Plenary session

Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

• Michael Kearns

SESSION: 1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison

• Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Evangelos Markakis
• Tim Roughgarden

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case

• Nikhil R. Devanur
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Nima Haghpanah
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas

SESSION: 1b: Peer Predictions

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering

• Rupert Freeman
• David M. Pennock
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Forecast Aggregation

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Rann Smorodinsky

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction

• Yang Liu
• Yiling Chen

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users

• Arpit Agarwal
• Debmalya Mandal
• David C. Parkes
• Nisarg Shah

SESSION: 2a: Matching 1

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm

• Sepehr Assadi
• Sanjeev Khanna
• Yang Li

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions

• Yash Kanoria
• Daniela Saban

Matching while Learning

• Ramesh Johari
• Vijay Kamble
• Yash Kanoria

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

• Avinatan Hassidim
• Assaf Romm
• Ran I. Shorrer

SESSION: 2b: Predictions and Queries

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games

• Noam Nisan
• Gali Noti

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness

• Jon Kleinberg
• Annie Liang
• Sendhil Mullainathan

Comparison-based Choices

• Jon Kleinberg
• Sendhil Mullainathan
• Johan Ugander

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction

• Sepehr Assadi

SESSION: 3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints

• Dirk Bergemann
• Francisco Castro
• Gabriel Weintraub

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

• Santiago Balseiro
• Vahab Mirrokni
• Renato Paes Leme

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

• Nicole Immorlica
• Brendan Lucier
• Emmanouil Pountourakis
• Samuel Taggart

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers

• José Correa
• Patricio Foncea
• Ruben Hoeksma
• Tim Oosterwijk
• Tjark Vredeveld

SESSION: 3b: Economic Equilibrium

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation

• Frank Cheng
• Michael P. Wellman

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets

• Erik Brinkman
• Michael P. Wellman

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation

• Pieter Kleer
• Guido Schäfer

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase

• Juan Camilo Castillo
• Dan Knoepfle
• Glen Weyl

SESSION: 4a: Matching 2

Stable Secretaries

• Yakov Babichenko
• Yuval Emek
• Michal Feldman
• Boaz Patt-Shamir
• Ron Peretz
• Rann Smorodinsky

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

• Saeed Alaei
• Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi
• Eva Tardos

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets

• Itai Ashlagi
• Mark Braverman
• Yash Kanoria
• Peng Shi

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks

• Ravi Jagadeesan

SESSION: 4b: Voting

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions

• Gerdus Benade
• Anson Kahng
• Ariel D. Procaccia

Voting in the Limelight

• Ronen Gradwohl

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties

• Ashish Goel
• Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy
• Kamesh Munagala

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

• Yu Cheng
• Shaddin Dughmi
• David Kempe

SESSION: 5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

• Alon Eden
• Michal Feldman
• Ophir Friedler
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing

• Elliot Anshelevich
• Shreyas Sekar

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

• Alon Eden
• Michal Feldman
• Ophir Friedler
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments

• Gerardo Berbeglia
• Gwenaël Joret

SESSION: 5b: Information Games

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers

• David Lingenbrink
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks

• Ronen Gradwohl

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

• Shaddin Dughmi
• Haifeng Xu

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents

• Sampath Kannan
• Michael Kearns
• Jamie Morgenstern
• Mallesh Pai
• Aaron Roth
• Rakesh Vohra
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations

Combinatorial Cost Sharing

• Shahar Dobzinski
• Shahar Ovadia

SESSION: 6a: Scheduling

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices

• Michal Feldman
• Amos Fiat
• Alan Roytman

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

• Shuchi Chawla
• Nikhil Devanur
• Janardhan Kulkarni
• Rad Niazadeh

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty

• Giorgos Christodoulou
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Alkmini Sgouritsa

SESSION: 6b: Fair Division 1

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

• Richard Cole
• Nikhil Devanur
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Kamal Jain
• Tung Mai
• Vijay V. Vazirani
• Sadra Yazdanbod

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division

• Eric Friedman
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas
• Shai Vardi

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting

• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Junxing Wang

SESSION: 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning

• Sebastien Bubeck
• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Zhiyi Huang
• Rad Niazadeh

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers

• Yiwei Chen
• Cong Shi

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework

• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Daniel Freund
• Thodoris Lykouris

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization

• Aaron Roth
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
• Jonathan Ullman
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: 7b: Experiments

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?

• Apostolos Filippas
• John Joseph Horton

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews

• Shrabastee Banerjee
• Chrysanthos Dellarocas
• Georgios Zervas

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem

• Daniel G. Goldstein
• R. Preston McAfee
• Siddharth Suri
• James R. Wright

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Matthew Jackson

SESSION: 8a: Mechanism Design -- General

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

• Georgios Amanatidis
• Georgios Birmpas
• George Christodoulou
• Evangelos Markakis

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

• Artur Gorokh
• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness

• Sophie Bade
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski

SESSION: 8b: Decision Making and Learning

Planning with Multiple Biases

• Jon Kleinberg
• Sigal Oren
• Manish Raghavan

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making

• Ilan Lobel
• Renato Paes Leme
• Adrian Vladu

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments

• Ger Yang
• Georgios Piliouras
• David Basanta

SESSION: 9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms

• Johannes Brustle
• Yang Cai
• Fa Wu
• Mingfei Zhao

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

• Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
• Paul W. Goldberg
• Bart de Keijzer
• Stefano Leonardi
• Tim Roughgarden
• Stefano Turchetta

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

• Santiago R. Balseiro
• Yonatan Gur

SESSION: 9b: Fair Division 2

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

• Simina Branzei
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Ruta Mehta

Fair Public Decision Making

• Vincent Conitzer
• Rupert Freeman
• Nisarg Shah

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division

• Siddharth Barman
• Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy

SESSION: Plenary session

Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

• Christian Borgs
• Jennifer Chayes

SESSION: 10a: Matching 3

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

• John William Hatfield
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Alexander Westkamp

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints

• Thanh Nguyen
• Rakesh Vohra

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

• Benjamin N. Roth
• Ran Shorrer

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing

• Nick Arnosti
• Peng Shi

SESSION: 10b: Strategic Games

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games

• Christian Kroer
• Kevin Waugh
• Fatma Kilinc-Karzan
• Tuomas Sandholm

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic

• Zhigang Cao
• Bo Chen
• Xujin Chen
• Changjun Wang

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games

• Soheil Behnezhad
• Mahsa Derakhshan
• MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
• Aleksandrs Slivkins