Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: Invited talk

Algorithmic Fairness and the Social Welfare Function

  • Sendhil Mullainathan

SESSION: 1a: Sharing Economy

Surge Pricing Moves Uber's Driver-Partners

  • Alice Lu
  • Peter I. Frazier
  • Oren Kislev

The Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb

  • Kyle Barron
  • Edward Kung
  • Davide Proserpio

Advertising Strategy in the Presence of Reviews: An Empirical Analysis

  • Brett Hollenbeck
  • Sridhar Moorthy
  • Davide Proserpio

SESSION: 1b: Information Acquisition I

Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions

  • Yiling Chen
  • Chara Podimata
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Nisarg Shah

Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation

  • Yiling Chen
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Juba Ziani

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition

  • Annie Liang
  • Xiaosheng Mu
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis

SESSION: 2a: Social Choice and Pricing

Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules

  • Martin Lackner
  • Piotr Skowron

Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities

  • Hongyao Ma
  • Reshef Meir
  • David C. Parkes

Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of New Virtual Machines

  • Ian A. Kash
  • Peter B. Key
  • Spyros I. Zoumpoulis

SESSION: 2b: Information Acquisition II

Learnability and Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty

  • Pathikrit Basu
  • Federico Echenique

Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences

  • Jinshuo Dong
  • Aaron Roth
  • Zachary Schutzman
  • Bo Waggoner
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

Overabundant Information and Learning Traps

  • Annie Liang
  • Xiaosheng Mu

SESSION: 3a: Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Shahar Dobzinski
  • Sigal Oren

The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social Welfare

  • Max Dupre la Tour
  • Adrian Vetta

Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach

  • Benedikt Bünz
  • Benjamin Lubin
  • Sven Seuken

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

  • Jason Hartline
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Mohammad Reza Khani
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Rad Niazadeh

SESSION: 3b: Equilibrium Computation

Computational Complexity of Proper Equilibrium

  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
  • Troels Bjerre Lund

Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game

  • Yasushi Kawase
  • Yutaro Yamaguchi
  • Yu Yokoi

The Big Match with a Clock and a Bit of Memory

  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
  • Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen
  • Abraham Neyman

Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games

  • Jakub Černý
  • Branislav Boýanský
  • Christopher Kiekintveld

SESSION: 4a: Mechanism Design I

Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Song Zuo

Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior

  • Shipra Agrawal
  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Vahab S. Mirrokni
  • Balasubramanian Sivan

A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization

  • Maria-Florina Balcan
  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • Ellen Vitercik

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Yishay Mansour
  • Shay Moran

SESSION: 4b: Information Acquisition and Rationality

Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual Information

  • Yuqing Kong
  • Grant Schoenebeck

Eliciting Expertise without Verification

  • Yuqing Kong
  • Grant Schoenebeck

The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game.

  • Itai Arieli
  • Moran Koren
  • Rann Smorodinsky

Dancing Pigs or Externalities?: Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions

  • Elissa M. Redmiles
  • Michelle L. Mazurek
  • John P. Dickerson

SESSION: Invited Talk

Keynote Talk: High-Frequency Trading and the Design of Financial Exchanges: Will the Market Fix the Market?

  • Eric Budish

SESSION: 5a: Matching

Almost Optimal Stochastic Weighted Matching with Few Queries

  • Soheil Behnezhad
  • Nima Reyhani

First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms

  • Umut Dur
  • Timo Mennle
  • Sven Seuken

Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences

  • Jiehua Chen
  • Rolf Niedermeier
  • Piotr Skowron

SESSION: 5b: Prophet Inequalities

Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Robert Kleinberg

Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e Barrier

  • Yossi Azar
  • Ashish Chiplunkar
  • Haim Kaplan

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking

  • Tomer Ezra
  • Michal Feldman
  • Ilan Nehama

SESSION: 6a: Equilibrium Dynamics

Multiplicative Weights Update in Zero-Sum Games

  • James P. Bailey
  • Georgios Piliouras

Cycles in Zero-Sum Differential Games and Biological Diversity

  • Tung Mai
  • Milena Mihail
  • Ioannis Panageas
  • Will Ratcliff
  • Vijay Vazirani
  • Peter Yunker

Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher Markets

  • Yun Kuen Cheung
  • Richard Cole
  • Yixin Tao

SESSION: 6b: Mechanism Design II

Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing

  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Amos Fiat
  • Kira Goldner

Credible Mechanisms

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Shengwu Li

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Yang Cai
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Mingfei Zhao

SESSION: 7a: Equilibrium Analysis

Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

  • José Correa
  • Cristóbal Guzmán
  • Thanasis Lianeas
  • Evdokia Nikolova
  • Marc Schröder

Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games

  • Costas Busch
  • Rajgopal Kannan

Spatio-Temporal Games Beyond One Dimension

  • Soheil Behnezhad
  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
  • Saeed Seddighin

SESSION: 7b: Mechanism Design III

Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Noam Nisan
  • Aviad Rubinstein

Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets

  • Shahar Dobzinski
  • Nitzan Uziely

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition

  • Michal Feldman
  • Ophir Friedler
  • Aviad Rubinstein

SESSION: 8a: Market Experiments

The A/B Testing Problem

  • Eduardo M. Azevedo
  • Alex Deng
  • Jose Luis Montiel Olea
  • Justin Rao
  • E. Glen Weyl

A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments

  • Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra
  • Johan Ugander

The Costs of Entering through Tying: Experimental Evidence

  • Hyunjin Kim
  • Michael Luca

Reputation Inflation

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • John Joseph Horton
  • Joseph Golden

SESSION: 8b: Mechanism Design IV

The Price of Prior Dependence in Auctions

  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Yulong Zeng

Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions

  • Amine Allouah
  • Omar Besbes

Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Value

  • Zhe Feng
  • Chara Podimata
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer

  • Mark Braverman
  • Jieming Mao
  • Jon Schneider
  • Matt Weinberg

SESSION: 9a: Fair Allocation

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations

  • Mohammad Ghodsi
  • Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
  • Masoud Seddighin
  • Saeed Seddighin
  • Hadi Yami

Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations

  • Siddharth Barman
  • Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy
  • Rohit Vaish

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods

  • Brandon Fain
  • Kamesh Munagala
  • Nisarg Shah

How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time

  • Gerdus Benade
  • Aleksandr M. Kazachkov
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Christos-Alexandros Psomas

SESSION: 9b: Markets and Networks

Redistribution through Markets

  • Piotr Dworczak
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Mohammad Akbarpour

Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked Markets

  • John Birge
  • Ozan Candogan
  • Hongfan Chen
  • Daniela Saban

Trading Networks with Frictions

  • Tamás Fleiner
  • Ravi Jagadeesan
  • Zsuzsanna Jankó
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Chain Stability in Trading Networks

  • John William Hatfield
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Alexandru Nichifor
  • Michael Ostrovsky
  • Alexander Westkamp

SESSION: 10a: Learning and Social Networks

Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks

  • Jerry Anunrojwong
  • Nat Sothanaphan

Bayesian Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment

  • Krishna Dasaratha
  • Benjamin Golub
  • Nir Hak

Social Learning Equilibria

  • Elchanan Mossel
  • Manuel Mueller-Frank
  • Allan Sly
  • Omer Tamuz

Diffusion, Seeding, and the Value of Network Information

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Suraj Malladi
  • Amin Saberi

SESSION: 10b: Mechanism Design V

On the Construction of Substitutes

  • Eric Balkanski
  • Renato Paes Leme

Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack

  • Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
  • Mohammad Reza Khani
  • Saeed Seddighin

Matching Auctions for Search and Native Ads

  • Ruggiero Cavallo
  • Maxim Sviridenko
  • Christopher A. Wilkens

The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • Alexandros A. Voudouris