Proceedings of the 21th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: Session 1a: New Solutions in Fair Division

EFX Exists for Three Agents

  • Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
  • Jugal Garg
  • Kurt Mehlhorn

Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation

  • Rupert Freeman
  • Nisarg Shah
  • Rohit Vaish

One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy

  • Johannes Brustle
  • Jack Dippel
  • Vishnu V. Narayan
  • Mashbat Suzuki
  • Adrian Vetta

SESSION: Session 1b: Information and Incentives

Data and Incentives

  • Annie Liang
  • Erik Madsen

Judged in Hindsight: Regulatory Incentives in Approving Innovations

  • Suraj Malladi

Sequential Fundraising and Social Insurance

  • Amir Ban
  • Moran Koren

SESSION: Session 1c: Equilibrium Computation

The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game

  • Enric Boix-Adserà
  • Benjamin L. Edelman
  • Siddhartha Jayanti

Escaping Saddle Points in Constant Dimensional Spaces: An Agent-based Modeling Perspective

  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Fang-Yi Yu

A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff

  • Jakub Dargaj
  • Jakob Grue Simonsen

SESSION: Session 2a: X: Evidence from Y

Designing Informative Rating Systems: Evidence from an Online Labor Market

  • Nikhil Garg
  • Ramesh Johari

The Effects of Influencer Advertising Disclosure Regulations: Evidence From Instagram

  • Daniel Ershov
  • Matthew Mitchell

The Engagement-Diversity Connection: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Spotify

  • David Holtz
  • Ben Carterette
  • Praveen Chandar
  • Zahra Nazari
  • Henriette Cramer
  • Sinan Aral

SESSION: Session 2b: Games on Networks

Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks

  • Victor Amelkin
  • Rakesh Vohra

Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk

  • Steffen Schuldenzucker
  • Sven Seuken

Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games

  • George Christodoulou
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Mohamad Latifian
  • Alkmini Sgouritsa

SESSION: Session 2c: Mechanism Design without Money

Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to be True

  • Deniz Kattwinkel

Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests

  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Oren Dean
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space

  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Dingli Yu
  • Shengyu Zhao

SESSION: Session 2d: Secretaries and Prophets

Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and Augmentations

  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Sahil Singla
  • Bo Waggoner

On Optimal Ordering in the Optimal Stopping Problem

  • Shipra Agrawal
  • Jay Sethuraman
  • Xingyu Zhang

The Secretary Recommendation Problem

  • Niklas Hahn
  • Martin Hoefer
  • Rann Smorodinsky

SESSION: Session 2e: Revenue Maximization

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Michal Feldman
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents

  • Nikhil R. Devanur
  • Kira Goldner
  • Raghuvansh R. Saxena
  • Ariel Schvartzman
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

More Revenue from Two Samples via Factor Revealing SDPs

  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Manolis Zampetakis

SESSION: Session 3a: Pricing

Pricing for the Stars: Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Rating Systems

  • André Stenzel
  • Christoph Wolf
  • Peter Schmidt

The Value of Observability in Dynamic Pricing

  • José R. Correa
  • Dana Pizarro
  • Gustavo Vulcano

Loot Box Pricing and Design

  • Ningyuan Chen
  • Adam N. Elmachtoub
  • Michael Hamilton
  • Xiao Lei

SESSION: Session 3b: Incentives in Labor Markets

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces

  • Arash Asadpour
  • Ilan Lobel
  • Garrett van Ryzin

Balancing Agent Retention and Waiting Time in Service Platforms

  • Marcelo Olivares
  • Andres Musalem
  • Daniel Yung

Online Policies for Efficient Volunteer Crowdsourcing

  • Vahideh Manshadi
  • Scott Rodilitz

SESSION: Session 3c: Queues

Queue Lengths as Constantly Adapting Prices: Allocative Efficiency Under Random Dynamics

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Jacob Leshno
  • Pengyu Qian
  • Amin Saberi

Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems

  • Jason Gaitonde
  • Éva Tardos

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion

  • Jerry Anunrojwong
  • Krishnamurthy Iyer
  • Vahideh Manshadi

SESSION: Session 3d: Markets and Beyond

The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects

  • Elizabeth Baldwin
  • Omer Edhan
  • Ravi Jagadeesan
  • Paul Klemperer
  • Alexander Teytelboym

To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Ran I. Shorrer

A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts

  • Tushant Jha
  • Yair Zick

SESSION: Session 4a: Computation of Fair Allocations

An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Shares

  • Jugal Garg
  • Setareh Taki

Consensus-Halving: Does It Ever Get Easier?

  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas
  • Alexandros Hollender
  • Katerina Sotiraki
  • Manolis Zampetakis

Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood Ratios

  • Siddharth Barman
  • Nidhi Rathi

SESSION: Session 4b: Search, Rankings, and Reviews

Pandora's Box Problem with Order Constraints

  • Shant Boodaghians
  • Federico Fusco
  • Philip Lazos
  • Stefano Leonardi

Product Ranking on Online Platforms

  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • Negin Golrezaei
  • Vahideh Manshadi
  • Vahab Mirrokni

Does Quality Improve with Customer Voice? Evidence from the Hotel Industry

  • Uttara Ananthakrishnan
  • Davide Proserpio
  • Siddhartha Sharma

SESSION: Session 4c: Matching Applications

Matching Algorithms for Blood Donation

  • Duncan C. McElfresh
  • Christian Kroer
  • Sergey Pupyrev
  • Eric Sodomka
  • Karthik Abinav Sankararaman
  • Zack Chauvin
  • Neil Dexter
  • John P. Dickerson

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Julien Combe
  • Yinghua He
  • Victor Hiller
  • Robert Shimer
  • Olivier Tercieux

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

  • Alex Rees-Jones
  • Ran Shorrer
  • Chloe J. Tergiman

SESSION: Session 4d: Social Networks

Contagion in Graphons

  • Selman Erol
  • Francesca Parise
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Adversarial Perturbations of Opinion Dynamics in Networks

  • Jason Gaitonde
  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Éva Tardos

An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning

  • Krishna Dasaratha
  • Kevin He

SESSION: Session 4e: Combinatorial Markets

Menu-size Complexity and Revenue Continuity of Buy-many Mechanisms

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Yifeng Teng
  • Christos Tzamos

On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer

  • Natalie Collina
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets

  • Tomer Ezra
  • Michal Feldman
  • Ophir Friedler

SESSION: Session 5a: Ridesharing

Driver Surge Pricing

  • Nikhil Garg
  • Hamid Nazerzadeh

Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror Backpressure

  • Yash Kanoria
  • Pengyu Qian

Spatial Distribution of Supply and the Role of Market Thickness: Theory and Evidence from Ridesharing

  • Soheil Ghili
  • Vineet Kumar

SESSION: Session 5b: Bounded Rationality

Ordered Search with Boundedly Rational Consumers

  • Mauro Papi

Finite State Machines Play Extensive-Form Games

  • Jakub Černý
  • Branislav Bosanský
  • Bo An

A Formal Separation Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Behavior

  • James R. Wright
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

SESSION: Session 5c: Data and Privacy

Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing

  • S. Nageeb Ali
  • Greg Lewis
  • Shoshana Vasserman

Dynamic Privacy Choices

  • Shota Ichihashi

Differentially Private Call Auctions and Market Impact

  • Emily Diana
  • Hadi Elzayn
  • Michael Kearns
  • Aaron Roth
  • Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi
  • Juba Ziani

SESSION: Session 5d: Matching Theory

Two-sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures

  • Simon Mauras

The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error

  • Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • David Kempe

Efficient Matchmaking in Assignment Games with Application to Online Platforms

  • Peng Shi

SESSION: Session 6a: Auctions

Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

  • Neil Newman
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown
  • Paul Milgrom
  • Ilya Segal

Information Choice in Auctions

  • Nina Bobkova

Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary Mechanisms

  • Santiago Balseiro
  • Anthony Kim
  • Mohammad Mahdian
  • Vahab Mirrokni

SESSION: Session 6b: Cryptocurrencies

Vertically Disintegrated Platforms

  • Christoph Aymanns
  • Mathias Dewatripont
  • Tarik Roukny

An Economic Analysis of Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms in Proof-of-Work Blockchain Systems

  • Shunya Noda
  • Kyohei Okumura
  • Yoshinori Hashimoto

Continuous Credit Networks and Layer 2 Blockchains: Monotonicity and Sampling

  • Ashish Goel
  • Geoffrey Ramseyer

SESSION: Session 6c: Optimization

Convex Optimization for Bundle Size Pricing Problem

  • Xiaobo Li
  • Hailong Sun
  • Chung Piaw Teo

Optimizing Offer Sets in Sub-Linear Time

  • Vivek F. Farias
  • Andrew A. Li
  • Deeksha Sinha

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Rann Smorodinsky
  • Takuro Yamashita

SESSION: Session 7a: Social Learning

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Fedor Sandomirskiy
  • Omer Tamuz

Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias

  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Suraj Malladi
  • David McAdams

Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure

  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Jieming Mao
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: Session 7b: Fairness and Ethics

On Fair Selection in the Presence of Implicit Variance

  • Vitalii Emelianov
  • Nicolas Gast
  • Krishna P. Gummadi
  • Patrick Loiseau

Fair Prediction with Endogenous Behavior

  • Christopher Jung
  • Sampath Kannan
  • Changhwa Lee
  • Mallesh Pai
  • Aaron Roth
  • Rakesh Vohra

Biased Programmers? Or Biased Data? A Field Experiment in Operationalizing AI Ethics

  • Bo Cowgill
  • Fabrizio Dell'Acqua
  • Samuel Deng
  • Daniel Hsu
  • Nakul Verma
  • Augustin Chaintreau

SESSION: Session 7c: Optimal Auctions

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

  • Matheus V. X. Ferreira
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Maxwell Fishelson
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Santhoshini Velusamy

Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness

  • Johannes Brustle
  • Yang Cai
  • Constantinos Daskalakis

SESSION: Session 7d: Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts

One for All, All for One---Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto

  • Mehmet S. Ismail

The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

  • Siddharth Barman
  • Federico Echenique

On Sustainable Equilibria

  • Srihari Govindan
  • Rida Laraki
  • Lucas Pahl

SESSION: Session 7e: Dynamic Matching

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models

  • Tomer Ezra
  • Michal Feldman
  • Nick Gravin
  • Zhihao Gavin Tang

Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time

  • Ali Aouad
  • Ömer Saritaç

Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards: Optimal Competitive Ratio via Path Based Formulation

  • Vineet Goyal
  • Rajan Udwani

SESSION: Session 8a: Social Choice

Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism

  • Dominik Peters
  • Piotr Skowron

Optimal Communication-Distortion Tradeoff in Voting

  • Debmalya Mandal
  • Nisarg Shah
  • David P. Woodruff

Meddling Metrics: the Effects of Measuring and Constraining Partisan Gerrymandering on Voter Incentives

  • Brian Brubach
  • Aravind Srinivasan
  • Shawn Zhao

SESSION: Session 8b: Econometric Methods

Machine Learning Instrument Variables for Causal Inference

  • Amandeep Singh
  • Kartik Hosanagar
  • Amit Gandhi

Variance-Weighted Estimators to Improve Sensitivity in Online Experiments

  • Kevin Liou
  • Sean J. Taylor

Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias

  • Ramesh Johari
  • Hannah Li
  • Gabriel Weintraub

SESSION: Session 8c: Crowdsourcing

Surrogate Scoring Rules

  • Yang Liu
  • Juntao Wang
  • Yiling Chen

Small Steps to Accuracy: Incremental Belief Updaters Are Better Forecasters

  • Pavel Atanasov
  • Jens Witkowski
  • Lyle Ungar
  • Barbara Mellers
  • Philip Tetlock

Prizes on Crowdsourcing Platforms: An Equilibrium Analysis of Competing Contests

  • Konstantinos I. Stouras
  • Sanjiv Erat
  • Kenneth C. Lichtendahl

SESSION: Session 8d: Dynamic Mechanisms

Quick or Cheap? Breaking Points in Dynamic Markets

  • Panayotis Mertikopoulos
  • Heinrich H. Nax
  • Bary S. R. Pradelski

Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching

  • Hanrui Zhang
  • Vincent Conitzer

Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division

  • David Zeng
  • Alexandros Psomas