The SIG
About
Officers
Membership
Activities
Seminar Series
Events
Recent Proceedings
2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
Recent EC Talk Videos
2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
2017
Awards
ACM TEAC
SIGecom Exchanges
CACM Research Highlights
Mailing List
Tweet
Proceedings of the 23th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library
SESSION: Best Paper and Best Paper with Student Lead Author
The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning
Etan A. Green
E. Barry Plunkett
Computationally Tractable Choice
Modibo K. Camara
SESSION: Exemplary Track Papers
The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization
Jon Kleinberg
Sendhil Mullainathan
Manish Raghavan
Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design
Martino Banchio
Andrzej Skrzypacz
Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence from E-Commerce
Leon Musolff
SESSION: Session 1A: Decision Theory
Monotone Additive Statistics
Xiaosheng Mu
Luciano Pomatto
Philipp Strack
Omer Tamuz
Closure Operators: Complexity and Applications to Classification and Decision-making
Hamed Hamze Bajgiran
Federico Echenique
Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty
Xiaoyu Cheng
Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy
Annie Liang
Jay Lu
Xiaosheng Mu
SESSION: Session 1B: Online Matching and Ridesharing
Randomized FIFO Mechanisms
Francisco Castro
Hongyao Ma
Hamid Nazerzadeh
Chiwei Yan
On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching
Süleyman Kerimov
Itai Ashlagi
Itai Gurvich
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
Mohammad Akbarpour
Yeganeh Alimohammadi
Shengwu Li
Amin Saberi
Dynamic Spatial Matching
Yash Kanoria
SESSION: Session 1C: Blockchains
Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time for Your Best Interest
Aviv Yaish
Saar Tochner
Aviv Zohar
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
Matheus V.X. Ferreira
Ye Lin Sally Hahn
S. Matthew Weinberg
Catherine Yu
Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris
Alex Evans
Tarun Chitra
Stephen Boyd
Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing
Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach
SESSION: Session 1D: Robust Auction Design
Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions
Nir Bachrach
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
Jerry Anunrojwong
Santiago Balseiro
Omar Besbes
Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints
Ethan Che
Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism
Wanchang Zhang
SESSION: Session 2A: Equilibrium in Games
The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game
Akash Gaonkar
Divya Raghunathan
S. Matthew Weinberg
An Algorithmic Solution to the Blotto Game using Multi-marginal Couplings
Vianney Perchet
Philippe Rigollet
Thibaut Le Gouic
Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games
Jakub Černý
Bo An
Allan N. Zhang
Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications
Evan Friedman
Felix Mauersberger
SESSION: Session 2B: Prophet Inequalities
Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem
Nick Arnosti
Will Ma
The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem
Kristen Kessel
Ali Shameli
Amin Saberi
David Wajc
Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities
Makis Arsenis
Robert Kleinberg
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality
Saeed Alaei
Ali Makhdoumi
Azarakhsh Malekian
Rad Niazadeh
SESSION: Session 2C: Social Networks
Seeding a Simple Contagion
Evan Sadler
On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Segregation
Rediet Abebe
Nicole Immorlica
Jon Kleinberg
Brendan Lucier
Ali Shirali
Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online Game
Daniel Goetz
Wei Lu
The Production and Consumption of Social Media
Apostolos Filippas
John Horton
Elliot Lipnowski
SESSION: Session 2D: School Choice and Object Reallocation
Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design?: Theory and Evidence
Natalie Cox
Ricardo Fonseca
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District
Maxwell Allman
Itai Ashlagi
Irene Lo
Juliette Love
Katherine Mentzer
Lulabel Ruiz-Setz
Henry O'Connell
Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects
Ozgun Ekici
SESSION: Session 3A: Empirics of Online Platforms
Bidders' Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions
Shumpei Goke
Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Ralph A. Mastromonaco
Samuel S. Seljan
Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules
Miguel Alcobendas
Robert Zeithammer
Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising Effects
George Gui
Harikesh Nair
Fengshi Niu
Chasing Stars: Firms' Strategic Responses to Online Consumer Ratings
Megan Hunter
SESSION: Session 3B: Pricing
Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity
Paul Milgrom
Mitchell Watt
Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks
J. Massey Cashore
Peter I. Frazier
Eva Tardos
The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing
Johannes Brustle
José Correa
Paul Dütting
Victor Verdugo
Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig Economy
Tristan Pollner
Mohammad Roghani
Amin Saberi
David Wajc
Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks
Wanying Huang
Philipp Strack
Omer Tamuz
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli
Yakov Babichenko
Bias-Variance Games
Yiding Feng
Ronen Gradwohl
Jason Hartline
Aleck Johnsen
Denis Nekipelov
SESSION: Session 3D: Mechanism Design I
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design
Afshin Nikzad
Mechanisms without Transfers for Fully Biased Agents
Deniz Kattwinkel
Axel Niemeyer
Justus Preusser
Alexander Winter
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
Niccolò Lomys
Takuro Yamashita
Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms
Estelle Marine Varloot
Rida Laraki
SESSION: Session 4A: Online Platforms and Fairness
The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential Investment
Ron Bekkerman
Maxime C. Cohen
Edward Kung
John Maiden
Davide Proserpio
Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis
Mario Leccese
Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Candidates
Vitalii Emelianov
Nicolas Gast
Patrick Loiseau
SESSION: Session 4B: Fair Division and Prediction Markets
On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms
Biaoshuai Tao
Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives
Moshe Babaioff
Uriel Feige
Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities
Yushi Bai
Uriel Feige
Paul Gölz
Ariel D. Procaccia
Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis
Dian Yu
Jianjun Gao
Weiping Wu
Zizhuo Wang
Credible Persuasion
Xiao Lin
Ce Liu
Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards
Chang Liu
Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning
Jibang Wu
Zixuan Zhang
Zhe Feng
Zhaoran Wang
Zhuoran Yang
Michael I. Jordan
Haifeng Xu
SESSION: Session 4D: Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders
Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers
Eleni Batziou
Martin Bichler
Maximilian Fichtl
Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
Santiago R. Balseiro
Yuan Deng
Jieming Mao
Vahab Mirrokni
Song Zuo
Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
Santiago R. Balseiro
Christian Kroer
Rachitesh Kumar
Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms
Shao-Heng Ko
Kamesh Munagala
SESSION: Session 5A: Mechanism Design with Learning
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
Priyank Agrawal
Eric Balkanski
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Tingting Ou
Xizhi Tan
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Kostas Kollias
Alkmini Sgouritsa
Xizhi Tan
Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset
Modibo K. Camara
Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic Decisions
Laura Blattner
Scott Nelson
Jann Spiess
SESSION: Session 5B: Voting
Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: The Design of Multi-member Districts
Nikhil Garg
Wes Gurnee
David Rothschild
David Shmoys
In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins
Paul Gölz
Dominik Peters
Ariel D. Procaccia
Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting
Soroush Ebadian
Anson Kahng
Dominik Peters
Nisarg Shah
A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions
Antonin Macé
Rafael Treibich
SESSION: Session 5C: Estimation Methods
Estimation of Standard Auction Models
Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri
Constantinos Daskalakis
Andrew Ilyas
Manolis Zampetakis
Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable Regression
Edvard Bakhitov
Amandeep Singh
Design and Analysis of Bipartite Experiments Under a Linear Exposure-response Model
Christopher Harshaw
Fredrik Sävje
David Eisenstat
Vahab Mirrokni
Jean Pouget-Abadie
Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated Products
Lorenzo Magnolfi
Jonathon McClure
Alan Sorensen
SESSION: Session 5D: Mechanism Design II
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
Dirk Bergemann
Yang Cai
Grigoris Velegkas
Mingfei Zhao
Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information
Yingkai Li
Delegated Pandora's Box
Curtis Bechtel
Shaddin Dughmi
Neel Patel
Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform
Zi Yang Kang
Ellen Muir
SESSION: Session 6A: Contract Design
Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules
Maneesha Papireddygari
Bo Waggoner
Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization
Matteo Castiglioni
Alberto Marchesi
Nicola Gatti
Public Signals in Network Congestion Games
Svenja M. Griesbach
Martin Hoefer
Max Klimm
Tim Koglin
Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection
Nicole Immorlica
Andre M. Sztutman
Robert M. Townsend
SESSION: Session 6B: Strategic Data Sharing and Attacks
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks
Yotam Gafni
Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems
Kun Jin
Xueru Zhang
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili
Parinaz Naghizadeh
Mingyan Liu
Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait
Federico Echenique
Kevin He
Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks
Yukun Cheng
Xiaotie Deng
Yuhao Li
Xiang Yan
SESSION: Session 6C: Recommendations
Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices
Peng Shi
Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations
Sarah Dean
Jamie Morgenstern
Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products
Arash Asadpour
Rad Niazadeh
Amin Saberi
Ali Shameli
Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret
Yiding Feng
Wei Tang
Haifeng Xu
SESSION: Session 6D: Auctions and Bargaining
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
Michal Feldman
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Nick Gravin
Daniel Schoepflin
Speculation in Procurement Auctions
Shanglyu Deng
Double Auctions and Transaction Costs
Simon Jantschgi
Heinrich H. Nax
Bary S. R. Pradelski
Marek Pycia
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
S. Nageeb Ali
Navin Kartik
Andreas Kleiner
SESSION: Session 7A: Information Design
The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design
Reza Alijani
Siddhartha Banerjee
Kamesh Munagala
Kangning Wang
Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion
Chenghan Zhou
Thanh H. Nguyen
Haifeng Xu
Information Design in Concave Games
Alex Smolin
Takuro Yamashita
Herd Design
Itai Arieli
Ronen Gradwohl
Rann Smorodinsky
SESSION: Session 7B: Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive Values
Soheil Ghili
Costly Multidimensional Screening
Frank Yang
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable
S. Matthew Weinberg
Zixin Zhou
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
Yang Cai
Constantinos Daskalakis
SESSION: Session 7C: Learning to Play
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria
Ioannis Anagnostides
Gabriele Farina
Christian Kroer
Andrea Celli
Tuomas Sandholm
Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents
Nika Haghtalab
Thodoris Lykouris
Sloan Nietert
Alexander Wei
Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller
Muhammed O. Sayin
Kaiqing Zhang
Asuman Ozdaglar
Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted Delays
Han Wu
Stefan Wager
SESSION: Session 7D: Stable Matching
How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India
Orhan Aygün
Bertan Turhan
A Continuum Model of Stable Matching with Finite Capacities
Nick Arnosti
On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets
Yunseo Choi
SESSION: Session 8A: Online Matching
Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources
Steven Delong
Alireza Farhadi
Rad Niazadeh
Balasubramanian Sivan
Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources
Yiding Feng
Rad Niazadeh
Amin Saberi
Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable Resources
Rajan Udwani
Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark
Mark Braverman
Mahsa Derakhshan
Antonio Molina Lovett
Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel Traffic
Vahideh Manshadi
Scott Rodilitz
Daniela Saban
Akshaya Suresh
SESSION: Session 8B: Information Elicitation and Crowdsourcing
Optimization of Scoring Rules
Yingkai Li
Jason D. Hartline
Liren Shan
Yifan Wu
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals
Eric Neyman
Tim Roughgarden
Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite Forecasters
Pavel Atanasov
Jens Witkowski
Barbara Mellers
Philip Tetlock
Equity in Resident Crowdsourcing: Measuring Under-reporting without Ground Truth Data
Zhi Liu
Nikhil Garg
SESSION: Session 8C: Market Design Applications
Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud
Patrick Hummel
Michael Schwarz
Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games
Mingliu Chen
Adam N. Elmachtoub
Xiao Lei
A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review
Yichi Zhang
Fang-Yi Yu
Grant Schoenebeck
David Kempe
When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?
Will Ma
SESSION: Session 8D: Social Ranking
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes
Emily Dale
Jessica Fielding
Hari Ramakrishnan
Sacheth Sathyanarayanan
S. Matthew Weinberg
Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess Tournaments
Pascal Führlich
Ágnes Cseh
Pascal Lenzner
Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
Thayer Morrill
Peter Troyan
Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
Javier Cembrano
Felix Fischer
David Hannon
Max Klimm
SESSION: Session 9A: Equilibrium Computation
Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
Jugal Garg
Peter McGlaughlin
Ruta Mehta
Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation
Brian Hu Zhang
Gabriele Farina
Andrea Celli
Tuomas Sandholm
Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints
Hanrui Zhang
Yu Cheng
Vincent Conitzer
SESSION: Session 9B: Privacy by Design
Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms
Alireza Fallah
Ali Makhdoumi
Azarakhsh Malekian
Asuman Ozdaglar
Information Design for Differential Privacy
Ian M. Schmutte
Nathan Yoder
Contextually Private Mechanisms
Andreas Alexander Haupt
Zoe Kettler Hitzig
Private Private Information
Kevin He
Fedor Sandomirskiy
Omer Tamuz
SESSION: Session 9C:Secretary Problems and Welfare Bounds
The Multi-secretary Problem with Many Types
Omar Besbes
Yash Kanoria
Akshit Kumar
General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching
Tomer Ezra
Michal Feldman
Nick Gravin
Zhihao Gavin Tang
Robust Bounds for Welfare Analysis
Zi Yang Kang
Shoshana Vasserman
SESSION: Session 9D: Allocation for Social Good
Lotteries for Shared Experiences
Nick Arnosti
Carlos Bonet
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
Mohammad Akbarpour
Eric Budish
Piotr Dworczak
Scott Duke Kominers
Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing
Kirk Bansak
Elisabeth Paulson
Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice Interact
Amanda Kube
Sanmay Das
Patrick J. Fowler
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik