Proceedings of the 23th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Paper with Student Lead Author

The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning

  • Etan A. Green
  • E. Barry Plunkett

Computationally Tractable Choice

  • Modibo K. Camara

SESSION: Exemplary Track Papers

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sendhil Mullainathan
  • Manish Raghavan

Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design

  • Martino Banchio
  • Andrzej Skrzypacz

Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence from E-Commerce

  • Leon Musolff

SESSION: Session 1A: Decision Theory

Monotone Additive Statistics

  • Xiaosheng Mu
  • Luciano Pomatto
  • Philipp Strack
  • Omer Tamuz

Closure Operators: Complexity and Applications to Classification and Decision-making

  • Hamed Hamze Bajgiran
  • Federico Echenique

Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty

  • Xiaoyu Cheng

Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy

  • Annie Liang
  • Jay Lu
  • Xiaosheng Mu

SESSION: Session 1B: Online Matching and Ridesharing

Randomized FIFO Mechanisms

  • Francisco Castro
  • Hongyao Ma
  • Hamid Nazerzadeh
  • Chiwei Yan

On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching

  • Süleyman Kerimov
  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Itai Gurvich

The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Yeganeh Alimohammadi
  • Shengwu Li
  • Amin Saberi

Dynamic Spatial Matching

  • Yash Kanoria

SESSION: Session 1C: Blockchains

Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time for Your Best Interest

  • Aviv Yaish
  • Saar Tochner
  • Aviv Zohar

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

  • Matheus V.X. Ferreira
  • Ye Lin Sally Hahn
  • S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Catherine Yu

Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers

  • Guillermo Angeris
  • Alex Evans
  • Tarun Chitra
  • Stephen Boyd

Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing

  • Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach

SESSION: Session 1D: Robust Auction Design

Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions

  • Nir Bachrach
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design

  • Jerry Anunrojwong
  • Santiago Balseiro
  • Omar Besbes

Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints

  • Ethan Che

Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism

  • Wanchang Zhang

SESSION: Session 2A: Equilibrium in Games

The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game

  • Akash Gaonkar
  • Divya Raghunathan
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

An Algorithmic Solution to the Blotto Game using Multi-marginal Couplings

  • Vianney Perchet
  • Philippe Rigollet
  • Thibaut Le Gouic

Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games

  • Jakub Černý
  • Bo An
  • Allan N. Zhang

Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications

  • Evan Friedman
  • Felix Mauersberger

SESSION: Session 2B: Prophet Inequalities

Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem

  • Nick Arnosti
  • Will Ma

The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem

  • Kristen Kessel
  • Ali Shameli
  • Amin Saberi
  • David Wajc

Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities

  • Makis Arsenis
  • Robert Kleinberg

Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality

  • Saeed Alaei
  • Ali Makhdoumi
  • Azarakhsh Malekian
  • Rad Niazadeh

SESSION: Session 2C: Social Networks

Seeding a Simple Contagion

  • Evan Sadler

On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Segregation

  • Rediet Abebe
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Ali Shirali

Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online Game

  • Daniel Goetz
  • Wei Lu

The Production and Consumption of Social Media

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • John Horton
  • Elliot Lipnowski

SESSION: Session 2D: School Choice and Object Reallocation

Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design?: Theory and Evidence

  • Natalie Cox
  • Ricardo Fonseca
  • Bobak Pakzad-Hurson

Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District

  • Maxwell Allman
  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Irene Lo
  • Juliette Love
  • Katherine Mentzer
  • Lulabel Ruiz-Setz
  • Henry O'Connell

Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects

  • Ozgun Ekici

SESSION: Session 3A: Empirics of Online Platforms

Bidders' Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions

  • Shumpei Goke
  • Gabriel Y. Weintraub
  • Ralph A. Mastromonaco
  • Samuel S. Seljan

Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules

  • Miguel Alcobendas
  • Robert Zeithammer

Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising Effects

  • George Gui
  • Harikesh Nair
  • Fengshi Niu

Chasing Stars: Firms' Strategic Responses to Online Consumer Ratings

  • Megan Hunter

SESSION: Session 3B: Pricing

Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity

  • Paul Milgrom
  • Mitchell Watt

Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks

  • J. Massey Cashore
  • Peter I. Frazier
  • Eva Tardos

The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing

  • Johannes Brustle
  • José Correa
  • Paul Dütting
  • Victor Verdugo

Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig Economy

  • Tristan Pollner
  • Mohammad Roghani
  • Amin Saberi
  • David Wajc

Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks

  • Wanying Huang
  • Philipp Strack
  • Omer Tamuz

A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko

Bias-Variance Games

  • Yiding Feng
  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Jason Hartline
  • Aleck Johnsen
  • Denis Nekipelov

SESSION: Session 3D: Mechanism Design I

Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design

  • Afshin Nikzad

Mechanisms without Transfers for Fully Biased Agents

  • Deniz Kattwinkel
  • Axel Niemeyer
  • Justus Preusser
  • Alexander Winter

A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment

  • Niccolò Lomys
  • Takuro Yamashita

Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms

  • Estelle Marine Varloot
  • Rida Laraki

SESSION: Session 4A: Online Platforms and Fairness

The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential Investment

  • Ron Bekkerman
  • Maxime C. Cohen
  • Edward Kung
  • John Maiden
  • Davide Proserpio

Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis

  • Mario Leccese

Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Candidates

  • Vitalii Emelianov
  • Nicolas Gast
  • Patrick Loiseau

SESSION: Session 4B: Fair Division and Prediction Markets

On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms

  • Biaoshuai Tao

Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Uriel Feige

Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities

  • Yushi Bai
  • Uriel Feige
  • Paul Gölz
  • Ariel D. Procaccia

Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis

  • Dian Yu
  • Jianjun Gao
  • Weiping Wu
  • Zizhuo Wang

Credible Persuasion

  • Xiao Lin
  • Ce Liu

Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards

  • Chang Liu

Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning

  • Jibang Wu
  • Zixuan Zhang
  • Zhe Feng
  • Zhaoran Wang
  • Zhuoran Yang
  • Michael I. Jordan
  • Haifeng Xu

SESSION: Session 4D: Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders

Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers

  • Eleni Batziou
  • Martin Bichler
  • Maximilian Fichtl

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping

  • Santiago R. Balseiro
  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Song Zuo

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees

  • Santiago R. Balseiro
  • Christian Kroer
  • Rachitesh Kumar

Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms

  • Shao-Heng Ko
  • Kamesh Munagala

SESSION: Session 5A: Mechanism Design with Learning

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location

  • Priyank Agrawal
  • Eric Balkanski
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Tingting Ou
  • Xizhi Tan

Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions

  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Kostas Kollias
  • Alkmini Sgouritsa
  • Xizhi Tan

Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset

  • Modibo K. Camara

Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic Decisions

  • Laura Blattner
  • Scott Nelson
  • Jann Spiess

SESSION: Session 5B: Voting

Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: The Design of Multi-member Districts

  • Nikhil Garg
  • Wes Gurnee
  • David Rothschild
  • David Shmoys

In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins

  • Paul Gölz
  • Dominik Peters
  • Ariel D. Procaccia

Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting

  • Soroush Ebadian
  • Anson Kahng
  • Dominik Peters
  • Nisarg Shah

A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions

  • Antonin Macé
  • Rafael Treibich

SESSION: Session 5C: Estimation Methods

Estimation of Standard Auction Models

  • Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri
  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Andrew Ilyas
  • Manolis Zampetakis

Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable Regression

  • Edvard Bakhitov
  • Amandeep Singh

Design and Analysis of Bipartite Experiments Under a Linear Exposure-response Model

  • Christopher Harshaw
  • Fredrik Sävje
  • David Eisenstat
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Jean Pouget-Abadie

Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated Products

  • Lorenzo Magnolfi
  • Jonathon McClure
  • Alan Sorensen

SESSION: Session 5D: Mechanism Design II

Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Yang Cai
  • Grigoris Velegkas
  • Mingfei Zhao

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information

  • Yingkai Li

Delegated Pandora's Box

  • Curtis Bechtel
  • Shaddin Dughmi
  • Neel Patel

Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform

  • Zi Yang Kang
  • Ellen Muir

SESSION: Session 6A: Contract Design

Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules

  • Maneesha Papireddygari
  • Bo Waggoner

Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization

  • Matteo Castiglioni
  • Alberto Marchesi
  • Nicola Gatti

Public Signals in Network Congestion Games

  • Svenja M. Griesbach
  • Martin Hoefer
  • Max Klimm
  • Tim Koglin

Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection

  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Andre M. Sztutman
  • Robert M. Townsend

SESSION: Session 6B: Strategic Data Sharing and Attacks

Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks

  • Yotam Gafni
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems

  • Kun Jin
  • Xueru Zhang
  • Mohammad Mahdi Khalili
  • Parinaz Naghizadeh
  • Mingyan Liu

Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait

  • Federico Echenique
  • Kevin He

Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks

  • Yukun Cheng
  • Xiaotie Deng
  • Yuhao Li
  • Xiang Yan

SESSION: Session 6C: Recommendations

Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices

  • Peng Shi

Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations

  • Sarah Dean
  • Jamie Morgenstern

Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products

  • Arash Asadpour
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Amin Saberi
  • Ali Shameli

Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret

  • Yiding Feng
  • Wei Tang
  • Haifeng Xu

SESSION: Session 6D: Auctions and Bargaining

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

  • Michal Feldman
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Nick Gravin
  • Daniel Schoepflin

Speculation in Procurement Auctions

  • Shanglyu Deng

Double Auctions and Transaction Costs

  • Simon Jantschgi
  • Heinrich H. Nax
  • Bary S. R. Pradelski
  • Marek Pycia

Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information

  • S. Nageeb Ali
  • Navin Kartik
  • Andreas Kleiner

SESSION: Session 7A: Information Design

The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design

  • Reza Alijani
  • Siddhartha Banerjee
  • Kamesh Munagala
  • Kangning Wang

Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion

  • Chenghan Zhou
  • Thanh H. Nguyen
  • Haifeng Xu

Information Design in Concave Games

  • Alex Smolin
  • Takuro Yamashita

Herd Design

  • Itai Arieli
  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Rann Smorodinsky

SESSION: Session 7B: Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design

A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive Values

  • Soheil Ghili

Costly Multidimensional Screening

  • Frank Yang

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable

  • S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Zixin Zhou

Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design

  • Yang Cai
  • Constantinos Daskalakis

SESSION: Session 7C: Learning to Play

Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria

  • Ioannis Anagnostides
  • Gabriele Farina
  • Christian Kroer
  • Andrea Celli
  • Tuomas Sandholm

Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents

  • Nika Haghtalab
  • Thodoris Lykouris
  • Sloan Nietert
  • Alexander Wei

Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller

  • Muhammed O. Sayin
  • Kaiqing Zhang
  • Asuman Ozdaglar

Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted Delays

  • Han Wu
  • Stefan Wager

SESSION: Session 7D: Stable Matching

How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India

  • Orhan Aygün
  • Bertan Turhan

A Continuum Model of Stable Matching with Finite Capacities

  • Nick Arnosti

On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets

  • Yunseo Choi

SESSION: Session 8A: Online Matching

Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources

  • Steven Delong
  • Alireza Farhadi
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Balasubramanian Sivan

Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources

  • Yiding Feng
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Amin Saberi

Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable Resources

  • Rajan Udwani

Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark

  • Mark Braverman
  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • Antonio Molina Lovett

Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel Traffic

  • Vahideh Manshadi
  • Scott Rodilitz
  • Daniela Saban
  • Akshaya Suresh

SESSION: Session 8B: Information Elicitation and Crowdsourcing

Optimization of Scoring Rules

  • Yingkai Li
  • Jason D. Hartline
  • Liren Shan
  • Yifan Wu

Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals

  • Eric Neyman
  • Tim Roughgarden

Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite Forecasters

  • Pavel Atanasov
  • Jens Witkowski
  • Barbara Mellers
  • Philip Tetlock

Equity in Resident Crowdsourcing: Measuring Under-reporting without Ground Truth Data

  • Zhi Liu
  • Nikhil Garg

SESSION: Session 8C: Market Design Applications

Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud

  • Patrick Hummel
  • Michael Schwarz

Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games

  • Mingliu Chen
  • Adam N. Elmachtoub
  • Xiao Lei

A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review

  • Yichi Zhang
  • Fang-Yi Yu
  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • David Kempe

When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?

  • Will Ma

SESSION: Session 8D: Social Ranking

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes

  • Emily Dale
  • Jessica Fielding
  • Hari Ramakrishnan
  • Sacheth Sathyanarayanan
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess Tournaments

  • Pascal Führlich
  • Ágnes Cseh
  • Pascal Lenzner

Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process

  • Thayer Morrill
  • Peter Troyan

Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion

  • Javier Cembrano
  • Felix Fischer
  • David Hannon
  • Max Klimm

SESSION: Session 9A: Equilibrium Computation

Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness

  • Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
  • Jugal Garg
  • Peter McGlaughlin
  • Ruta Mehta

Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation

  • Brian Hu Zhang
  • Gabriele Farina
  • Andrea Celli
  • Tuomas Sandholm

Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints

  • Hanrui Zhang
  • Yu Cheng
  • Vincent Conitzer

SESSION: Session 9B: Privacy by Design

Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local Mechanisms

  • Alireza Fallah
  • Ali Makhdoumi
  • Azarakhsh Malekian
  • Asuman Ozdaglar

Information Design for Differential Privacy

  • Ian M. Schmutte
  • Nathan Yoder

Contextually Private Mechanisms

  • Andreas Alexander Haupt
  • Zoe Kettler Hitzig

Private Private Information

  • Kevin He
  • Fedor Sandomirskiy
  • Omer Tamuz

SESSION: Session 9C:Secretary Problems and Welfare Bounds

The Multi-secretary Problem with Many Types

  • Omar Besbes
  • Yash Kanoria
  • Akshit Kumar

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching

  • Tomer Ezra
  • Michal Feldman
  • Nick Gravin
  • Zhihao Gavin Tang

Robust Bounds for Welfare Analysis

  • Zi Yang Kang
  • Shoshana Vasserman

SESSION: Session 9D: Allocation for Social Good

Lotteries for Shared Experiences

  • Nick Arnosti
  • Carlos Bonet

An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Eric Budish
  • Piotr Dworczak
  • Scott Duke Kominers

Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing

  • Kirk Bansak
  • Elisabeth Paulson

Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice Interact

  • Amanda Kube
  • Sanmay Das
  • Patrick J. Fowler
  • Yevgeniy Vorobeychik