Post-conference Update: Video recordings from the EC main conference are now online!


The workshops and tutorials will be on June 26-27, and the main technical program will be on June 28-30. Lunch will be provided by the conference.

Complete PDF Schedule for Workshops, Tutorials and Main Conference is here!

Tuesday, June 27, 2017
6:00 - 8:00 PM
Reception and Poster Session (Location: Stata 4th floor lounge)
Wednesday, June 28, 2017
8:00 - 9:00 AM
9:00 - 9:15 AM
Opening Remarks
9:15 - 10:15 AM
Plenary Session (Location: 32-123)

Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania)
Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

10:15 - 10:40 AM
10:40 AM - 12:00 PM

Session 1a
Static Revenue Maximization 1 (Session Chair: Vahab Mirrokni, Location: 32-123)

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao (Tsinghua University)

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service
Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: the General Case
Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton)

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Nima Haghpanah (Penn State University); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (University of California, Berkeley)

Session 1b
Peer Predictions (Session Chair: Preston McAfee, Location: 32-141)

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering
Rupert Freeman (Duke University); David M. Pennock (Microsoft Research); Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Microsoft Research)

Forecast Aggregation
Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion)

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction
Yang Liu (Harvard University); Yiling Chen (Harvard University)

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users
Arpit Agarwal (University of Pennsylvania); Debmalya Mandal (Harvard University); David C. Parkes (Harvard University); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University)

12:00 - 1:30 PM
1:10 - 2:30 PM
Business Meeting (Location: 32-123)
2:40 - 4:00 PM

Session 2a
Matching 1 (Session Chair: Scott Kominers, Location: 32-123)

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm
Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania); Sanjeev Khanna (University of Pennsylvania); Yang Li (University of Pennsylvania)

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions
Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Daniela Saban (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

Matching while Learning
Ramesh Johari (Stanford University); Vijay Kamble (Stanford University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia University)

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match
Avinatan Hassidim (Bar-Ilan University); Assaf Romm (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Ran I. Shorrer (Penn State University)

Session 2b
Predictions and Queries (Session Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown, Location: 32-141)

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games
Noam Nisan (Hebrew University and Microsoft Research); Gali Noti (Hebrew University)

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete? An Application to Human Perception of Randomness
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Annie Liang (Microsoft Research); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University)

Comparison-based Choices
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University); Johan Ugander (Stanford University)

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction
Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania)

4:00 - 4:30 PM
4:30 - 5:50 PM

Session 3a
Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1 (Session Chair: Alex Slivkins, Location: 32-123)

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Francisco Castro (Columbia University); Gabriel Weintraub (Stanford University and AppNexus)

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
Santiago R. Balseiro (Duke University); Vahab Mirrokni (Google Research); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research)

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers
Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research); Brendan Lucier (Microsoft Research); Emmanouil Pountourakis (University of Texas, Austin); Sam Taggart (Northwestern University)

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers
José Correa (Universidad de Chile); Patricio Foncea (Universidad de Chile); Ruben Hoeksma (Universidad de Chile); Tim Oosterwijk (Maastricht University); Tjark Vredeveld (Maastricht University)

Session 3b
Economic Equilibrium (Session Chair: Giorgos Zervas, Location: 32-141)

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation
Frank Cheng (University of Michigan); Michael P. Wellman (University of Michigan)

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets
Erik Brinkman (University of Michigan); Michael P. Wellman (University of Michigan)

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation
Pieter Kleer (CWI); Guido Schaefer (CWI and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase
Juan Camilo Castillo (Stanford University); Dan Knoepfle (Uber Technologies); Glen Weyl (Microsoft Research and Yale University)

6:00 - 7:00 PM
Open discussion on job market advice for graduate students (Location: 32-123)
lead by Kevin Leyton-Brown, Ruta Mehta and Matt Weinberg
Thursday, June 29, 2017
8:00 - 9:00 AM
9:00 - 10:20 AM

Session 4a
Matching 2 (Session Chair: Richard Cole, Location: 32-123)

Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Yuval Emek (Technion); Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University); Boaz Patt-Shamir (Tel Aviv University); Ron Peretz (Bar-Ilan University); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion)

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
Saeed Alaei (Google); Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University); Mark Braverman (Princeton University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia University); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research)

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks
Ravi Jagadeesan (Harvard University)

Session 4b
Voting (Session Chair: Vincent Conitzer, Location: 32-141)

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions
Gerdus Benade (Carnegie Mellon University); Anson Kahng (Carnegie Mellon University); Ariel D. Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University)

Voting in the Limelight
Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University)

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules
Ashish Goel (Stanford University); Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy (Stanford University); Kamesh Munagala (Duke University)

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates
Yu Cheng (University of Southern California); Shaddin Dughmi (University of Southern California); David Kempe (University of Southern California)

10:20 - 10:50 AM
10:50 AM - 12:10 PM

Session 5a
Static Revenue Maximization 2 (Session Chair: Shuchi Chawla, Location: 32-123)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden (Tel-Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University); Ophir Friedler (Tel-Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing
Elliot Anshelevich (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Shreyas Sekar (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden (Tel-Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University); Ophir Friedler (Tel-Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments
Gerardo Berbeglia (Melbourne Business School, The University of Melbourne); Gwenaël Joret (Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Session 5b
Information Games (Session Chair: Ilya Segal, Location: 32-141)

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers
David Lingenbrink (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University)

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks
Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University)

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
Shaddin Dughmi (University of Southern California); Haifeng Xu (University of Southern California)

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents
Sampath Kannan (University of Pennsylvania); Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania); Jamie Morgenstern (University of Pennsylvania); Mallesh Pai (Rice University); Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)

12:10 - 1:40 PM
1:40 - 2:40 PM
Best paper and Best Dissertation presentations (Location: 32-123)

Combinatorial Cost Sharing
Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann Institute of Science); Shahar Ovadia (Weizmann Institute of Science)

SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation by Peng Shi

2:50 - 3:50 PM

Session 6a
Scheduling (Session Chair: Elliot Anshelevich, Location: 32-123)

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University); Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University); Alan Roytman (University of Copenhagen)

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling
Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin - Madison); Nikhil R. Devanur (MSR); Janardhan Kulkarni (MSR); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University)

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty
Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Alkmini Sgouritsa (University of Liverpool)

Session 6b
Fair Division 1 (Session Chair: Liad Blumrosen, Location: 32-141)

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
Richard Cole (New York University); Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Kamal Jain (Faira); Tung Mai (Georgia Institute of Technology); Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology); Sadra Yazdanbod (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division
Eric Friedman (ICSI and University of California, Berkeley); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (University of California, Berkeley); Shai Vardi (California Institute of Technology)

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting
Ariel D. Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University); Junxing Wang (Carnegie Mellon University)

3:50 - 4:20 PM
4:20 - 5:40 PM

Session 7a
Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2 (Session Chair: Michal Feldman, Location: 32-123)

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning
Sebastien Bubeck (Microsoft Research); Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Zhiyi Huang (The University of Hong Kong); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University)

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers
Yiwei Chen (Singapore University of Technology and Design); Cong Shi (University of Michigan)

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework
Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Daniel Freund (Cornell Unviersity); Thodoris Lykouris (Cornell University)

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization
Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research); Jonathan Ullman (Northeastern University); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)

Session 7b
Experiments (Session Chair: Nicole Immorlica, Location: 32-141)

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?
Filippas Apostolos (New York University, Stern School of Business); John Joseph Horton (New York University, Stern School of Business)

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews
Shrabastee Banerjee (Questrom School of Business, Boston University); Chris Dellarocas (Questrom School of Business, Boston University); Georgios Zervas (Questrom School of Business, Boston University)

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem
Daniel G. Goldstein (Microsoft Reserach); R. Preston McAfee (Microsoft Corporation); Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research); James R. Wright (Microsoft Research)

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness
Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University); Matthew Jackson; (Stanford University)

6:00 - 9:00 PM
EC Social Event: Reception hosted by Microsoft
Location: Microsoft NERD Center, One Memorial Drive
Friday, June 30, 2017
8:00 - 9:00 AM
9:00 - 10:00 AM

Session 8a
Mechanism Design: General (Session Chair: Glen Weyl, Location: 32-123)

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Georgios Birmpas (Athens University of Economics and Business); Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business)

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies
Artur Gorokh (Cornell University); Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University)

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
Sophie Bade (Royal Holloway, University of London & Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Yannai A. Gonczarowski (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & Microsoft Research)

Session 8b
Decision Making and Learning (Session Chair: David Pennock, Location: 32-141)

Planning with Multiple Biases
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Manish Raghavan (Cornell University)

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making
Ilan Lobel (New York University); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research NY); Adrian Vladu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments
Ger Yang (University of Texas at Austin); Georgios Piliouras (Singapore University of Technology and Design); David Basanta (H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute)

10:00 - 10:20 AM
10:20 - 11:20 AM

Session 9a
Auctions: Equilibrium (Session Chair: Vasilis Syrgkanis, Location: 32-123)

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
Johannes Brustle (McGill University); Yang Cai (McGill University); Fa Wu (McGill University and Zhejiang University); Mingfei Zhao (Mcgill University)

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi (LUISS); Paul W. Goldberg (University of Oxford); Bart de Keijzer (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI)); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University); Stefano Turchetta (KPMG Italy and University of Oxford)

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
Santiago R. Balseiro (Duke University); Yonatan Gur (Stanford University)

Session 9b
Fair Division 2 (Session Chair: Anna Karlin, Location: 32-141)

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
Simina Branzei (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Ruta Mehta (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Fair Public Decision Making
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University); Rupert Freeman (Duke University); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University)

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division
Siddharth Barman (Indian Institute of Science); Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy (Chennai Mathematical Institute)

11:30 AM - 12:30 PM
Plenary Session (Location: 32-123)

Jennifer Chayes (Microsoft Research)
Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

12:30 - 2:00 PM
2:00 - 3:20 PM

Session 10a
Matching 3 (Session Chair: Matt Weinberg, Location: 32-123)

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
John William Hatfield (University of Texas at Austin); Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University); Alexander Westkamp (University of Cologne)

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
Thanh Nguyen (Purdue University); Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
Benjamin N. Roth (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Ran I. Shorrer (The ennsylvania State University)

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing
Nick Arnosti (Columbia University); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research)

Session 10b
Strategic Games (Session Chair: Yakov Babichenko, Location: 32-141)

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players
Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion)

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games
Christian Kroer (Carnegie Mellon University); Kevin Waugh (University of Alberta); Fatma Kilinc-Karzan (Carnegie Mellon University); Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic
Zhigang Cao (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Bo Chen (University of Warwick); Xujin Chen (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Changjun Wang (Beijing University of Technology)

A Polynomial Time Algorithm For Spatio-Temporal Security Games
Soheil Behnezhad (University of Maryland); Mahsa Derakhshan (University of Maryland); MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi (University of Maryland); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research)

3:20 - 3:45 PM
3:45 - 4:30 PM

ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award (Location: 32-123)
video acceptance and discussion