Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2017 (listed by first submission time):
Paper Title | Authors and Affiliations |
---|---|
Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments | Gerardo Berbeglia (Melbourne Business School); Gwenael Joret (Universite Libre de Bruxelles) |
Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization | Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research); Jonathan Ullman (Northeastern University); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania) |
A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting | Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University); Junxing Wang (Carnegie Mellon University) |
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms | John Hatfield (University of Texas at Austin); Scott Kominers (Harvard University); Alexander Westkamp (University of Cologne) |
Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks | Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University) |
Voting in the Limelight | Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University) |
The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized? | Filippas Apostolos (NYU Stern School of Business); John Horton (NYU Stern School of Business) |
Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers | Yiwei Chen (Singapore University of Technology and Design); Cong Shi (University of Michigan) |
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase | Juan Castillo (Stanford University); Dan Knoepfle (Uber Technologies); Glen Weyl (Microsoft Research and Yale University) |
Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews | Shrabastee Banerjee (Boston University); Chris Dellarocas (Boston University); Georgios Zervas (Boston University) |
Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions | Gerdus Benade (Carnegie Mellon University); Anson Kahng (Carnegie Mellon University); Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University) |
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare | Richard Cole (NYU); Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Kamal Jain (Faira); Tung Mai (Georgia Institute of Technology); Vijay Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology); Sadra Yazdanbod (Georgia Institute of Technology) |
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players | Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion) |
A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games | Noam Nisan (Hebrew University); Gali Noti (Hebrew University) |
Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem | Daniel Goldstein (Microsoft Reserach); R. Preston McAfee (Microsoft Corporation); Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research); James Wright (Microsoft Research) |
Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium | Santiago Balseiro (Duke University); Yonatan Gur (Stanford University) |
Complementary inputs and the existence of stable outcomes in large trading networks | Ravi Jagadeesan (Harvard University) |
Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework | Sid Banerjee (Cornell University); Daniel Freund (Cornell Unviersity); Thodoris Lykouris (Cornell University) |
Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities | Santiago Balseiro (Duke University); Vahab Mirrokni (Google); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research) |
Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making | Ilan Lobel (New York University); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research); Adrian Vladu (MIT) |
Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation | Frank Cheng (University of Michigan); Michael Wellman (University of Michigan) |
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders | Alon Eden (Tel Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Ophir Friedler (Tel Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University) |
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements | Alon Eden (Tel Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Ophir Friedler (Tel Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University) |
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing | Elliot Anshelevich (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Shreyas Sekar (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) |
The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering | Rupert Freeman (Duke University); David Pennock (Microsoft Research); Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Microsoft Research) |
Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling | Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin); Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Janardhan Kulkarni (Microsoft Research); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University) |
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison | Andrew Yao (Tsinghua University) |
A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic | Zhigang Cao (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Bo Chen (University of Warwick); Xujin Chen (Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences); Changjun Wang (Beijing University of Technology) |
Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction | Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania) |
Optimal Multi-Unit Pricing with Private Demands | Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Nima Haghpanah (Penn State University); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (UC Berkeley) |
Controlled Dynamic Fair Division | Eric Friedman (ICSI and University of California Berkeley); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (UC Berkeley); Shai Vardi (California Institute of Technology) |
Forecast Aggregation | Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion) |
Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match | Avinatan Hassidim (Bar Ilan University and Google); Assaf Romm (Hebrew University); Ran I. Shorrer (Penn State) |
The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints | Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Francisco Castro (Columbia Business School); Gabriel Weintraub (Stanford Graduate School of Business) |
Fair Public Decision Making | Vincent Conitzer (Duke); Rupert Freeman (Duke University); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University) |
Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction | Yang Liu (Harvard University); Yiling Chen (Harvard University) |
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users | Debmalya Mandal (Graduate Student); Arpit Agarwal (University of Pennsylvania); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University); David Parkes (Harvard) |
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions | Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi (Sapienza University of Rome); Paul Goldberg (University of Oxford); Bart de Keijzer (CWI Amsterdam); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University); Stefano Turchetta (Univ. of Oxford) |
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices | Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University); Alan Roytman (University of Copenhagen) |
Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers | Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern and MSR NE); Brendan Lucier (Microsoft); Emmanouil Pountourakis (UT Austin); Sam Taggart (Northwestern University) |
Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games | Christian Kroer (Carnegie Mellon University); Kevin Waugh (University of Alberta); Fatma Kilinc-Karzan (Carnegie Mellon University); Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University) |
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: the General Case | Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University) |
A Polynomial Time Algorithm For Spatio-Temporal Security Games | Soheil Behnezhad (University of Maryland); Mahsa Derakhshan (University of Maryland); MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi (University of Maryland College Park); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research) |
Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints | Thanh Nguyen (Purdue); Rakesh Vohra (Penn) |
Comparison-Based Choices | Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University); Johan Ugander (Stanford University) |
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers | David Lingenbrink (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University) |
Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division | Siddharth Barman (IISc); Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy (CMI) |
Posted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers | Jose Correa (Universidad de Chile); Patricio Foncea (Universidad de Chile); Ruben Hoeksma (Universidad de Chile); Tim Oosterwijk (Maastricht University); Tjark Vredeveld (Maastricht University) |
Stable Secretaries | Rann Smorodinsky (Technion); Yuval Emek (Technion); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Boaz Patt-Shamir (Tel Aviv University); Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Ron Peretz (Bar-Ilan univ) |
Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules | Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy (Stanford University); Ashish Goel (Stanford University); Kamesh Munagala (Duke University) |
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design | Benjamin Roth (MIT); Ran I. Shorrer (Penn State) |
From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies | Artur Gorokh (Cornell University); Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University) |
Combinatorial Cost Sharing | Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann); Shahar Ovadia (Weizmann) |
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service | Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University) |
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents | Simina Branzei (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Ruta Mehta (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) |
Bifurcation Mechanism Design - From Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments | Ger Yang (University of Texas at Austin); Georgios Piliouras (Singapore University of Technology and Design); David Basanta (H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Inst.) |
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness | Sophie Bade (Royal Holloway University of London and Max Planck Institut Bonn); Yannai Gonczarowski (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research) |
Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning | Sebastien Bubeck (Microsoft Research); Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Zhiyi Huang (The University of Hong Kong); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University) |
The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm | Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania); Sanjeev Khanna (University of Pennsylvania); Yang Li (University of Pennsylvania) |
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness | Georgios Amanatidis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Georgios Birmpas (Athens University of Economics and Business); Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business) |
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms | Johannes Brustle (McGill University); Yang Cai (McGill University); Fa Wu (McGill University and Zhejiang University); Mingfei Zhao (Mcgill University) |
Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms: Restricting agent actions | Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Daniela Saban (Stanford University) |
Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness | Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford Graduate School of Business); Matthew Jackson; (Stanford University) |
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets | Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University); Mark Braverman (Princeton University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research) |
Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation | Pieter Kleer (CWI); Guido Schaefer (CWI and VU University Amsterdam) |
The Theory is Predictive but is it Complete? An Application to Human Perception of Randomness | Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Annie Liang (Microsoft Research New England); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University) |
Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets | Saeed Alaei (Google); Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University and Department of Computer Science) |
Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty | Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Alkmini Sgouritsa (University of Liverpool) |
Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities | Shaddin Dughmi (Univ. of Southern California); Haifeng Xu (University of Southern California) |
Matching while learning | Ramesh Johari (Stanford University); Vijay Kamble (Stanford University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School) |
Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets | Erik Brinkman (University of Michigan); Michael Wellman (University of Michigan) |
Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents | Sampath Kannan (University of Pennsylvania); Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania); Jamie Morgenstern (Carnegie Mellon University and University of Pennsylvania); Mallesh Pai (Rice University); Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Rakesh Vohra (Penn); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania) |
Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates | Yu Cheng (University of Southern California); Shaddin Dughmi (Univ. of Southern California); David Kempe (University of Southern California) |
Planning with Multiple Biases | Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Manish Raghavan (Cornell University) |
How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing | Nick Arnosti (Columbia University); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research) |