Vol. 14.2
December, 2015
- News and Views
- Editor's Introduction
- SHADDIN DUGHMI
- Editor's Introduction
- Survey
- Letters
- Two Desirable Fairness Concepts for Allocation of Indivisible Objects under Ordinal Preferences
- HARIS AZIZ, SERGE GASPERS, SIMON MACKENZIE, and TOBY WALSH
- Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round
- PAUL DÜTTING, THOMAS KESSELHEIM, and ÉVA TARDOS
- Incentivizing High Quality Crowdwork
- CHIEN-JU HO, ALEKSANDRS SLIVKINS, SIDDHARTH SURI, and JENNIFER WORTMAN VAUGHAN
- Why Prices Need Algorithms
- TIM ROUGHGARDEN and INBAL TALGAM-COHEN
- The Complexity of Simplicity in Mechanism Design
- AVIAD RUBINSTEIN
- Two Desirable Fairness Concepts for Allocation of Indivisible Objects under Ordinal Preferences
ISSN 1551-9031