## Test of Time Award

The SIGecom Test of Time Award recognizes the author or authors of an influential paper or series of papers published between ten and twenty-five years ago that has significantly impacted research or applications exemplifying the interplay of economics and computation. More details and nomination procedure…

- Past and Present Members of the Test of Time Award Committee

- Yeon-Koo Che, Nikhil Devanur, Joan Feigenbaum, Bobby Kleinberg, Paul Milgrom, Noam Nisan, David Parkes, David Pennock, Alvin Roth, Tim Roughgarden, Larry Samuelson, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham, Éva Tardos, Moshe Tennenholtz

### Test of Time Award Winners

- 2023
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Nicole Immorlica and Mohammad Mahdian
- Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2005, pp. 53–62.

- Unbalanced random matching markets
- Itai Ashlagi, Yash Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno
- Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2013, pp. 27–28.

- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- 2022
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, and Christos H. Papadimitriou
- Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2006, pp. 71–78.
- SIAM Journal on Computing 39(3), 2009, pp. 129–259.

- Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
- Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng
- Proceedings of the 47th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2006, pp. 261–272.
- Journal of the ACM 56(3), 2009, pp. 14–57.

- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- 2021
- Competitive auctions and digital goods
- Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, and Andrew Wright
- Proceedings of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2001, pp. 735–744.

- Competitive auctions and digital goods
- 2020
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Dean Foster and Rakesh Vohra
- Games and Economic Behavior 21(1–2), 1997, pp. 40–55

- A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
- Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
- Econometrica 68(5), 2000, pp. 1127–1150

- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- 2019
- The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices
- Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal
- Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), 2006, pp. 192–224

- The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices
- 2018
- Position Auctions
- Hal R. Varian
- International Journal of Industrial Organization 25(6), 2007, pp. 1163–1178

- Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
- Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz
- American Economic Review 97(1), 2007, pp. 242–259

- Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords
- Gagan Aggarwal, Ashish Goel, and Rajeev Motwani
- Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2006, pp. 1–7

- Position Auctions
- 2017
- Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
- Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham
- Journal of the ACM 49(5), 2002, pp. 577–602

- Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
- 2016
- Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
- John J. Bartholdi III and James B. Orlin
- Social Choice and Welfare, 8(4), 1991, pp. 341–354

- How Hard is it to Control an Election?
- John J. Bartholdi III, Craig A. Tovey, and Michael A. Trick
- Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 16(8–9), 1992, pp. 27–40

- Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
- 2015
- The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
- Eric J. Friedman and Paul Resnick
- Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 10(2), 2001, pp. 173–199

- The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms

*"… for explaining an apparent gap between the theory and practice of matching markets and helping us understand why small cores are so common."*

*"… for settling the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium."*

*"… for foundational work initiating a long and fruitful line of work in approximately revenue-optimal auction design in prior free settings."*

*"… for foundational work on games played by learning agents, an important research direction that continues to inspire researchers to this day."*

*"… for laying the foundations for applying communication complexity in algorithmic game theory, and for identifying the deep connections between communication complexity and price theory."*

*"… for independently introducing the first game-theoretic models and analyses of the Generalized Second-Price Auction (GSP), laying the groundwork for a large body of papers that followed—a literature that remains active to this day."*