## Test of Time Award

The SIGecom Test of Time Award recognizes the author or authors of an influential paper or series of papers published between ten and twenty-five years ago that has significantly impacted research or applications exemplifying the interplay of economics and computation. More details and nomination procedure…

- Past and Present Members of the Test of Time Award Committee

- Yeon-Koo Che, Yiling Chen, Nikhil Devanur, Joan Feigenbaum, Jason Hartline, Bobby Kleinberg, Paul Milgrom, Noam Nisan, Asu Ozdaglar, David Parkes, David Pennock, Alvin Roth, Tim Roughgarden, Larry Samuelson, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham, Éva Tardos, Moshe Tennenholtz

### Test of Time Award Winners

- 2024
- AdWords and generalized online matching
- Aranyak Mehta, Amin Saberi, Umesh Vazirani, Vijay Vazirani
- Journal of the ACM 54(5), 2007, Article 22

- AdWords and generalized online matching
- 2023
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Nicole Immorlica and Mohammad Mahdian
- Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2005, pp. 53–62.

- Unbalanced random matching markets
- Itai Ashlagi, Yash Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno
- Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2013, pp. 27–28.

- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- 2022
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, and Christos H. Papadimitriou
- Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2006, pp. 71–78.
- SIAM Journal on Computing 39(3), 2009, pp. 129–259.

- Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
- Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng
- Proceedings of the 47th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2006, pp. 261–272.
- Journal of the ACM 56(3), 2009, pp. 14–57.

- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- 2021
- Competitive auctions and digital goods
- Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, and Andrew Wright
- Proceedings of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2001, pp. 735–744.

- Competitive auctions and digital goods
- 2020
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Dean Foster and Rakesh Vohra
- Games and Economic Behavior 21(1–2), 1997, pp. 40–55

- A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
- Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
- Econometrica 68(5), 2000, pp. 1127–1150

- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- 2019
- The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices
- Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal
- Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), 2006, pp. 192–224

- The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices
- 2018
- Position Auctions
- Hal R. Varian
- International Journal of Industrial Organization 25(6), 2007, pp. 1163–1178

- Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
- Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz
- American Economic Review 97(1), 2007, pp. 242–259

- Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords
- Gagan Aggarwal, Ashish Goel, and Rajeev Motwani
- Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2006, pp. 1–7

- Position Auctions
- 2017
- Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
- Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham
- Journal of the ACM 49(5), 2002, pp. 577–602

- Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
- 2016
- Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
- John J. Bartholdi III and James B. Orlin
- Social Choice and Welfare, 8(4), 1991, pp. 341–354

- How Hard is it to Control an Election?
- John J. Bartholdi III, Craig A. Tovey, and Michael A. Trick
- Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 16(8–9), 1992, pp. 27–40

- Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
- 2015
- The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
- Eric J. Friedman and Paul Resnick
- Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 10(2), 2001, pp. 173–199

- The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms

*"… for introducing and solving a model of online matching with budgets that has seen many practical applications to online markets and broad and continuing impact in the literature."*

*"… for explaining an apparent gap between the theory and practice of matching markets and helping us understand why small cores are so common."*

*"… for settling the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium."*

*"… for foundational work initiating a long and fruitful line of work in approximately revenue-optimal auction design in prior free settings."*

*"… for foundational work on games played by learning agents, an important research direction that continues to inspire researchers to this day."*

*"… for laying the foundations for applying communication complexity in algorithmic game theory, and for identifying the deep connections between communication complexity and price theory."*

*"… for independently introducing the first game-theoretic models and analyses of the Generalized Second-Price Auction (GSP), laying the groundwork for a large body of papers that followed—a literature that remains active to this day."*