Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Pricing Shared Rides

  • Chiwei Yan
  • Julia Yan
  • Yifan Shen

On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms

  • Daniel Freund
  • Ilan Lobel
  • Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

Market Fragmentation and Inefficiencies in Maritime Shipping

  • Kostas Bimpikis
  • Giacomo Mantegazza
  • Salomón Wollenstein-Betech

Equitable Congestion Pricing under the Markovian Traffic Model: An Application to Bogota

  • Alfredo Torrico
  • Natthawut Boonsiriphatthanajaroen
  • Nikhil Garg
  • Andrea Lodi
  • Hugo Mainguy

Algorithmic Cheap Talk

  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • Haifeng Xu
  • Konstantin Zabarnyi

Complexity, Communication and Misrepresentation

  • Junya Zhou
  • Collin Raymond

A belief-based approach to signaling

  • Frédéric Koessler
  • Marie Laclau
  • Tristan Tomala

Encouraging a Go-Getter

  • Thomas Brzustowski

Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets

  • Argyrios Deligkas
  • John Fearnley
  • Alexandros Hollender
  • Themistoklis Melissourgos

Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm

  • Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
  • Christian Kroer
  • Ruta Mehta
  • Tianlong Nan

An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive Valuations

  • Eric Balkanski
  • Christopher En
  • Yuri Faenza

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability

  • Thorben Troebst
  • Vijay V. Vazirani

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions

  • Yang Cai
  • Yingkai Li
  • Jinzhao Wu

As-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms

  • Lea Nagel
  • Roberto Saitto

Non-Market Screening with Investment

  • Victor Augias
  • Eduardo Perez-Richet

A mechanism-design approach to property rights

  • Piotr Dworczak
  • Ellen Muir

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences

  • Felix Brandt
  • Matthias Greger
  • Erel Segal-Halevi
  • Warut Suksompong

Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences

  • Théo Delemazure
  • Dominik Peters

Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting Games

  • Adrian Haret
  • Sophie Klumper
  • Jan Maly
  • Guido Schäfer

Monotone Randomized Apportionment

  • José Correa
  • Paul Gölz
  • Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
  • Jamie Tucker-Foltz
  • Victor Verdugo

Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Long-term Reference Effects

  • Shipra Agrawal
  • Wei Tang

Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium

  • Brian Hu Zhang
  • Gabriele Farina
  • Ioannis Anagnostides
  • Federico Cacciamani
  • Stephen McAleer
  • Andreas Haupt
  • Andrea Celli
  • Nicola Gatti
  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Tuomas Sandholm

Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems

  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Georgios Piliouras
  • Jon Schneider
  • Kelly Spendlove
  • Song Zuo

Preferences Evolve and so Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms

  • Khashayar Khosravi
  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Chara Podimata
  • Apostolis Tsorvantzis

Managing Strategic Complexity

  • Jeffrey Ely
  • Benjamin Golub
  • Annie Liang
  • Chaofeng Wu

AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court

  • David Almog
  • Romain Gauriot
  • Lionel Page
  • Daniel Martin

Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation

  • Luca Carminati
  • Brian Hu Zhang
  • Gabriele Farina
  • Nicola Gatti
  • Tuomas Sandholm

Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design

  • Aadityan Ganesh
  • Jason D. Hartline
  • Atanu R Sinha
  • Matthew vonAllmen

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

  • Tomer Ezra
  • Michal Feldman
  • Zhihao Gavin Tang

Online Matching and Contention Resolution for Edge Arrivals with Vanishing Probabilities

  • Will Ma
  • Calum MacRury
  • Pranav Nuti

The Hidden Cost of `Zero-Commission';

  • Simon Jantschgi

With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm Disclosures

  • Jonathan Libgober
  • Beatrice Michaeli
  • Elyashiv Wiedman

Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition

  • Spyros Galanis
  • Sergei Mikhalishchev

Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective

  • Gagan Aggarwal
  • Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru
  • Paul Duetting
  • Federico Fusco

Learning to Maximize Gains From Trade in Small Markets

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Amitai Frey
  • Noam Nisan

Active Learning for Fair and Stable Online Allocations

  • Riddhiman Bhattacharya
  • Thanh Nguyen
  • Will Wei Sun
  • Mohit Tawarmalani

Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share

  • Hannaneh Akrami
  • Jugal Garg
  • Eklavya Sharma
  • Setareh Taki

Multi-item Resource Allocation for Maximizing Social Welfare under Network Externalities

  • S. Rasoul Etesami

Mobility Data in Operations: Multi-Location Facility Location Problem

  • Ozan Candogan
  • Yiding Feng

User Strategization and Trustworthy Algorithms

  • Sarah H. Cen
  • Andrew Ilyas
  • Aleksander Ma̧dry

Measuring Strategization in Recommendation: Users Adapt Their Behavior to Shape Future Content

  • Sarah H. Cen
  • Andrew Ilyas
  • Jennifer Allen
  • Hannah Li
  • Aleksander Ma̧dry

Human-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls

  • Francisco Castro
  • Jian Gao
  • Sébastien Martin

Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework

  • Tommaso Bondi
  • Omid Rafieian
  • Yunfei (Jesse) Yao

Common Knowledge, Regained

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Yoram Moses

Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational Asymmetries

  • Francesco Fabbri
  • Sofia Moroni

Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency

  • Franz Ostrizek
  • Elia Sartori

Stability in Random Hedonic Games

  • Martin Bullinger
  • Sonja Kraiczy

Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to Coalitions

  • Ivan Geffner
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Nonprogressive Diffusion on Social Networks: Approximation and Applications

  • Yunduan Lin
  • Heng Zhang
  • Renyu Zhang
  • Zuo-Jun Max Shen

Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

  • Harry Pei

How effective is the High Stock Delivery Windows Information Sharing Policy for Online Platforms

  • Do Yoon Kim
  • Benjamin Knight
  • Dmitry Mitrofanov

Ex-Post Equilibrium Market Recommendations

  • Shai Vardi
  • Chris Parker

Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation

  • Marios Mertzanidis
  • Alexandros Psomas
  • Paritosh Verma

A Data-driven Approach to Improve Artisans’ Productivity in Distributed Supply Chains

  • Divya Singhvi
  • Somya Singhvi
  • Xinyu Zhang

Optimal Stopping with Interdependent Values

  • Simon Mauras
  • Divyarthi Mohan
  • Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

Setting Targets is All You Need: Improved Order Competitive Ratio for Online Selection

  • Liyan Chen
  • Nuozhou Sun
  • Zhihao Gavin Tang

Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource Allocation

  • Alexander Braun
  • Thomas Kesselheim
  • Tristan Pollner
  • Amin Saberi

Improved Bounds for Fractional Online Matching Problems

  • Zhihao Gavin Tang
  • Yuhao Zhang

The Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and Merit

  • Allen Sirolly
  • Yash Kanoria
  • Hongyao Ma

Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government Operations

  • Zhi Liu
  • Nikhil Garg

Explainable Affirmative Action

  • Carlos Bonet
  • Nick Arnosti
  • Jay Sethuraman

Equal Pay for Similar Work

  • Diego Gentile Passaro
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Bobak Pakzad-Hurson

Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions

  • Martino Bernasconi
  • Matteo Castiglioni
  • Andrea Celli

Revisiting the First-Order-Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

  • Hang Jiang
  • Chen Jin
  • Luyi Yang

Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?

  • Yurong Chen
  • Zhaohua Chen
  • Xiaotie Deng
  • Zhiyi Huang

Monitoring with Rich Data

  • Mira Frick
  • Ryota Iijima
  • Yuhta Ishii

The Dedicated Docket in U.S. Immigration Courts: An analysis of fairness and efficiency properties

  • Daniel Freund
  • Wentao Weng

Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and Opportunity

  • Cynthia Dwork
  • Chris Hays
  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Manish Raghavan

Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules

  • Oguzhan Celebi

Target the vulnerable? An analysis of rapid rehousing prioritization

  • Felipe Simon
  • Nick Arnosti

Social Learning through Action-Signals

  • Wenji Xu

Social Learning with Bounded Rationality: Negative Reviews Persist under Newest First

  • Jackie Baek
  • Atanas Dinev
  • Thodoris Lykouris

Learning about Informativeness

  • Wanying Huang

Learning from Viral Content

  • Krishna Dasaratha
  • Kevin He

Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

  • Zaiwei Chen
  • Kaiqing Zhang
  • Eric Mazumdar
  • Asuman Ozdaglar
  • Adam Wierman

On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions

  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas
  • Yiannis Giannakopoulos
  • Alexandros Hollender
  • Charalampos Kokkalis

Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications

  • Simone Cerreia-Vioglio
  • Giacomo Lanzani
  • Roberto Corrao

A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion Games

  • Yiannis Giannakopoulos

Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • John Horton
  • Prasanna Parasurama
  • Diego Urraca

Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Ori Heffetz
  • Guy Ishai
  • Clayton Thomas

Stable Matching as Transportation

  • Federico Echenique
  • Joseph Root
  • Fedor Sandomirskiy

When Geography Shapes Preferences: Redesigning Teacher Assignment in Italy

  • Mariagrazia Cavallo
  • Battal Dogan

Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items

  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • Emily Ryu
  • S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Eric Xue

Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets

  • Thành Nguyen
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids

  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Simon Mauras
  • Divyarthi Mohan

Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors

  • Linda Cai
  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Brendan Lucier

Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agents

  • Aaron Roth
  • Mirah Shi

Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion

  • Atulya Jain
  • Vianney Perchet

Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games

  • Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran
  • Natalie Collina
  • Jon Schneider

Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents

  • Natalie Collina
  • Aaron Roth
  • Han Shao

Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places

  • Alon Eden
  • Gary Qiurui Ma
  • David C. Parkes

Duopoly Assortment Competition under the Multinomial Logit Model: Simultaneous vs. Sequential

  • Kameng Nip
  • Changjun Wang

The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided Marketplace

  • Peng Shi

Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization

  • Luca D'Amico-Wong
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Gary Qiurui Ma
  • David C. Parkes

Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad

  • Jan Knoepfle
  • Juia Salmi

Learning from Strategic Sources

  • Kailin Chen

Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention

  • Tommaso Denti
  • Doron Ravid

Dynamic Competition for Attention

  • Jan Knoepfle

Full Dynamic Implementation

  • Andrew Koh
  • Sivakorn Sanguanmoo
  • Kei Uzui

Managing Newsvendors: A Demand Mechanism

  • Yilun Chen
  • Jiaqi Lu

Incentivizing Resource Pooling

  • Chen Chen
  • Yilun Chen
  • Pengyu Qian

Optimal Queueing Regimes

  • Marco Scarsini
  • Eran Shmaya

Can LLMs Mimic Human-Like Mental Accounting and Behavioral Biases?

  • Yan Leng

Eliciting Informative Text Evaluations with Large Language Models

  • Yuxuan Lu
  • Shengwei Xu
  • Yichi Zhang
  • Yuqing Kong
  • Grant Schoenebeck

Using GPT for Market Research

  • James Brand
  • Ayelet Israeli
  • Donald Ngwe

Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus?

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • John J. Horton
  • Benjamin S. Manning

Contract Design With Safety Inspections

  • Alireza Fallah
  • Michael Jordan

Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition

  • Yingkai Li
  • Jonathan Libgober

Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability

  • Natalie Collina
  • Varun Gupta
  • Aaron Roth

Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem

  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • Haifeng Xu
  • Konstantin Zabarnyi

Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sigal Oren
  • Emily Ryu
  • Eva Tardos

Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement

  • Kirk Bansak
  • Soonbong Lee
  • Vahideh Manshadi
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Elisabeth Paulson

Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement

  • Irene Lo
  • Vahideh Manshadi
  • Scott Rodilitz
  • Ali Shameli

Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets

  • Kenny Peng
  • Nikhil Garg

Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols

  • Matheus V. X. Ferreira
  • Aadityan Ganesh
  • Jack Hourigan
  • Hannah Huh
  • S. Matthew Weinberg
  • Catherine Yu

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

  • Aadityan Ganesh
  • Clayton Thomas
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus

  • Eric Budish
  • Andrew Lewis-Pye
  • Tim Roughgarden

The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers

  • Guillermo Angeris
  • Tarun Chitra
  • Theo Diamandis
  • Kshitij Kulkarni
  • Alex Evans

Alpha-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities

  • Fabian Raoul Pieroth
  • Martin Bichler

A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making

  • Tomáš Masařík
  • Grzegorz Pierczyński
  • Piotr Skowron

The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings

  • Patrick Lederer
  • Dominik Peters
  • Tomasz Wąs

Fair, Manipulation-Robust, and Transparent Sortition

  • Carmel Baharav
  • Bailey Flanigan

Adaptive Neyman Allocation

  • Jinglong Zhao

Enhancing External Validity in Experiments with Ongoing Sampling

  • Chen Wang
  • Shichao Han
  • Shan Huang

When Is Heterogeneity Actionable for Targeting?

  • Anya Shchetkina
  • Ron Berman

Experimenting under Stochastic Congestion

  • Shuangning Li
  • Ramesh Johari
  • Xu Kuang
  • Stefan Wager

Sample-Based Matroid Prophet Inequalities

  • Hu Fu
  • Pinyan Lu
  • Zhihao Gavin Tang
  • Hongxun Wu
  • Jinzhao Wu
  • Qianfan Zhang

Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies

  • Vasilis Livanos
  • Kalen Patton
  • Sahil Singla

Planning against a prophet: a graph-theoretic framework for making sequential decisions

  • Andres Cristi
  • Sigal Oren

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

  • Johannes Brustle
  • José Correa
  • Paul Dütting
  • Tomer Ezra
  • Michal Feldman
  • Victor Verdugo

Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experiment

  • Marie-Pierre Dargnies
  • Rustamdjan Hakimov
  • Dorothea Kübler

The Impact of AI Technology on the Productivity of Gig Economy Workers

  • Benjamin Knight
  • Dmitry Mitrofanov
  • Serguei Netessine

Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy

  • Enrique Ide
  • Eduard Talamàs

The Effects of Self-Advertising in a Labor Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • John Horton
  • Prasanna Parasurama
  • Diego Urraca

Competitive Markets for Personal Data

  • Simone Galperti
  • Tianhao Liu
  • Jacopo Perego

Information Design and Pricing of Supply Competition in Lead-Selling Platforms

  • Yanwei Sun
  • Niloofar Zamani Foroushani
  • Zhe Liu
  • Jiahua Wu

Learning to Rank under Strategic "Brush Wars"

  • Qinzhen Li
  • Yifan Feng
  • Hongfan(Kevin) Chen

Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies

  • Shreyas Sekar
  • Auyon Siddiq

Inference for an Algorithmic Fairness-Accuracy Frontier

  • Yiqi Liu
  • Francesca Molinari

An Alternative Approach for Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models

  • Christopher Turansick

Preference Regression

  • Peter Caradonna

On the limitations of data-based price discrimination

  • Haitian Xie
  • Ying Zhu
  • Denis Shishkin

From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

  • Tan Gan
  • Nicholas T. Wu

Certification Design for a Competitive Market

  • Andreas Alexander Haupt
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Brendan Lucier

Robust Advertisement Pricing

  • Tan Gan
  • Hongcheng Li

Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning

  • Doron Ravid
  • Jeffrey Mensch

Supply and demand function competition in input-output networks

  • Matteo Bizzarri

Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement

  • Gaurab Aryal
  • Charles Murry
  • Pallavi Pal
  • Arnab Palit

Exclusive Contracts in the Video Streaming Market

  • Yihao Yuan

A Strategic Model of Software Dependency Networks

  • Cornelius Fritz
  • Co-Pierre Georg
  • Angelo Mele
  • Michael Schweinberger

Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions

  • Rachitesh Kumar
  • Jon Schneider
  • Balasubramanian Sivan

Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions

  • Aviad Rubinstein
  • Junyao Zhao

Bandit Sequential Posted Pricing via Half-Concavity

  • Sahil Singla
  • Yifan Wang

Bandit Profit-Maximization for Targeted Marketing

  • Joon Suk Huh
  • Ellen Vitercik
  • Kirthevasan Kandasamy

Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes

  • Daniel Halpern
  • Safwan Hossain
  • Jamie Tucker-Foltz

Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting

  • Mashbat Suzuki
  • Jeremy Vollen

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core

  • Ben Berger
  • Michal Feldman
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Xizhi Tan

Generative Social Choice

  • Sara Fish
  • Paul Gölz
  • David C. Parkes
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Gili Rusak
  • Itai Shapira
  • Manuel Wüthrich

Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers

  • Geoffrey Ramseyer
  • Mohak Goyal
  • Ashish Goel
  • David Mazières

Undetectable Selfish Mining

  • Maryam Bahrani
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

  • Hao Chung
  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Elaine Shi

Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms

  • Yotam Gafni
  • Aviv Yaish

Optimal Cohort Partitions

  • Sofoklis Goulas
  • Faidra Monachou

Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules

  • Arthur Delarue
  • Zhen Lian
  • Sebastien Martin

Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation

  • Ermis Soumalias
  • Behnoosh Zamanlooy
  • Jakob Weissteiner
  • Sven Seuken

GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning

  • Tonghan Wang
  • Yanchen Jiang
  • David C. Parkes

Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets

  • Santiago Balseiro
  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Song Zuo

Understanding Iterative Combinatorial Auction Designs via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

  • Greg d'Eon
  • Neil Newman
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

The Surprising Benefits of Base Rate Neglect in Robust Aggregation

  • Yuqing Kong
  • Shu Wang
  • Ying Wang

Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests

  • Fupeng Sun
  • Yanwei Sun
  • Chiwei Yan
  • Li Jin

Full Accuracy Scoring Accelerates the Discovery of Skilled Forecasters

  • Pavel Atanasov
  • Ezra Karger
  • Philip Tetlock

To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model

  • Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
  • Sophie Klumper
  • Guido Schäfer
  • Artem Tsikiridis

Competitive Auctions with Imperfect Predictions

  • Pinyan Lu
  • Zongqi Wan
  • Jialin Zhang

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions

  • Eric Balkanski
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Xizhi Tan
  • Cherlin Zhu

Redistribution through Market Segmentation

  • Victor Augias
  • Daniel M. A. Barreto
  • Alexis Ghersengorin

Optimal Design of Default Donations

  • Francisco Castro
  • Scott Rodilitz

A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Tibor Heumann
  • Michael Wang

Inclusive Recommendations and User Engagement: Experimental Evidence from Pinterest

  • Madhav Kumar
  • Pedro Silva
  • Ashudeep Singh
  • Abhay Varmaraja

Algorithmic vs. Friend-based Recommendations in Shaping Novel Content Engagement: A Large-scale Field Experiment

  • Shan Huang
  • Yi Ji

Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy Concerns

  • Sebastián D. Bauer
  • Florencia M. Hnilo

Search and Rediscovery

  • Martino Banchio
  • Suraj Malladi

Decomposable Stochastic Choice

  • Fedor Sandomirskiy
  • Omer Tamuz

Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition

  • Jeffrey Mensch
  • Komal Malik

The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality

  • Zihao Li
  • Jonathan Libgober

The Core of Bayesian persuasion

  • Laura Doval
  • Ran Eilat

Incentivized Exploration via Filtered Posterior Sampling

  • Yonatan Gur
  • Anand Kalvit
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins

Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication

  • Xiaoyu Cheng
  • Peter Klibanoff
  • Sujoy Mukerji
  • Ludovic Renou

Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders

  • Zhicheng Du
  • Wei Tang
  • Zihe Wang
  • Shuo Zhang

Estimating Treatment Effects under Recommender Interference: A Structured Neural Networks Approach

  • Ruohan Zhan
  • Shichao Han
  • Yuchen Hu
  • Zhenling Jiang

Forecasting Algorithms for Causal Inference with Panel Data

  • Jacob Goldin
  • Julian Nyarko
  • Justin Young

Coarse Personalization

  • Walter Zhang
  • Sanjog Misra

Minimax-Regret Sample Selection in Randomized Experiments

  • Yuchen Hu
  • Henry Zhu
  • Emma Brunskil
  • Stefan Wager

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

  • Michal Feldman
  • Simon Mauras
  • Vishnu V. Narayan
  • Tomasz Ponitka

On the Fairness of Normalized $p$-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores

  • Owen Eckart
  • Alexandros Psomas
  • Paritosh Verma

Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations

  • Georgios Amanatidis
  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas
  • Alkmini Sgouritsa

On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations

  • Gerdus Benade
  • Daniel Halpern
  • Alexandros Psomas
  • Paritosh Verma

Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General Constraints

  • Kenzo Imamura
  • Yasushi Kawase

Equilibrium in Pseudomarkets

  • Thành Nguyen
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited

  • Kenzo Imamura
  • Keisuke Bando
  • Tomoya Kazumura

Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics

  • Afshin Nikzad

Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard

  • Jeffrey Ely
  • George Georgiadis
  • Luis Rayo

Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions

  • Federico Cacciamani
  • Martino Bernasconi
  • Matteo Castiglioni
  • Nicola Gatti

Optimal Robust Contract Design

  • Bo Peng
  • Zhihao Gavin Tang

Optimality of Weighted Contracts for Multi-agent Contract Design with a Budget

  • Wade Hann-Caruthers
  • Sumit Goel