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Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library
Pricing Shared Rides
Chiwei Yan
Julia Yan
Yifan Shen
On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms
Daniel Freund
Ilan Lobel
Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao
Market Fragmentation and Inefficiencies in Maritime Shipping
Kostas Bimpikis
Giacomo Mantegazza
Salomón Wollenstein-Betech
Equitable Congestion Pricing under the Markovian Traffic Model: An Application to Bogota
Alfredo Torrico
Natthawut Boonsiriphatthanajaroen
Nikhil Garg
Andrea Lodi
Hugo Mainguy
Algorithmic Cheap Talk
Yakov Babichenko
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Haifeng Xu
Konstantin Zabarnyi
Complexity, Communication and Misrepresentation
Junya Zhou
Collin Raymond
A belief-based approach to signaling
Frédéric Koessler
Marie Laclau
Tristan Tomala
Encouraging a Go-Getter
Thomas Brzustowski
Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets
Argyrios Deligkas
John Fearnley
Alexandros Hollender
Themistoklis Melissourgos
Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
Christian Kroer
Ruta Mehta
Tianlong Nan
An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive Valuations
Eric Balkanski
Christopher En
Yuri Faenza
Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability
Thorben Troebst
Vijay V. Vazirani
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
Yang Cai
Yingkai Li
Jinzhao Wu
As-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Lea Nagel
Roberto Saitto
Non-Market Screening with Investment
Victor Augias
Eduardo Perez-Richet
A mechanism-design approach to property rights
Piotr Dworczak
Ellen Muir
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences
Felix Brandt
Matthias Greger
Erel Segal-Halevi
Warut Suksompong
Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences
Théo Delemazure
Dominik Peters
Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting Games
Adrian Haret
Sophie Klumper
Jan Maly
Guido Schäfer
Monotone Randomized Apportionment
José Correa
Paul Gölz
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Jamie Tucker-Foltz
Victor Verdugo
Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Long-term Reference Effects
Shipra Agrawal
Wei Tang
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium
Brian Hu Zhang
Gabriele Farina
Ioannis Anagnostides
Federico Cacciamani
Stephen McAleer
Andreas Haupt
Andrea Celli
Nicola Gatti
Vincent Conitzer
Tuomas Sandholm
Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems
Renato Paes Leme
Georgios Piliouras
Jon Schneider
Kelly Spendlove
Song Zuo
Preferences Evolve and so Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms
Khashayar Khosravi
Renato Paes Leme
Chara Podimata
Apostolis Tsorvantzis
Managing Strategic Complexity
Jeffrey Ely
Benjamin Golub
Annie Liang
Chaofeng Wu
AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court
David Almog
Romain Gauriot
Lionel Page
Daniel Martin
Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation
Luca Carminati
Brian Hu Zhang
Gabriele Farina
Nicola Gatti
Tuomas Sandholm
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design
Aadityan Ganesh
Jason D. Hartline
Atanu R Sinha
Matthew vonAllmen
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms
Tomer Ezra
Michal Feldman
Zhihao Gavin Tang
Online Matching and Contention Resolution for Edge Arrivals with Vanishing Probabilities
Will Ma
Calum MacRury
Pranav Nuti
The Hidden Cost of `Zero-Commission';
Simon Jantschgi
With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm Disclosures
Jonathan Libgober
Beatrice Michaeli
Elyashiv Wiedman
Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition
Spyros Galanis
Sergei Mikhalishchev
Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective
Gagan Aggarwal
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru
Paul Duetting
Federico Fusco
Learning to Maximize Gains From Trade in Small Markets
Moshe Babaioff
Amitai Frey
Noam Nisan
Active Learning for Fair and Stable Online Allocations
Riddhiman Bhattacharya
Thanh Nguyen
Will Wei Sun
Mohit Tawarmalani
Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share
Hannaneh Akrami
Jugal Garg
Eklavya Sharma
Setareh Taki
Multi-item Resource Allocation for Maximizing Social Welfare under Network Externalities
S. Rasoul Etesami
Mobility Data in Operations: Multi-Location Facility Location Problem
Ozan Candogan
Yiding Feng
User Strategization and Trustworthy Algorithms
Sarah H. Cen
Andrew Ilyas
Aleksander Ma̧dry
Measuring Strategization in Recommendation: Users Adapt Their Behavior to Shape Future Content
Sarah H. Cen
Andrew Ilyas
Jennifer Allen
Hannah Li
Aleksander Ma̧dry
Human-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls
Francisco Castro
Jian Gao
Sébastien Martin
Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework
Tommaso Bondi
Omid Rafieian
Yunfei (Jesse) Yao
Common Knowledge, Regained
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Yoram Moses
Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational Asymmetries
Francesco Fabbri
Sofia Moroni
Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency
Franz Ostrizek
Elia Sartori
Stability in Random Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger
Sonja Kraiczy
Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to Coalitions
Ivan Geffner
Moshe Tennenholtz
Nonprogressive Diffusion on Social Networks: Approximation and Applications
Yunduan Lin
Heng Zhang
Renyu Zhang
Zuo-Jun Max Shen
Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records
Harry Pei
How effective is the High Stock Delivery Windows Information Sharing Policy for Online Platforms
Do Yoon Kim
Benjamin Knight
Dmitry Mitrofanov
Ex-Post Equilibrium Market Recommendations
Shai Vardi
Chris Parker
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation
Marios Mertzanidis
Alexandros Psomas
Paritosh Verma
A Data-driven Approach to Improve Artisans’ Productivity in Distributed Supply Chains
Divya Singhvi
Somya Singhvi
Xinyu Zhang
Optimal Stopping with Interdependent Values
Simon Mauras
Divyarthi Mohan
Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Setting Targets is All You Need: Improved Order Competitive Ratio for Online Selection
Liyan Chen
Nuozhou Sun
Zhihao Gavin Tang
Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource Allocation
Alexander Braun
Thomas Kesselheim
Tristan Pollner
Amin Saberi
Improved Bounds for Fractional Online Matching Problems
Zhihao Gavin Tang
Yuhao Zhang
The Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and Merit
Allen Sirolly
Yash Kanoria
Hongyao Ma
Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government Operations
Zhi Liu
Nikhil Garg
Explainable Affirmative Action
Carlos Bonet
Nick Arnosti
Jay Sethuraman
Equal Pay for Similar Work
Diego Gentile Passaro
Fuhito Kojima
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions
Martino Bernasconi
Matteo Castiglioni
Andrea Celli
Revisiting the First-Order-Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Hang Jiang
Chen Jin
Luyi Yang
Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
Yurong Chen
Zhaohua Chen
Xiaotie Deng
Zhiyi Huang
Monitoring with Rich Data
Mira Frick
Ryota Iijima
Yuhta Ishii
The Dedicated Docket in U.S. Immigration Courts: An analysis of fairness and efficiency properties
Daniel Freund
Wentao Weng
Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and Opportunity
Cynthia Dwork
Chris Hays
Jon Kleinberg
Manish Raghavan
Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules
Oguzhan Celebi
Target the vulnerable? An analysis of rapid rehousing prioritization
Felipe Simon
Nick Arnosti
Social Learning through Action-Signals
Wenji Xu
Social Learning with Bounded Rationality: Negative Reviews Persist under Newest First
Jackie Baek
Atanas Dinev
Thodoris Lykouris
Learning about Informativeness
Wanying Huang
Learning from Viral Content
Krishna Dasaratha
Kevin He
Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
Zaiwei Chen
Kaiqing Zhang
Eric Mazumdar
Asuman Ozdaglar
Adam Wierman
On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Yiannis Giannakopoulos
Alexandros Hollender
Charalampos Kokkalis
Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio
Giacomo Lanzani
Roberto Corrao
A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion Games
Yiannis Giannakopoulos
Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Apostolos Filippas
John Horton
Prasanna Parasurama
Diego Urraca
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Ori Heffetz
Guy Ishai
Clayton Thomas
Stable Matching as Transportation
Federico Echenique
Joseph Root
Fedor Sandomirskiy
When Geography Shapes Preferences: Redesigning Teacher Assignment in Italy
Mariagrazia Cavallo
Battal Dogan
Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items
Mahsa Derakhshan
Emily Ryu
S. Matthew Weinberg
Eric Xue
Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets
Thành Nguyen
Alexander Teytelboym
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids
Alon Eden
Michal Feldman
Simon Mauras
Divyarthi Mohan
Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors
Linda Cai
Moshe Babaioff
Brendan Lucier
Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agents
Aaron Roth
Mirah Shi
Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
Atulya Jain
Vianney Perchet
Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran
Natalie Collina
Jon Schneider
Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
Natalie Collina
Aaron Roth
Han Shao
Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places
Alon Eden
Gary Qiurui Ma
David C. Parkes
Duopoly Assortment Competition under the Multinomial Logit Model: Simultaneous vs. Sequential
Kameng Nip
Changjun Wang
The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided Marketplace
Peng Shi
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization
Luca D'Amico-Wong
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Gary Qiurui Ma
David C. Parkes
Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad
Jan Knoepfle
Juia Salmi
Learning from Strategic Sources
Kailin Chen
Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention
Tommaso Denti
Doron Ravid
Dynamic Competition for Attention
Jan Knoepfle
Full Dynamic Implementation
Andrew Koh
Sivakorn Sanguanmoo
Kei Uzui
Managing Newsvendors: A Demand Mechanism
Yilun Chen
Jiaqi Lu
Incentivizing Resource Pooling
Chen Chen
Yilun Chen
Pengyu Qian
Optimal Queueing Regimes
Marco Scarsini
Eran Shmaya
Can LLMs Mimic Human-Like Mental Accounting and Behavioral Biases?
Yan Leng
Eliciting Informative Text Evaluations with Large Language Models
Yuxuan Lu
Shengwei Xu
Yichi Zhang
Yuqing Kong
Grant Schoenebeck
Using GPT for Market Research
James Brand
Ayelet Israeli
Donald Ngwe
Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus?
Apostolos Filippas
John J. Horton
Benjamin S. Manning
Contract Design With Safety Inspections
Alireza Fallah
Michael Jordan
Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition
Yingkai Li
Jonathan Libgober
Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability
Natalie Collina
Varun Gupta
Aaron Roth
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem
Yakov Babichenko
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Haifeng Xu
Konstantin Zabarnyi
Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice
Jon Kleinberg
Sigal Oren
Emily Ryu
Eva Tardos
Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement
Kirk Bansak
Soonbong Lee
Vahideh Manshadi
Rad Niazadeh
Elisabeth Paulson
Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement
Irene Lo
Vahideh Manshadi
Scott Rodilitz
Ali Shameli
Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets
Kenny Peng
Nikhil Garg
Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Matheus V. X. Ferreira
Aadityan Ganesh
Jack Hourigan
Hannah Huh
S. Matthew Weinberg
Catherine Yu
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh
Clayton Thomas
S. Matthew Weinberg
The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus
Eric Budish
Andrew Lewis-Pye
Tim Roughgarden
The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris
Tarun Chitra
Theo Diamandis
Kshitij Kulkarni
Alex Evans
Alpha-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities
Fabian Raoul Pieroth
Martin Bichler
A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
Tomáš Masařík
Grzegorz Pierczyński
Piotr Skowron
The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings
Patrick Lederer
Dominik Peters
Tomasz Wąs
Fair, Manipulation-Robust, and Transparent Sortition
Carmel Baharav
Bailey Flanigan
Adaptive Neyman Allocation
Jinglong Zhao
Enhancing External Validity in Experiments with Ongoing Sampling
Chen Wang
Shichao Han
Shan Huang
When Is Heterogeneity Actionable for Targeting?
Anya Shchetkina
Ron Berman
Experimenting under Stochastic Congestion
Shuangning Li
Ramesh Johari
Xu Kuang
Stefan Wager
Sample-Based Matroid Prophet Inequalities
Hu Fu
Pinyan Lu
Zhihao Gavin Tang
Hongxun Wu
Jinzhao Wu
Qianfan Zhang
Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies
Vasilis Livanos
Kalen Patton
Sahil Singla
Planning against a prophet: a graph-theoretic framework for making sequential decisions
Andres Cristi
Sigal Oren
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle
José Correa
Paul Dütting
Tomer Ezra
Michal Feldman
Victor Verdugo
Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experiment
Marie-Pierre Dargnies
Rustamdjan Hakimov
Dorothea Kübler
The Impact of AI Technology on the Productivity of Gig Economy Workers
Benjamin Knight
Dmitry Mitrofanov
Serguei Netessine
Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy
Enrique Ide
Eduard Talamàs
The Effects of Self-Advertising in a Labor Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Apostolos Filippas
John Horton
Prasanna Parasurama
Diego Urraca
Competitive Markets for Personal Data
Simone Galperti
Tianhao Liu
Jacopo Perego
Information Design and Pricing of Supply Competition in Lead-Selling Platforms
Yanwei Sun
Niloofar Zamani Foroushani
Zhe Liu
Jiahua Wu
Learning to Rank under Strategic "Brush Wars"
Qinzhen Li
Yifan Feng
Hongfan(Kevin) Chen
Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies
Shreyas Sekar
Auyon Siddiq
Inference for an Algorithmic Fairness-Accuracy Frontier
Yiqi Liu
Francesca Molinari
An Alternative Approach for Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models
Christopher Turansick
Preference Regression
Peter Caradonna
On the limitations of data-based price discrimination
Haitian Xie
Ying Zhu
Denis Shishkin
From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing
Tan Gan
Nicholas T. Wu
Certification Design for a Competitive Market
Andreas Alexander Haupt
Nicole Immorlica
Brendan Lucier
Robust Advertisement Pricing
Tan Gan
Hongcheng Li
Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning
Doron Ravid
Jeffrey Mensch
Supply and demand function competition in input-output networks
Matteo Bizzarri
Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement
Gaurab Aryal
Charles Murry
Pallavi Pal
Arnab Palit
Exclusive Contracts in the Video Streaming Market
Yihao Yuan
A Strategic Model of Software Dependency Networks
Cornelius Fritz
Co-Pierre Georg
Angelo Mele
Michael Schweinberger
Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions
Rachitesh Kumar
Jon Schneider
Balasubramanian Sivan
Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein
Junyao Zhao
Bandit Sequential Posted Pricing via Half-Concavity
Sahil Singla
Yifan Wang
Bandit Profit-Maximization for Targeted Marketing
Joon Suk Huh
Ellen Vitercik
Kirthevasan Kandasamy
Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes
Daniel Halpern
Safwan Hossain
Jamie Tucker-Foltz
Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting
Mashbat Suzuki
Jeremy Vollen
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core
Ben Berger
Michal Feldman
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Xizhi Tan
Generative Social Choice
Sara Fish
Paul Gölz
David C. Parkes
Ariel D. Procaccia
Gili Rusak
Itai Shapira
Manuel Wüthrich
Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers
Geoffrey Ramseyer
Mohak Goyal
Ashish Goel
David Mazières
Undetectable Selfish Mining
Maryam Bahrani
S. Matthew Weinberg
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Hao Chung
Tim Roughgarden
Elaine Shi
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Yotam Gafni
Aviv Yaish
Optimal Cohort Partitions
Sofoklis Goulas
Faidra Monachou
Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules
Arthur Delarue
Zhen Lian
Sebastien Martin
Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation
Ermis Soumalias
Behnoosh Zamanlooy
Jakob Weissteiner
Sven Seuken
GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning
Tonghan Wang
Yanchen Jiang
David C. Parkes
Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets
Santiago Balseiro
Yuan Deng
Jieming Mao
Vahab Mirrokni
Song Zuo
Understanding Iterative Combinatorial Auction Designs via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Greg d'Eon
Neil Newman
Kevin Leyton-Brown
The Surprising Benefits of Base Rate Neglect in Robust Aggregation
Yuqing Kong
Shu Wang
Ying Wang
Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests
Fupeng Sun
Yanwei Sun
Chiwei Yan
Li Jin
Full Accuracy Scoring Accelerates the Discovery of Skilled Forecasters
Pavel Atanasov
Ezra Karger
Philip Tetlock
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
Sophie Klumper
Guido Schäfer
Artem Tsikiridis
Competitive Auctions with Imperfect Predictions
Pinyan Lu
Zongqi Wan
Jialin Zhang
Online Mechanism Design with Predictions
Eric Balkanski
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Xizhi Tan
Cherlin Zhu
Redistribution through Market Segmentation
Victor Augias
Daniel M. A. Barreto
Alexis Ghersengorin
Optimal Design of Default Donations
Francisco Castro
Scott Rodilitz
A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination
Dirk Bergemann
Tibor Heumann
Michael Wang
Inclusive Recommendations and User Engagement: Experimental Evidence from Pinterest
Madhav Kumar
Pedro Silva
Ashudeep Singh
Abhay Varmaraja
Algorithmic vs. Friend-based Recommendations in Shaping Novel Content Engagement: A Large-scale Field Experiment
Shan Huang
Yi Ji
Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy Concerns
Sebastián D. Bauer
Florencia M. Hnilo
Search and Rediscovery
Martino Banchio
Suraj Malladi
Decomposable Stochastic Choice
Fedor Sandomirskiy
Omer Tamuz
Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition
Jeffrey Mensch
Komal Malik
The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality
Zihao Li
Jonathan Libgober
The Core of Bayesian persuasion
Laura Doval
Ran Eilat
Incentivized Exploration via Filtered Posterior Sampling
Yonatan Gur
Anand Kalvit
Aleksandrs Slivkins
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
Xiaoyu Cheng
Peter Klibanoff
Sujoy Mukerji
Ludovic Renou
Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders
Zhicheng Du
Wei Tang
Zihe Wang
Shuo Zhang
Estimating Treatment Effects under Recommender Interference: A Structured Neural Networks Approach
Ruohan Zhan
Shichao Han
Yuchen Hu
Zhenling Jiang
Forecasting Algorithms for Causal Inference with Panel Data
Jacob Goldin
Julian Nyarko
Justin Young
Coarse Personalization
Walter Zhang
Sanjog Misra
Minimax-Regret Sample Selection in Randomized Experiments
Yuchen Hu
Henry Zhu
Emma Brunskil
Stefan Wager
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
Michal Feldman
Simon Mauras
Vishnu V. Narayan
Tomasz Ponitka
On the Fairness of Normalized $p$-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores
Owen Eckart
Alexandros Psomas
Paritosh Verma
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
Georgios Amanatidis
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Alkmini Sgouritsa
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations
Gerdus Benade
Daniel Halpern
Alexandros Psomas
Paritosh Verma
Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General Constraints
Kenzo Imamura
Yasushi Kawase
Equilibrium in Pseudomarkets
Thành Nguyen
Alexander Teytelboym
Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited
Kenzo Imamura
Keisuke Bando
Tomoya Kazumura
Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics
Afshin Nikzad
Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard
Jeffrey Ely
George Georgiadis
Luis Rayo
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Federico Cacciamani
Martino Bernasconi
Matteo Castiglioni
Nicola Gatti
Optimal Robust Contract Design
Bo Peng
Zhihao Gavin Tang
Optimality of Weighted Contracts for Multi-agent Contract Design with a Budget
Wade Hann-Caruthers
Sumit Goel