Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: Plenary session

Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

  • Michael Kearns

SESSION: 1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison

  • Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Evangelos Markakis
  • Tim Roughgarden

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case

  • Nikhil R. Devanur
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

  • Nikhil R. Devanur
  • Nima Haghpanah
  • Christos-Alexandros Psomas

SESSION: 1b: Peer Predictions

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering

  • Rupert Freeman
  • David M. Pennock
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Forecast Aggregation

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Rann Smorodinsky

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction

  • Yang Liu
  • Yiling Chen

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users

  • Arpit Agarwal
  • Debmalya Mandal
  • David C. Parkes
  • Nisarg Shah

SESSION: 2a: Matching 1

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm

  • Sepehr Assadi
  • Sanjeev Khanna
  • Yang Li

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions

  • Yash Kanoria
  • Daniela Saban

Matching while Learning

  • Ramesh Johari
  • Vijay Kamble
  • Yash Kanoria

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Assaf Romm
  • Ran I. Shorrer

SESSION: 2b: Predictions and Queries

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games

  • Noam Nisan
  • Gali Noti

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Annie Liang
  • Sendhil Mullainathan

Comparison-based Choices

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sendhil Mullainathan
  • Johan Ugander

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction

  • Sepehr Assadi

SESSION: 3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Francisco Castro
  • Gabriel Weintraub

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

  • Santiago Balseiro
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Renato Paes Leme

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Emmanouil Pountourakis
  • Samuel Taggart

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers

  • José Correa
  • Patricio Foncea
  • Ruben Hoeksma
  • Tim Oosterwijk
  • Tjark Vredeveld

SESSION: 3b: Economic Equilibrium

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation

  • Frank Cheng
  • Michael P. Wellman

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets

  • Erik Brinkman
  • Michael P. Wellman

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation

  • Pieter Kleer
  • Guido Schäfer

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase

  • Juan Camilo Castillo
  • Dan Knoepfle
  • Glen Weyl

SESSION: 4a: Matching 2

Stable Secretaries

  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Yuval Emek
  • Michal Feldman
  • Boaz Patt-Shamir
  • Ron Peretz
  • Rann Smorodinsky

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

  • Saeed Alaei
  • Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi
  • Eva Tardos

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Mark Braverman
  • Yash Kanoria
  • Peng Shi

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks

  • Ravi Jagadeesan

SESSION: 4b: Voting

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions

  • Gerdus Benade
  • Anson Kahng
  • Ariel D. Procaccia

Voting in the Limelight

  • Ronen Gradwohl

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties

  • Ashish Goel
  • Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy
  • Kamesh Munagala

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

  • Yu Cheng
  • Shaddin Dughmi
  • David Kempe

SESSION: 5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Ophir Friedler
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing

  • Elliot Anshelevich
  • Shreyas Sekar

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Ophir Friedler
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments

  • Gerardo Berbeglia
  • Gwenaël Joret

SESSION: 5b: Information Games

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers

  • David Lingenbrink
  • Krishnamurthy Iyer

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks

  • Ronen Gradwohl

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

  • Shaddin Dughmi
  • Haifeng Xu

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents

  • Sampath Kannan
  • Michael Kearns
  • Jamie Morgenstern
  • Mallesh Pai
  • Aaron Roth
  • Rakesh Vohra
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations

Combinatorial Cost Sharing

  • Shahar Dobzinski
  • Shahar Ovadia

SESSION: 6a: Scheduling

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices

  • Michal Feldman
  • Amos Fiat
  • Alan Roytman

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Nikhil Devanur
  • Janardhan Kulkarni
  • Rad Niazadeh

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty

  • Giorgos Christodoulou
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Alkmini Sgouritsa

SESSION: 6b: Fair Division 1

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

  • Richard Cole
  • Nikhil Devanur
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Kamal Jain
  • Tung Mai
  • Vijay V. Vazirani
  • Sadra Yazdanbod

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division

  • Eric Friedman
  • Christos-Alexandros Psomas
  • Shai Vardi

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting

  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Junxing Wang

SESSION: 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning

  • Sebastien Bubeck
  • Nikhil R. Devanur
  • Zhiyi Huang
  • Rad Niazadeh

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers

  • Yiwei Chen
  • Cong Shi

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework

  • Siddhartha Banerjee
  • Daniel Freund
  • Thodoris Lykouris

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization

  • Aaron Roth
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Jonathan Ullman
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: 7b: Experiments

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • John Joseph Horton

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews

  • Shrabastee Banerjee
  • Chrysanthos Dellarocas
  • Georgios Zervas

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem

  • Daniel G. Goldstein
  • R. Preston McAfee
  • Siddharth Suri
  • James R. Wright

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Matthew Jackson

SESSION: 8a: Mechanism Design -- General

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

  • Georgios Amanatidis
  • Georgios Birmpas
  • George Christodoulou
  • Evangelos Markakis

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

  • Artur Gorokh
  • Siddhartha Banerjee
  • Krishnamurthy Iyer

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness

  • Sophie Bade
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski

SESSION: 8b: Decision Making and Learning

Planning with Multiple Biases

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sigal Oren
  • Manish Raghavan

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making

  • Ilan Lobel
  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Adrian Vladu

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments

  • Ger Yang
  • Georgios Piliouras
  • David Basanta

SESSION: 9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms

  • Johannes Brustle
  • Yang Cai
  • Fa Wu
  • Mingfei Zhao

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

  • Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
  • Paul W. Goldberg
  • Bart de Keijzer
  • Stefano Leonardi
  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Stefano Turchetta

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

  • Santiago R. Balseiro
  • Yonatan Gur

SESSION: 9b: Fair Division 2

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

  • Simina Branzei
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Ruta Mehta

Fair Public Decision Making

  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Rupert Freeman
  • Nisarg Shah

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division

  • Siddharth Barman
  • Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy

SESSION: Plenary session

Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

  • Christian Borgs
  • Jennifer Chayes

SESSION: 10a: Matching 3

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

  • John William Hatfield
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Alexander Westkamp

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints

  • Thanh Nguyen
  • Rakesh Vohra

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

  • Benjamin N. Roth
  • Ran Shorrer

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing

  • Nick Arnosti
  • Peng Shi

SESSION: 10b: Strategic Games

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games

  • Christian Kroer
  • Kevin Waugh
  • Fatma Kilinc-Karzan
  • Tuomas Sandholm

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic

  • Zhigang Cao
  • Bo Chen
  • Xujin Chen
  • Changjun Wang

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games

  • Soheil Behnezhad
  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins