Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: ACM SIGecom Best Paper Award

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority

  • Marek Pycia
  • Peter Troyan

SESSION: ACM SIGecom Best Full Paper Award

Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution

  • José Correa
  • Paul Dütting
  • Felix Fischer
  • Kevin Schewior

SESSION: ACM SIGecom Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Amos Fiat
  • Kira Goldner
  • Anna R. Karlin

SESSION: Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets

Stable Fractional Matchings

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas
  • Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
  • Rohit Vaish

Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-Offs

  • Jiehua Chen
  • Piotr Skowron
  • Manuel Sorge

Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints

  • Thành Nguyen
  • Hai Nguyen
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Trading Networks with General Preferences

  • Jan Christoph Schlegel

SESSION: Session 1b: Machine Learning and Applications

Fundamental Limits of Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Discrete Choice

  • Arjun Seshadri
  • Johan Ugander

How Do Machine Learning Algorithms Perform in Predicting Hospital Choices?: Evidence from Changing Environments

  • Devesh Raval
  • Ted Rosenbaum
  • Nathan E. Wilson

Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach

  • Dmitry Ivanov
  • Alexander Nesterov

The Congressional Classification Challenge: Domain Specificity and Partisan Intensity

  • Hao Yan
  • Sanmay Das
  • Allen Lavoie
  • Sirui Li
  • Betsy Sinclair

SESSION: Session 1c: Prophet Inequalities

Nearly Optimal Pricing Algorithms for Production Constrained and Laminar Bayesian Selection

  • Nima Anari
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Amin Saberi
  • Ali Shameli

Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Non Adaptive

  • Nikolai Gravin
  • Hongao Wang

Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors

  • Paul Dütting
  • Thomas Kesselheim

Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection

  • Hedyeh Beyhaghi
  • Robert Kleinberg

SESSION: Session 2a: Signaling and Strategic Learning

Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and k-Cores

  • Ozan Candogan

Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration

  • Lee Cohen
  • Yishay Mansour

Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge

  • Gal Bahar
  • Rann Smorodinsky
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach

  • Guy Aridor
  • Kevin Liu
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

Regression Equilibrium

  • Omer Ben-Porat
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

SESSION: Session 2b: Online Platforms

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market: Extended Abstract

  • Zoë B. Cullen
  • Bobak Pakzad-Hurson

Managing Market Mechanism Transitions: A Randomized Trial of Decentralized Pricing Versus Platform Control

  • Apostolos Filippas
  • Srikanth Jagabathula
  • Arun Sundararajan

The Supply and Demand Effects of Review Platforms

  • Gregory Lewis
  • Georgios Zervas

Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems

  • Akos Lada
  • Alexander Peysakhovich
  • Diego Aparicio
  • Michael Bailey

You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer Search

  • Charles Hodgson
  • Gregory Lewis

SESSION: Session 2c: Mechanism Design I

Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions

  • Yang Cai
  • Mingfei Zhao

Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item Pricing

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Yifeng Teng
  • Christos Tzamos

Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities

  • Yang Cai
  • Nikhil R. Devanur
  • Kira Goldner
  • R. Preston McAfee

Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation

  • Nima Haghpapanah
  • Ron Siegel

The Value of Price Discrimination in Large Random Networks

  • Jiali Huang
  • Ankur Mani
  • Zizhuo Wang

SESSION: Session 3a: Voting and Social Choice

Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules

  • Kamesh Munagala
  • Kangning Wang

Group Fairness in Committee Selection

  • Yu Cheng
  • Zhihao Jiang
  • Kamesh Munagala
  • Kangning Wang

No Stratification Without Representation

  • Gerdus Benadè
  • Paul Gölz
  • Ariel D. Procaccia

Equitable Voting Rules

  • Laurent Bartholdi
  • Wade Hann-Caruther
  • Maya Josyula
  • Omer Tamuz
  • Leeat Yariv

Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games

  • François Durand
  • Antonin Macé
  • Matías Núñez

SESSION: Session 3b: Applied Matching Markets

Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Noam Nisan
  • Lior Kovalio
  • Assaf Romm

Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India

  • Surender Baswana
  • Partha Pratim Chakrabarti
  • Sharat Chandran
  • Yashodhan Kanoria
  • Utkarsh Patange

School Choice in Chile

  • Jose Correa
  • Rafael Epstein
  • Juan Escobar
  • Ignacio Rios
  • Bastian Bahamondes
  • Carlos Bonet
  • Natalie Epstein
  • Nicolas Aramayo
  • Martin Castillo
  • Andres Cristi
  • Boris Epstein

Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Assaf Romm

Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes

  • Ran I. Shorrer

Incorporating Compatible Pairs in Kidney Exchange: A Dynamic Weighted Matching Model

  • Zhuoshu Li
  • Kelsey Lieberman
  • William Macke
  • Sofia Carrillo
  • Chien-Ju Ho
  • Jason Wellen
  • Sanmay Das

SESSION: Session 3c: Pricing and Contracts

Simple versus Optimal Contracts

  • Paul Dütting
  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

  • Ian Ball
  • Deniz Kattwinkel

Sample-Based Optimal Pricing

  • Amine Allouah
  • Omar Besbes

Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources

  • Omar Besbes
  • Adam N. Elmachtoub
  • Yunjie Sun

Power of Dynamic Pricing in Revenue Management with Strategic (Forward-looking) Customers

  • Yiwei Chen
  • Stefanus Jasin

Dynamic Learning and Market Making in Spread Betting Markets with Informed Bettors

  • John R. Birge
  • Yifan Feng
  • N. Bora Keskin
  • Adam Schultz

SESSION: Session 3d: Joint session with 51st ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC)

Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms

  • Jason Hartline
  • Samuel Taggart

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values

  • Alexandros Psomas
  • Ariel Schvartzman
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue

  • Hu Fu
  • Christopher Liaw
  • Sikander Randhawa

SESSION: Session 4a: Networks

Seeding with Costly Network Information

  • Dean Eckles
  • Hossein Esfandiari
  • Elchanan Mossel
  • M. Amin Rahimian

Influence Maximization on Undirected Graphs: Towards Closing the (1-1/e) Gap

  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Biaoshuai Tao

Displaying Things in Common to Encourage Friendship Formation: A Large Randomized Field Experiment

  • Tianshu Sun
  • Sean J. Taylor

Graphon Games

  • Francesca Parise
  • Asuman Ozdaglar

SESSION: Session 4b: Cryptocurrency and Financial Markets

Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols

  • Jonah Brown-Cohen
  • Arvind Narayanan
  • Alexandros Psomas
  • S. Matthew Weinberg

Mind the Mining

  • Guy Goren
  • Alexander Spiegelman

Energy Equilibria in Proof-of-Work Mining

  • Amos Fiat
  • Anna Karlin
  • Elias Koutsoupias
  • Christos Papadimitriou

Information and Learning in Heterogeneous Markets

  • Yaarit Even
  • Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi
  • Xavier Vives

SESSION: Session 4c: Fair Division

High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation: Lenstra Empowered by N-fold Integer Programming

  • Robert Bredereck
  • Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
  • Dušan Knop
  • Rolf Niedermeier

Communication Complexity of Cake Cutting

  • Simina Brânzei
  • Noam Nisan

Envy-Freeness Up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating Items

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • Nick Gravin
  • Xin Huang

Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

  • Maria Kyropoulou
  • Josué Ortega
  • Erel Segal-Halevi

SESSION: Session 5a: Social Learning

Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Segev Shlomov

Local Non-Bayesian Social Learning with Stubborn Agents

  • Daniel Vial
  • Vijay Subramanian

Naive Learning Through Probability Matching

  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Manuel Mueller-Frank

Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications

  • Gad Allon
  • Kimon Drakopoulos
  • Vahideh Manshadi

The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning

  • Itai Arieli
  • Moran Koren
  • Rann Smorodinsky

SESSION: Session 5b: Routing and Ridesharing

On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time

  • José Correa
  • Andrés Cristi
  • Tim Oosterwijk

Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs

  • Roberto Cominetti
  • Marco Scarsini
  • Marc Schröder
  • Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars

  • Michael Ostrovsky
  • Michael Schwarz

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms

  • Hongyao Ma
  • Fei Fang
  • David C. Parkes

Spatial Capacity Planning

  • Omar Besbes
  • Francisco Castro
  • Ilan Lobel

SESSION: Session 5c: Applied Pricing

Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Christian Kroer
  • Debmalya Panigrahi
  • Okke Schrijvers
  • Eric Sodomka
  • Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
  • Chris Wilkens

LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices

  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • Negin Golrezaei
  • Renato Paes Leme

Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces

  • Jason D. Hartline
  • Aleck Johnsen
  • Denis Nekipelov
  • Onno Zoeter

Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back

  • Ludwig Dierks
  • Sven Seuken

Optimal Pricing in Markets with Non-Convex Costs

  • Navid Azizan
  • Yu Su
  • Krishnamurthy Dvijotham
  • Adam Wierman

SESSION: Session 6a: Game Theory

Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond Convexity

  • Soheil Behnezhad
  • Avrim Blum
  • Mahsa Derakhshan
  • Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
  • Christos H. Papadimitriou
  • Saeed Seddighin

Iterated Deep Reinforcement Learning in Games: History-Aware Training for Improved Stability

  • Mason Wright
  • Yongzhao Wang
  • Michael P. Wellman

Robust Commitments and Partial Reputation

  • Vidya Muthukumar
  • Anant Sahai

Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games

  • Jiarui Gan
  • Haifeng Xu
  • Qingyu Guo
  • Long Tran-Thanh
  • Zinovi Rabinovich
  • Michael Wooldridge

SESSION: Session 6b: Data Markets

Prior-free Data Acquisition for Accurate Statistical Estimation

  • Yiling Chen
  • Shuran Zheng

How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization

  • Sameer Mehta
  • Milind Dawande
  • Ganesh Janakiraman
  • Vijay Mookerjee

Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data Commercialization

  • Parinaz Naghizadeh
  • Arunesh Sinha

A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution

  • Anish Agarwal
  • Munther Dahleh
  • Tuhin Sarkar

SESSION: Session 6c: Dynamic Algorithms

Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios for Online Edge-weighted Bipartite Matching and Beyond

  • Will Ma
  • David Simchi-Levi

Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Maximilien Burq
  • Chinmoy Dutta
  • Patrick Jaillet
  • Amin Saberi
  • Chris Sholley

Learning in Structured MDPs with Convex Cost Functions: Improved Regret Bounds for Inventory Management

  • Shipra Agrawal
  • Randy Jia

SESSION: Session 7a: Combinatorial Markets and Social Choice

Computing Large Market Equilibria using Abstractions

  • Christian Kroer
  • Alexander Peysakhovich
  • Eric Sodomka
  • Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

Computing Core-Stable Outcomes in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Bidders

  • Martin Bichler
  • Stefan Waldherr

Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions

  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Benjamin Lubin

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals

  • Rupert Freeman
  • David M. Pennock
  • Dominik Peters
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences

  • Haris Aziz
  • Anna Bogomolnaia
  • Hervé Moulin

Principal-Agent VCG Contracts

  • Ron Lavi
  • Elisheva S. Shamash

SESSION: Session 7b: Fairness and Social Good

Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization

  • Taylor Lundy
  • Alexander Wei
  • Hu Fu
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

Individual Fairness in Hindsight

  • Swati Gupta
  • Vijay Kamble

Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and Interpretability

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sendhil Mullainathan

Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of Fairness

  • Sumegha Garg
  • Michael P. Kim
  • Omer Reingold

How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Manish Raghavan

Price of Privacy in the Keynesian Beauty Contest

  • Hadi Elzayn
  • Zachary Schutzman

SESSION: Session 7c: Mechanism Design II

Obvious Manipulations

  • Peter Troyan
  • Thayer Morrill

Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility

  • Maria-Florina Balcan
  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • Ellen Vitercik

The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors

  • Evangelia Gergatsouli
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Christos Tzamos

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility

  • Yiding Feng
  • Jason D. Hartline
  • Yingkai Li

Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations

  • Nick Gravin
  • Yaonan Jin
  • Pinyan Lu
  • Chenhao Zhang

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

  • Georgios Amanatidis
  • Pieter Kleer
  • Guido Schäfer