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Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library
Keynote address
Centrality, gossip, and diffusion of information in networks
Matthew O. Jackson
Session 1
Strategic trading in informationally complex environments
Nicolas S. Lambert
Michael Ostrovsky
Mikhail Panov
Incentivizing exploration
Peter Frazier
David Kempe
Jon Kleinberg
Robert Kleinberg
Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling
Hu Fu
Nima Haghpanah
Jason Hartline
Robert Kleinberg
An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms
Timo Mennle
Sven Seuken
Session 2a
Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match
Wei Chen
Di He
Tie-Yan Liu
Tao Qin
Yixin Tao
Liwei Wang
Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
Paul Dütting
Felix Fischer
David C. Parkes
Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions
Yoram Bachrach
Sofia Ceppi
Ian A. Kash
Peter Key
David Kurokawa
Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions
Tri-Dung Nguyen
Tuomas Sandholm
Session 2b
A dynamic network game for the adoption of new technologies
Matt V. Leduc
Characterizing strategic cascades on networks
Travis Martin
Grant Schoenebeck
Mike Wellman
The polarizing effect of network influences
MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
Hamid Mahini
David Malec
Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in research
Siddhartha Banerjee
Ashish Goel
Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy
Session 3a
Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints
Gagan Goel
Vahab Mirrokni
Renato Paes Leme
Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation
Paul Milgrom
Ilya Segal
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
Paul Dütting
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Tim Roughgarden
Session 3b
Individual security and network design
Diego Cerdeiro
Marcin Dziubiński
Sanjeev Goyal
Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profit
Pavel Hubáček
Sunoo Park
The complexity of fairness through equilibrium
Abraham Othman
Christos Papadimitriou
Aviad Rubinstein
Session 4a
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
Zihe Wang
Pingzhong Tang
Modularity and greed in double auctions
Paul Dütting
Tim Roughgarden
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
Yiannis Giannakopoulos
Elias Koutsoupias
Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings
Shuchi Chawla
Hu Fu
Anna Karlin
Session 4b
Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach
Yuval Filmus
Joel Oren
A local-dominance theory of voting equilibria
Reshef Meir
Omer Lev
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
Haris Aziz
Florian Brandl
Felix Brandt
Neutrality and geometry of mean voting
Sebastien Lahaie
Nisarg Shah
Session 5a
Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach
Itai Ashlagi
Peng Shi
Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences
Guillaume Haeringer
Vincent Iehlé
Dynamic matching market design
Mohammad Akbarpour
Shengwu Li
Shayan Oveis Gharan
Misdirected search effort in a matching market: causes, consequences and a partial solution
John Joseph Horton
Session 5b
Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
Chien-Ju Ho
Aleksandrs Slivkins
Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Removing arbitrage from wagering mechanisms
Yiling Chen
Nikhil R. Devanur
David M. Pennock
Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Information aggregation in exponential family markets
Jacob Abernethy
Sindhu Kutty
Sébastien Lahaie
Rahul Sami
A general volume-parameterized market making framework
Jacob D. Abernethy
Rafael M. Frongillo
Xiaolong Li
Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Session 6a
Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information
Baharak Rastegari
Anne Condon
Nicole Immorlica
Robert Irving
Kevin Leyton-Brown
Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists
Yannai A. Gonczarowski
Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets
Nick Arnosti
Ramesh Johari
Yash Kanoria
Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
Piotr Krysta
David Manlove
Baharak Rastegari
Jinshan Zhang
Session 6b
The wisdom of smaller, smarter crowds
Daniel G. Goldstein
Randolph Preston McAfee
Siddharth Suri
Revealing and incorporating implicit communities to improve recommender systems
Euijin Choo
Ting Yu
Min Chi
Yan Sun
Trick or treat: putting peer prediction to the test
Xi Alice Gao
Andrew Mao
Yiling Chen
Ryan Prescott Adams
Corporate prediction markets: evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X
Bo Cowgill
Eric Zitzewitz
Session 7a
Incentivized optimal advert assignment via utility decomposition
Frank Kelly
Peter Key
Neil Walton
Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machines
Eric Friedman
Ali Ghodsi
Christos-Alexandros Psomas
Time-inconsistent planning: a computational problem in behavioral economics
Jon Kleinberg
Sigal Oren
Session 7b
Towards a better measure of business proximity: topic modeling for analyzing M&As
Zhan Shi
Gene Moo Lee
Andrew B. Whinston
Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: the role of test-control interference
Thomas Blake
Dominic Coey
Whole page optimization: how page elements interact with the position auction
Pavel Metrikov
Fernando Diaz
Sebastien Lahaie
Justin Rao
Session 8a
Local computation mechanism design
Avinatan Hassidim
Yishay Mansour
Shai Vardi
Reallocation mechanisms
Liad Blumrosen
Shahar Dobzinski
Knightian self uncertainty in the VCG mechanism for unrestricted combinatorial auctions
Alessandro Chiesa
Silvio Micali
Zeyuan Allen Zhu
Session 8b
Extensive-form game abstraction with bounds
Christian Kroer
Tuomas Sandholm
Bounds for the query complexity of approximate equilibria
Paul W. Goldberg
Aaron Roth
Finding approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games via payoff queries
John Fearnley
Rahul Savani
Session 9
Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares
Ariel D. Procaccia
Junxing Wang
Price of anarchy for auction revenue
Jason Hartline
Darrell Hoy
Sam Taggart
Mechanism design for data science
Shuchi Chawla
Jason Hartline
Denis Nekipelov
Session 10a
Routing and staffing when servers are strategic
Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan
Sherwin Doroudi
Amy R. Ward
Adam Wierman
Multiplicative bidding in online advertising
MohammadHossein Bateni
Jon Feldman
Vahab Mirrokni
Sam Chiu-wai Wong
Cournot competition in networked markets
Kostas Bimpikis
Shayan Ehsani
Rahmi Ilkiliç
Session 10b
Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure
Eli A. Meirom
Shie Mannor
Ariel Orda
Simple approximate equilibria in large games
Yakov Babichenko
Siddharth Barman
Ron Peretz
Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games
Ryan M. Rogers
Aaron Roth
Session 11a
On the efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism
Moshe Babaioff
Brendan Lucier
Noam Nisan
Renato Paes Leme
Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalence
John William Hatfield
Fuhito Kojima
Scott Duke Kominers
Optimal impartial selection
Felix Fischer
Max Klimm
Session 11b
Long-run learning in games of cooperation
Winter Mason
Siddharth Suri
Duncan J. Watts
Strategic information platforms: selective disclosure and the price of "free"
Chen Hajaj
David Sarne
Level-0 meta-models for predicting human behavior in games
James R. Wright
Kevin Leyton-Brown
Keynote address
Pragmatic algorithmic game theory
Kevin Leyton-Brown
Session 12a
Mechanism with unique learnable equilibria
Paul Dütting
Thomas Kesselheim
Éva Tardos
Simultaneous Bayesian auctions and computational complexity
Yang Cai
Christos Papadimitriou
Contract complexity
Moshe Babaioff
Eyal Winter
Optimal contest design for simple agents
Arpita Ghosh
Robert Kleinberg
Session 12b
Buying private data without verification
Arpita Ghosh
Katrina Ligett
Aaron Roth
Grant Schoenebeck
Differentially private and incentive compatible recommendation system for the adoption of network goods
Kevin He
Xiaosheng Mu
A dynamic model of certification and reputation
Mihaela van der Schaar
Simpson Z. Zhang
The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice
Rachel Cummings
Federico Echenique
Adam Wierman
Session 13
Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem
Drew Fudenberg
Alexander Peysakhovich
Dynamically eliciting unobservable information
Christopher P. Chambers
Nicolas S. Lambert
Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks
Shipra Agrawal
Nikhil R. Devanur