Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

Keynote address

Centrality, gossip, and diffusion of information in networks

• Matthew O. Jackson

Session 1

Strategic trading in informationally complex environments

• Nicolas S. Lambert
• Michael Ostrovsky
• Mikhail Panov

Incentivizing exploration

• Peter Frazier
• David Kempe
• Jon Kleinberg
• Robert Kleinberg

Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling

• Hu Fu
• Nima Haghpanah
• Jason Hartline
• Robert Kleinberg

An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms

• Timo Mennle
• Sven Seuken

Session 2a

Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match

• Wei Chen
• Di He
• Tie-Yan Liu
• Tao Qin
• Yixin Tao
• Liwei Wang

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

• Paul Dütting
• Felix Fischer
• David C. Parkes

Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions

• Yoram Bachrach
• Sofia Ceppi
• Ian A. Kash
• Peter Key
• David Kurokawa

Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions

• Tri-Dung Nguyen
• Tuomas Sandholm

Session 2b

A dynamic network game for the adoption of new technologies

• Matt V. Leduc

Characterizing strategic cascades on networks

• Travis Martin
• Grant Schoenebeck
• Mike Wellman

The polarizing effect of network influences

• MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
• Hamid Mahini
• David Malec

Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in research

• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Ashish Goel
• Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy

Session 3a

Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints

• Gagan Goel
• Vahab Mirrokni
• Renato Paes Leme

Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation

• Paul Milgrom
• Ilya Segal

The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions

• Paul Dütting
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Tim Roughgarden

Session 3b

Individual security and network design

• Diego Cerdeiro
• Marcin Dziubiński
• Sanjeev Goyal

Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profit

• Pavel Hubáček
• Sunoo Park

The complexity of fairness through equilibrium

• Abraham Othman
• Christos Papadimitriou
• Aviad Rubinstein

Session 4a

Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

• Zihe Wang
• Pingzhong Tang

Modularity and greed in double auctions

• Paul Dütting
• Tim Roughgarden
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

• Yiannis Giannakopoulos
• Elias Koutsoupias

Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings

• Shuchi Chawla
• Hu Fu
• Anna Karlin

Session 4b

Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach

• Yuval Filmus
• Joel Oren

A local-dominance theory of voting equilibria

• Reshef Meir
• Omer Lev
• Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

• Haris Aziz
• Florian Brandl
• Felix Brandt

Neutrality and geometry of mean voting

• Sebastien Lahaie
• Nisarg Shah

Session 5a

Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach

• Itai Ashlagi
• Peng Shi

Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences

• Guillaume Haeringer
• Vincent Iehlé

Dynamic matching market design

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Shengwu Li
• Shayan Oveis Gharan

Misdirected search effort in a matching market: causes, consequences and a partial solution

• John Joseph Horton

Session 5b

Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems

• Chien-Ju Ho
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Removing arbitrage from wagering mechanisms

• Yiling Chen
• Nikhil R. Devanur
• David M. Pennock
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Information aggregation in exponential family markets

• Jacob Abernethy
• Sindhu Kutty
• Sébastien Lahaie
• Rahul Sami

A general volume-parameterized market making framework

• Jacob D. Abernethy
• Rafael M. Frongillo
• Xiaolong Li
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Session 6a

Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information

• Baharak Rastegari
• Anne Condon
• Nicole Immorlica
• Robert Irving
• Kevin Leyton-Brown

Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists

• Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets

• Nick Arnosti
• Ramesh Johari
• Yash Kanoria

Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem

• Piotr Krysta
• David Manlove
• Baharak Rastegari
• Jinshan Zhang

Session 6b

The wisdom of smaller, smarter crowds

• Daniel G. Goldstein
• Randolph Preston McAfee
• Siddharth Suri

Revealing and incorporating implicit communities to improve recommender systems

• Euijin Choo
• Ting Yu
• Min Chi
• Yan Sun

Trick or treat: putting peer prediction to the test

• Xi Alice Gao
• Andrew Mao
• Yiling Chen
• Ryan Prescott Adams

Corporate prediction markets: evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X

• Bo Cowgill
• Eric Zitzewitz

Session 7a

Incentivized optimal advert assignment via utility decomposition

• Frank Kelly
• Peter Key
• Neil Walton

Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machines

• Eric Friedman
• Ali Ghodsi
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Time-inconsistent planning: a computational problem in behavioral economics

• Jon Kleinberg
• Sigal Oren

Session 7b

Towards a better measure of business proximity: topic modeling for analyzing M&As

• Zhan Shi
• Gene Moo Lee
• Andrew B. Whinston

Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: the role of test-control interference

• Thomas Blake
• Dominic Coey

Whole page optimization: how page elements interact with the position auction

• Pavel Metrikov
• Fernando Diaz
• Sebastien Lahaie
• Justin Rao

Session 8a

Local computation mechanism design

• Avinatan Hassidim
• Yishay Mansour
• Shai Vardi

Reallocation mechanisms

• Liad Blumrosen
• Shahar Dobzinski

Knightian self uncertainty in the VCG mechanism for unrestricted combinatorial auctions

• Alessandro Chiesa
• Silvio Micali
• Zeyuan Allen Zhu

Session 8b

Extensive-form game abstraction with bounds

• Christian Kroer
• Tuomas Sandholm

Bounds for the query complexity of approximate equilibria

• Paul W. Goldberg
• Aaron Roth

Finding approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games via payoff queries

• John Fearnley
• Rahul Savani

Session 9

Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares

• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Junxing Wang

Price of anarchy for auction revenue

• Jason Hartline
• Darrell Hoy
• Sam Taggart

Mechanism design for data science

• Shuchi Chawla
• Jason Hartline
• Denis Nekipelov

Session 10a

Routing and staffing when servers are strategic

• Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan
• Sherwin Doroudi
• Amy R. Ward
• Adam Wierman

Multiplicative bidding in online advertising

• MohammadHossein Bateni
• Jon Feldman
• Vahab Mirrokni
• Sam Chiu-wai Wong

Cournot competition in networked markets

• Kostas Bimpikis
• Shayan Ehsani
• Rahmi Ilkiliç

Session 10b

Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure

• Eli A. Meirom
• Shie Mannor
• Ariel Orda

Simple approximate equilibria in large games

• Yakov Babichenko
• Siddharth Barman
• Ron Peretz

Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games

• Ryan M. Rogers
• Aaron Roth

Session 11a

On the efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism

• Moshe Babaioff
• Brendan Lucier
• Noam Nisan
• Renato Paes Leme

Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalence

• John William Hatfield
• Fuhito Kojima
• Scott Duke Kominers

Optimal impartial selection

• Felix Fischer
• Max Klimm

Session 11b

Long-run learning in games of cooperation

• Winter Mason
• Siddharth Suri
• Duncan J. Watts

Strategic information platforms: selective disclosure and the price of "free"

• Chen Hajaj
• David Sarne

Level-0 meta-models for predicting human behavior in games

• James R. Wright
• Kevin Leyton-Brown

Keynote address

Pragmatic algorithmic game theory

• Kevin Leyton-Brown

Session 12a

Mechanism with unique learnable equilibria

• Paul Dütting
• Thomas Kesselheim
• Éva Tardos

Simultaneous Bayesian auctions and computational complexity

• Yang Cai
• Christos Papadimitriou

Contract complexity

• Moshe Babaioff
• Eyal Winter

Optimal contest design for simple agents

• Arpita Ghosh
• Robert Kleinberg

Session 12b

Buying private data without verification

• Arpita Ghosh
• Katrina Ligett
• Aaron Roth
• Grant Schoenebeck

Differentially private and incentive compatible recommendation system for the adoption of network goods

• Kevin He
• Xiaosheng Mu

A dynamic model of certification and reputation

• Mihaela van der Schaar
• Simpson Z. Zhang

The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice

• Rachel Cummings
• Federico Echenique
• Adam Wierman

Session 13

Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem

• Drew Fudenberg
• Alexander Peysakhovich

Dynamically eliciting unobservable information

• Christopher P. Chambers
• Nicolas S. Lambert

Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks

• Shipra Agrawal
• Nikhil R. Devanur