Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: ACM SIGecom Best Paper Award

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority

• Marek Pycia
• Peter Troyan

SESSION: ACM SIGecom Best Full Paper Award

Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution

• José Correa
• Paul Dütting
• Felix Fischer
• Kevin Schewior

SESSION: ACM SIGecom Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

• Alon Eden
• Michal Feldman
• Amos Fiat
• Kira Goldner
• Anna R. Karlin

SESSION: Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets

Stable Fractional Matchings

• Ioannis Caragiannis
• Aris Filos-Ratsikas
• Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
• Rohit Vaish

Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-Offs

• Jiehua Chen
• Piotr Skowron
• Manuel Sorge

Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints

• Thành Nguyen
• Hai Nguyen
• Alexander Teytelboym

Trading Networks with General Preferences

• Jan Christoph Schlegel

SESSION: Session 1b: Machine Learning and Applications

Fundamental Limits of Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Discrete Choice

• Arjun Seshadri
• Johan Ugander

How Do Machine Learning Algorithms Perform in Predicting Hospital Choices?: Evidence from Changing Environments

• Devesh Raval
• Ted Rosenbaum
• Nathan E. Wilson

Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach

• Dmitry Ivanov
• Alexander Nesterov

The Congressional Classification Challenge: Domain Specificity and Partisan Intensity

• Hao Yan
• Sanmay Das
• Allen Lavoie
• Sirui Li
• Betsy Sinclair

SESSION: Session 1c: Prophet Inequalities

Nearly Optimal Pricing Algorithms for Production Constrained and Laminar Bayesian Selection

• Nima Anari
• Rad Niazadeh
• Amin Saberi
• Ali Shameli

Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Non Adaptive

• Nikolai Gravin
• Hongao Wang

Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors

• Paul Dütting
• Thomas Kesselheim

Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection

• Hedyeh Beyhaghi
• Robert Kleinberg

SESSION: Session 2a: Signaling and Strategic Learning

Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and k-Cores

• Ozan Candogan

Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration

• Lee Cohen
• Yishay Mansour

Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge

• Gal Bahar
• Rann Smorodinsky
• Moshe Tennenholtz

The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach

• Guy Aridor
• Kevin Liu
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

Regression Equilibrium

• Omer Ben-Porat
• Moshe Tennenholtz

SESSION: Session 2b: Online Platforms

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market: Extended Abstract

• Zoë B. Cullen
• Bobak Pakzad-Hurson

Managing Market Mechanism Transitions: A Randomized Trial of Decentralized Pricing Versus Platform Control

• Apostolos Filippas
• Srikanth Jagabathula
• Arun Sundararajan

The Supply and Demand Effects of Review Platforms

• Gregory Lewis
• Georgios Zervas

Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems

• Akos Lada
• Alexander Peysakhovich
• Diego Aparicio
• Michael Bailey

You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer Search

• Charles Hodgson
• Gregory Lewis

SESSION: Session 2c: Mechanism Design I

Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions

• Yang Cai
• Mingfei Zhao

Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item Pricing

• Shuchi Chawla
• Yifeng Teng
• Christos Tzamos

Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities

• Yang Cai
• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Kira Goldner
• R. Preston McAfee

Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation

• Nima Haghpapanah
• Ron Siegel

The Value of Price Discrimination in Large Random Networks

• Jiali Huang
• Ankur Mani
• Zizhuo Wang

SESSION: Session 3a: Voting and Social Choice

Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules

• Kamesh Munagala
• Kangning Wang

Group Fairness in Committee Selection

• Yu Cheng
• Zhihao Jiang
• Kamesh Munagala
• Kangning Wang

No Stratification Without Representation

• Gerdus Benadè
• Paul Gölz
• Ariel D. Procaccia

Equitable Voting Rules

• Laurent Bartholdi
• Wade Hann-Caruther
• Maya Josyula
• Omer Tamuz
• Leeat Yariv

Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games

• François Durand
• Antonin Macé
• Matías Núñez

SESSION: Session 3b: Applied Matching Markets

Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements

• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Noam Nisan
• Lior Kovalio
• Assaf Romm

Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India

• Surender Baswana
• Partha Pratim Chakrabarti
• Sharat Chandran
• Yashodhan Kanoria
• Utkarsh Patange

School Choice in Chile

• Jose Correa
• Rafael Epstein
• Juan Escobar
• Ignacio Rios
• Bastian Bahamondes
• Carlos Bonet
• Natalie Epstein
• Nicolas Aramayo
• Martin Castillo
• Andres Cristi
• Boris Epstein

Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure

• Moshe Babaioff
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Assaf Romm

Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes

• Ran I. Shorrer

Incorporating Compatible Pairs in Kidney Exchange: A Dynamic Weighted Matching Model

• Zhuoshu Li
• Kelsey Lieberman
• William Macke
• Sofia Carrillo
• Chien-Ju Ho
• Jason Wellen
• Sanmay Das

SESSION: Session 3c: Pricing and Contracts

Simple versus Optimal Contracts

• Paul Dütting
• Tim Roughgarden
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

• Ian Ball
• Deniz Kattwinkel

Sample-Based Optimal Pricing

• Amine Allouah
• Omar Besbes

Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources

• Omar Besbes
• Adam N. Elmachtoub
• Yunjie Sun

Power of Dynamic Pricing in Revenue Management with Strategic (Forward-looking) Customers

• Yiwei Chen
• Stefanus Jasin

Dynamic Learning and Market Making in Spread Betting Markets with Informed Bettors

• John R. Birge
• Yifan Feng
• N. Bora Keskin
• Adam Schultz

SESSION: Session 3d: Joint session with 51st ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC)

Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms

• Jason Hartline
• Samuel Taggart

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values

• Alexandros Psomas
• Ariel Schvartzman
• S. Matthew Weinberg

The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue

• Hu Fu
• Christopher Liaw
• Sikander Randhawa

SESSION: Session 4a: Networks

Seeding with Costly Network Information

• Dean Eckles
• Hossein Esfandiari
• Elchanan Mossel
• M. Amin Rahimian

Influence Maximization on Undirected Graphs: Towards Closing the (1-1/e) Gap

• Grant Schoenebeck
• Biaoshuai Tao

Displaying Things in Common to Encourage Friendship Formation: A Large Randomized Field Experiment

• Tianshu Sun
• Sean J. Taylor

Graphon Games

• Francesca Parise
• Asuman Ozdaglar

SESSION: Session 4b: Cryptocurrency and Financial Markets

Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols

• Jonah Brown-Cohen
• Arvind Narayanan
• Alexandros Psomas
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Mind the Mining

• Guy Goren
• Alexander Spiegelman

Energy Equilibria in Proof-of-Work Mining

• Amos Fiat
• Anna Karlin
• Elias Koutsoupias
• Christos Papadimitriou

Information and Learning in Heterogeneous Markets

• Yaarit Even
• Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi
• Xavier Vives

SESSION: Session 4c: Fair Division

High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation: Lenstra Empowered by N-fold Integer Programming

• Robert Bredereck
• Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
• Dušan Knop
• Rolf Niedermeier

Communication Complexity of Cake Cutting

• Simina Brânzei
• Noam Nisan

Envy-Freeness Up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating Items

• Ioannis Caragiannis
• Nick Gravin
• Xin Huang

Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

• Maria Kyropoulou
• Josué Ortega
• Erel Segal-Halevi

SESSION: Session 5a: Social Learning

Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Segev Shlomov

Local Non-Bayesian Social Learning with Stubborn Agents

• Daniel Vial
• Vijay Subramanian

Naive Learning Through Probability Matching

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Manuel Mueller-Frank

Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications

• Gad Allon
• Kimon Drakopoulos
• Vahideh Manshadi

The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning

• Itai Arieli
• Moran Koren
• Rann Smorodinsky

SESSION: Session 5b: Routing and Ridesharing

On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time

• José Correa
• Andrés Cristi
• Tim Oosterwijk

Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs

• Roberto Cominetti
• Marco Scarsini
• Marc Schröder
• Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars

• Michael Ostrovsky
• Michael Schwarz

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms

• Hongyao Ma
• Fei Fang
• David C. Parkes

Spatial Capacity Planning

• Omar Besbes
• Francisco Castro
• Ilan Lobel

SESSION: Session 5c: Applied Pricing

Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

• Vincent Conitzer
• Christian Kroer
• Debmalya Panigrahi
• Okke Schrijvers
• Eric Sodomka
• Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
• Chris Wilkens

LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices

• Mahsa Derakhshan
• Negin Golrezaei
• Renato Paes Leme

Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces

• Jason D. Hartline
• Aleck Johnsen
• Denis Nekipelov
• Onno Zoeter

Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back

• Ludwig Dierks
• Sven Seuken

Optimal Pricing in Markets with Non-Convex Costs

• Navid Azizan
• Yu Su
• Krishnamurthy Dvijotham
• Adam Wierman

SESSION: Session 6a: Game Theory

Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond Convexity

• Soheil Behnezhad
• Avrim Blum
• Mahsa Derakhshan
• Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
• Christos H. Papadimitriou
• Saeed Seddighin

Iterated Deep Reinforcement Learning in Games: History-Aware Training for Improved Stability

• Mason Wright
• Yongzhao Wang
• Michael P. Wellman

Robust Commitments and Partial Reputation

• Vidya Muthukumar
• Anant Sahai

Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games

• Jiarui Gan
• Haifeng Xu
• Qingyu Guo
• Long Tran-Thanh
• Zinovi Rabinovich
• Michael Wooldridge

SESSION: Session 6b: Data Markets

Prior-free Data Acquisition for Accurate Statistical Estimation

• Yiling Chen
• Shuran Zheng

How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization

• Sameer Mehta
• Milind Dawande
• Ganesh Janakiraman
• Vijay Mookerjee

Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data Commercialization

• Parinaz Naghizadeh
• Arunesh Sinha

A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution

• Anish Agarwal
• Munther Dahleh
• Tuhin Sarkar

SESSION: Session 6c: Dynamic Algorithms

Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios for Online Edge-weighted Bipartite Matching and Beyond

• Will Ma
• David Simchi-Levi

Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching

• Itai Ashlagi
• Maximilien Burq
• Chinmoy Dutta
• Patrick Jaillet
• Amin Saberi
• Chris Sholley

Learning in Structured MDPs with Convex Cost Functions: Improved Regret Bounds for Inventory Management

• Shipra Agrawal
• Randy Jia

SESSION: Session 7a: Combinatorial Markets and Social Choice

Computing Large Market Equilibria using Abstractions

• Christian Kroer
• Alexander Peysakhovich
• Eric Sodomka
• Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

Computing Core-Stable Outcomes in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Bidders

• Martin Bichler
• Stefan Waldherr

Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions

• Sébastien Lahaie
• Benjamin Lubin

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals

• Rupert Freeman
• David M. Pennock
• Dominik Peters
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences

• Haris Aziz
• Anna Bogomolnaia
• Hervé Moulin

Principal-Agent VCG Contracts

• Ron Lavi
• Elisheva S. Shamash

SESSION: Session 7b: Fairness and Social Good

Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization

• Taylor Lundy
• Alexander Wei
• Hu Fu
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Kevin Leyton-Brown

Individual Fairness in Hindsight

• Swati Gupta
• Vijay Kamble

Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and Interpretability

• Jon Kleinberg
• Sendhil Mullainathan

Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of Fairness

• Sumegha Garg
• Michael P. Kim
• Omer Reingold

How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?

• Jon Kleinberg
• Manish Raghavan

Price of Privacy in the Keynesian Beauty Contest

• Hadi Elzayn
• Zachary Schutzman

SESSION: Session 7c: Mechanism Design II

Obvious Manipulations

• Peter Troyan
• Thayer Morrill

Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility

• Maria-Florina Balcan
• Tuomas Sandholm
• Ellen Vitercik

The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors

• Evangelia Gergatsouli
• Brendan Lucier
• Christos Tzamos

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility

• Yiding Feng
• Jason D. Hartline
• Yingkai Li

Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations

• Nick Gravin
• Yaonan Jin
• Pinyan Lu
• Chenhao Zhang

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

• Georgios Amanatidis
• Pieter Kleer
• Guido Schäfer