Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: Keynote Talk

Disentangling Exploration from Exploitation

• Leeat Yariv

SESSION: Technical Program Presentation

Dynamic Pricing and Learning under the Bass Model

• Shipra Agrawal
• Steven Yin
• Assaf Zeevi

Robust Repeated First Price Auctions

• Shipra Agrawal
• Eric Balkanski
• Vahab Mirrokni
• Balasubramanian Sivan

Dynamic Placement in Refugee Resettlement

• Narges Ahani
• Paul Gölz
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Alexander Teytelboym
• Andrew C. Trapp

The Strategic Perceptron

• Saba Ahmadi
• Hedyeh Beyhaghi
• Avrim Blum
• Keziah Naggita

Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Shengwu Li
• Paul R. Milgrom

Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory Inspection

• Saeed Alaei
• Ali Makhdoumi
• Azarakhsh Malekian

The Role of Accuracy in Algorithmic Process Fairness Across Multiple Domains

• Michele Albach
• James R. Wright

Optimal Pricing with a Single Point

• Amine Allouah
• Achraf Bahamou
• Omar Besbes

Revenue Maximization from Finite Samples

• Amine Allouah
• Achraf Bahamou
• Omar Besbes

Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort

• Tal Alon
• Paul Dütting
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency

• Tal Alon
• Ron Lavi
• Elisheva S. Shamash
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Graphical Economies with Resale

• Gabriel Andrade
• Rafael Frongillo
• Sharadha Srinivasan
• Elliot Gorokhovsky

Online Assortment Optimization for Two-sided Matching Platforms

• Ali Aouad
• Daniela Saban

The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR

• Guy Aridor
• Yeon-Koo Che
• Tobias Salz

On Social Networks that Support Learning

• Itai Arieli
• Fedor Sandomirskiy
• Rann Smorodinsky

Sequential Naive Learning

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Manuel Mueller-Frank

Learning Product Characteristics and Consumer Preferences from Search Data

• Luis Armona
• Greg Lewis
• Georgios Zervas

Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation

• Nick Arnosti
• Tim Randolph

Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design

• Itai Ashlagi
• Faidra Monachou
• Afshin Nikzad

Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing

• Haris Aziz
• Florian Brandl

Multi-Rank Smart Reserves

• Haris Aziz
• Zhaohong Sun

MNL-Bandit with Knapsacks

• Abdellah Aznag
• Vineet Goyal
• Noémie Périvier

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

• Moshe Babaioff
• Tomer Ezra
• Uriel Feige

Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion

• Yakov Babichenko
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
• Haifeng Xu
• Konstantin Zabarnyi

Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis

• Matthew Backus
• Thomas Blake
• Jett Pettus
• Steven Tadelis

The Limits to Learning a Diffusion Model

• Jackie Baek
• Vivek F. Farias
• Andreea Georgescu
• Retsef Levi
• Tianyi Peng
• Deeksha Sinha
• Joshua Wilde
• Andrew Zheng

The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization

• Santiago R. Balseiro
• Yuan Deng
• Jieming Mao
• Vahab S. Mirrokni
• Song Zuo

Simple Economies are Almost Optimal

• Amir Ban
• Avi Cohen
• Shahar Dobzinski
• Itai Ashlagi

iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding

• Manuel Beyeler
• Gianluca Brero
• Benjamin Lubin
• Sven Seuken

Data Tracking under Competition

• Kostas Bimpikis
• Ilan Morgenstern
• Daniela Saban

Incentive-Compatible Kidney Exchange in a Slightly Semi-Random Model

• Avrim Blum
• Paul Gölz

The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions

• Vitor Bosshard
• Sven Seuken

Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain't Bad

• Florian Brandl
• Felix Brandt
• Dominik Peters
• Christian Stricker

Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies

• Simina Brânzei
• Nikhil Devanur
• Yuval Rabani

Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities

• Alexander Braun
• Thomas Kesselheim

Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability

• Mark Braverman
• Jon Schneider
• S. Matthew Weinberg

99% Revenue with Constant Enhanced Competition

• Linda Cai
• Raghuvansh R. Saxena

On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items

• Yang Cai
• Argyris Oikonomou

Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver

• Ozan Candogan
• Philipp Strack

On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries

• Ioannis Caragiannis
• Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
• Maria Kyropoulou

Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts

• Matteo Castiglioni
• Alberto Marchesi
• Nicola Gatti

Multidimensional Apportionment through Discrepancy Theory

• Javier Cembrano
• José Correa
• Victor Verdugo

A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade

• Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi
• Tommaso R. Cesari
• Roberto Colomboni
• Federico Fusco
• Stefano Leonardi

Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number

• Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
• Jugal Garg
• Kurt Mehlhorn
• Ruta Mehta
• Pranabendu Misra

Optimal Queue Design

• Yeon-Koo Che
• Olivier Tercieux

Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods

• Yeon-Koo Che
• Weijie Zhong

Revenue Maximization and Learning in Products Ranking

• Ningyuan Chen
• Anran Li
• Shuoguang Yang

The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions

• Xi Chen
• Christian Kroer
• Rachitesh Kumar

Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and Complexity

• Christine T. Cheng
• Will Rosenbaum

Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks

• Krishna Dasaratha
• Kevin He

Robust Merging of Information

• Henrique De Oliveira
• Yuhta Ishii
• Xiao Lin

Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness

• Rahul Deb
• Anne-Katrin Roesler

Processing Reserves Simultaneously

• David Delacrétaz

Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of Agents

• Argyrios Deligkas
• Aris Filos-Ratsikas
• Alexandros Hollender

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

• Yuan Deng
• Vahab Mirrokni
• Song Zuo

Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms

• Yuan Deng
• Jason Hartline
• Jieming Mao
• Balasubramanian Sivan

Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio Design

• Emily Diana
• Travis Dick
• Hadi Elzayn
• Michael Kearns
• Aaron Roth
• Zachary Schutzman
• Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi
• Juba Ziani

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

• Shahar Dobzinski
• Uriel Feige
• Michal Feldman

Secretaries with Advice

• Paul Dütting
• Silvio Lattanzi
• Renato Paes Leme
• Sergei Vassilvitskii

Optimal Feedback in Contests

• Jeffrey Ely
• George Georgiadis
• Sina Moghadas Khorasani
• Luis Rayo

Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria

• Gabriele Farina
• Christian Kroer
• Tuomas Sandholm

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

• Matheus V. X. Ferreira
• S. Matthew Weinberg

On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions

• Aris Filos-Ratsikas
• Yiannis Giannakopoulos
• Alexandros Hollender
• Philip Lazos
• Diogo Poças

Overbooking with Bounded Loss

• Daniel Freund
• Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic Forecasters

• Rafael Frongillo
• Robert Gomez
• Anish Thilagar
• Bo Waggoner

How Flexible is that Functional Form?: Measuring the Restrictiveness of Theories

• Drew Fudenberg
• Wayne Gao
• Annie Liang

Polarization in Geometric Opinion Dynamics

• Jason Gaitonde
• Jon Kleinberg
• Éva Tardos

Virtues of Patience in Strategic Queuing Systems

• Jason Gaitonde
• Éva Tardos

Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors

• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Emmanouil Pountourakis
• Alkmini Sgouritsa

Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users

• Negin Golrezaei
• Vahideh Manshadi
• Jon Schneider
• Shreyas Sekar

The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market

• Artur Gorokh
• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

• Guru Guruganesh
• Jon Schneider
• Joshua R. Wang

Selling to a Group

• Nima Haghpanah
• Aditya Kuvalekar
• Elliot Lipnowski

Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences

• Xiang Han
• Onur Kesten
• M. Utku Ünver

Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications

• Kevin He
• Jonathan Libgober

The Market for Fake Reviews

• Sherry He
• Brett Hollenbeck
• Davide Proserpio

On Modeling Human Perceptions of Allocation Policies with Uncertain Outcomes

• Hoda Heidari
• Solon Barocas
• Jon Kleinberg
• Karen Levy

Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design

• Yihang Hu
• Zhiyi Huang
• Yiheng Shen
• Xiangning Wang

An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores

• Xin Huang
• Pinyan Lu

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms

• Nicole Immorlica
• Brendan Lucier
• Vahideh Manshadi
• Alexander Wei

Matching and Money

• Ravi Jagadeesan
• Alexander Teytelboym

Decentralized Matching in a Probabilistic Environment

• Mobin Y. Jeloudar
• Irene Lo
• Tristan Pollner
• Amin Saberi

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms

• Yaonan Jin
• Shunhua Jiang
• Pinyan Lu
• Hengjie Zhang

Robust Performance Evaluation

• Ashwin Kambhampati

Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods

• Zi Yang Kang

Equilibrium Computation of Generalized Nash Games: A New Lagrangian-Based Approach

• Jong Gwang Kim

Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes

• Margarita Kirneva
• Matías Núñez

Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games

• Pieter Kleer

Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference Points

• Jon Kleinberg
• Robert Kleinberg
• Sigal Oren

Indivisible Mixed Manna: On the Computability of MMS+PO Allocations

• Rucha Kulkarni
• Ruta Mehta
• Setareh Taki

Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?

• Jiangtao Li
• Piotr Dworczak

Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information

• Annie Liang
• Xiaosheng Mu
• Vasilis Syrgkanis

The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition

• Guocheng Liao
• Yu Su
• Juba Ziani
• Adam Wierman
• Jianwei Huang

Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints

• Young-San Lin
• Hai Nguyen
• Thành Nguyen
• Kemal Altinkemer

Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal Ordering

• Allen Liu
• Renato Paes Leme
• Martin Pál
• Jon Schneider
• Balasubramanian Sivan

Optimal Pricing of Information

• Shuze Liu
• Weiran Shen
• Haifeng Xu

Fair Dynamic Rationing

• Vahideh Manshadi
• Rad Niazadeh
• Scott Rodilitz

Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources

• Antonio Miralles
• Marek Pycia

Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule

• Kamesh Munagala
• Zeyu Shen
• Kangning Wang

Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision

• Eric Neyman
• Georgy Noarov
• S. Matthew Weinberg

From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation

• Eric Neyman
• Tim Roughgarden

Δ-Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities

• Thành Nguyen
• Rakesh Vohra

Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization

• Rad Niazadeh
• Negin Golrezaei
• Joshua R. Wang
• Fransisca Susan
• Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru

Screening with Frames

• Franz Ostrizek
• Denis Shishkin

Choice Screen Auctions

• Michael Ostrovsky

In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation

• Dario Paccagnan
• Martin Gairing

Public Goods Games in Directed Networks

• Christos Papadimitriou
• Binghui Peng

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities

• Christos Papadimitriou
• Tristan Pollner
• Amin Saberi
• David Wajc

Debt Swapping for Risk Mitigation in Financial Networks

• Pál András Papp
• Roger Wattenhofer

Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing

• Parag A. Pathak
• Tayfun Sönmez
• M. Utku Ünver
• M. Bumin Yenmez

Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid

• Marek Pycia
• Kyle Woodward

Improving Match Rates in Dating Markets through Assortment Optimization

• Ignacio Rios
• Daniela Saban
• Fanyin Zheng

Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy Awards

• Michelangelo Rossi

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

• Tim Roughgarden

Efficient Approximation Schemes for Stochastic Probing and Prophet Problems

• Danny Segev
• Sahil Singla

The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexity

• Mark Sellke
• Aleksandrs Slivkins

Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows Over Time

• Leon Sering
• Laura Vargas Koch
• Theresa Ziemke

Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure

• Denis Shishkin

Fulfillment by Platform: Antitrust and Upstream Market Power

• Amandeep Singh
• Jiding Zhang
• Senthil Veeraraghavan

Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules

• Piotr Skowron

Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Method

• Krzysztof Sornat
• Virginia Vassilevska Williams
• Yinzhan Xu

Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable

• Clayton Thomas

Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain

• Can Urgun
• Leeat Yariv

Colonel Blotto Games with Favoritism: Competitions with Pre-allocations and Asymmetric Effectiveness

• Dong Quan Vu
• Patrick Loiseau

Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market

• Xintong Wang
• David M. Pennock
• Nikhil R. Devanur
• David M. Rothschild
• Biaoshuai Tao
• Michael P. Wellman

How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?

• Lirong Xia

A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk

• Mu Zhang

Optimal Advertising for Information Products

• Shuran Zheng
• Yiling Chen

The Limits of Multi-task Peer Prediction

• Shuran Zheng
• Fang-Yi Yu
• Yiling Chen

Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance

• You Zu
• Krishnamurthy Iyer
• Haifeng Xu