Prophet Inequalities over Time

• Andreas Abels
• Elias Pitschmann
• Daniel Schmand

Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World

• Gagan Aggarwal
• Andres Perlroth
• Junyao Zhao

Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification

• Saba Ahmadi
• Avrim Blum
• Kunhe Yang

Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets

• Mete Şeref Ahunbay
• Martin Bichler
• Johannes Knörr

Comparison of Screening Devices

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Piotr Dworczak
• Frank Yang

EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number

• Hannaneh Akrami
• Noga Alon
• Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
• Jugal Garg
• Kurt Mehlhorn
• Ruta Mehta

The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising Markets

• Miguel Alcobendas
• Shunto Kobayashi
• Ke Shi
• Matthew Shum

Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World

• Yeganeh Alimohammadi
• Aranyak Mehta
• Andres Perlroth

Equitable stable matchings under modular assessment

• Ahmet Alkan
• Kemal Yildiz

Interviewing Matching in Random Markets

• Maxwell Allman
• Itai Ashlagi

Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts

• Tal Alon
• Paul Duetting
• Yingkai Li
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria

• Georgios Amanatidis
• Georgios Birmpas
• Philip Lazos
• Stefano Leonardi
• Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

Multi-Item Order Fulfillment Revisited: LP Formulation and Prophet Inequality

• Ayoub Amil
• Ali Makhdoumi
• Yehua Wei

Algorithms and Complexity for Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team Games

• Ioannis Anagnostides
• Fivos Kalogiannis
• Ioannis Panageas
• Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis
• Stephen Mcaleer

Distortion in metric matching with ordinal preferences

• Nima Anari
• Moses Charikar
• Prasanna Ramakrishnan

No-Regret Learning in Games is Turing Complete

• Gabriel P. Andrade
• Rafael Frongillo
• Georgios Piliouras

Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference Approach

• Nemanja Antic
• George Georgiadis

Robust Auction Design with Support Information

• Jerry Anunrojwong
• Santiago R. Balseiro
• Omar Besbes

A Nonparametric Framework for Online Stochastic Matching with Correlated Arrivals

• Ali Aouad
• Will Ma

Centralized Versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching Platforms

• Ali Aouad
• Omer Saritac
• Chiwei Yan

Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment

• Guy Aridor

The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens

• Guy Aridor
• Duarte Goncalves
• Daniel Kluver
• Ruoyan Kong
• Joseph Konstan

Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
• Konstantin Zabarnyi

The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenkoyako
• Stephan Müller
• Farzad Pourbabaee
• Omer Tamuz

Fast computation of exact confidence intervals for randomized experiments with binary outcomes

• P. M. Aronow
• Haoge Chang
• Patrick Lopatto

On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare

• Alex P. Arsenault-Morin
• Hayri Alper Arslan
• Matthew Gentry

Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets

• Itai Ashlagi
• Mark Braverman
• Geng Zhao

Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling

• Sepehr Assadi
• Vikram Kher
• George Li
• Ariel Schvartzman

Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity

• Moshe Babaioff
• Shahar Dobzinski
• Ron Kupfer

On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings

• Moshe Babaioff
• Shahar Dobzinski
• Shiri Ron

Principal Trading Arrangements: Optimality under Temporary and Permanent Price Impact

• Markus Baldauf
• Christoph Frei
• Joshua Mollner

The Power of Greedy for Online Minimum Cost Matching on the Line

• Eric Balkanski
• Yuri Faenza
• Noémie Périvier

Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?

• Ian Ball
• Jan Knoepfle

Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice

• Santiago Balseiro
• Christian Kroer
• Rachitesh Kumar

Adaptive Algorithms and Collusion via Coupling

• Martino Banchio
• Giacomo Mantegazza

Allocating with Priorities and Quotas: Algorithms, Complexity, and Dynamics

• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Matthew Eichhorn
• David Kempe

Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources

• Siddhartha Banerjee
• Giannis Fikioris
• Eva Tardos

Guaranteeing Envy-Freeness under Generalized Assignment Constraints

• Siddharth Barman
• Arindam Khan
• Sudarshan Shyam
• K. V. N. Sreenivas

You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too

• Gerdus Benade
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Jamie Tucker-Foltz

Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising

• Dirk Bergemann
• Alessandro Bonatti
• Nicholas Wu

Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing

• Dirk Bergemann
• Tibor Heumann
• Stephen Morris

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost

• Ben Berger
• Tomer Ezra
• Michal Feldman
• Federico Fusco

Signaling Competition in Two-Sided Markets

• Omar Besbes
• Yuri Fonseca
• Ilan Lobel
• Fanyin Zheng

Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging

• Martin Bichler
• Maximilian Fichtl
• Matthias Oberlechner

Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice

• Federico Bobbio
• Margarida Carvalho
• Andrea Lodi
• Ignacio Rios
• Alfredo Torrico

Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews

• Tommaso Bondi

The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings

• Tommaso Bondi
• Michelangelo Rossi
• Ryan Stevens

Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-out

• Ariel Boyarsky
• Hongseok Namkoong
• Jean Pouget-Abadie

Balanced Donor Coordination

• Felix Brandt
• Matthias Greger
• Erel Segal-Halevi
• Warut Suksompong

Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices

• Ido Bright
• Arthur Delarue
• Ilan Lobel

Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting

• Markus Brill
• Jannik Peters

Prophet Inequality: Order selection beats random order

• Archit Bubna
• Ashish Chiplunkar

Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI)

• Eric Budish
• Ruiquan Gao
• Abraham Othman
• Aviad Rubinstein
• Qianfan Zhang

Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study

• Noah Burrell
• Grant Schoenebeck

Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets

• Johannes Bäumler
• Martin Bullinger
• Stefan Kober
• Donghao Zhu

Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization

• Yang Cai
• Eric Xue

Correlated Cluster-Based Randomized Experiments: Robust Variance Minimization

• Ozan Candogan
• Chen Chen
• Rad Niazadeh

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes

• Matteo Castiglioni
• Alberto Marchesi
• Nicola Gatti

Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection

• Javier Cembrano
• Felix Fischer
• Max Klimm

The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs

• Yi-Chun Chen
• Manuel Mueller-Frank
• Mallesh Pai

Feature Based Dynamic Matching

• Yilun Chen
• Yash Kanoria
• Akshit Kumar
• Wenxin Zhang

Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions

• Ziyun Chen
• Zhiyi Huang
• Dorsa Majdi
• Zipeng Yan

I'll Tell You Tomorrow: Committing to Future Commitments

• Andrew Bongjune Choi

Fair allocation in graphs

• George Christodoulou
• Amos Fiat
• Elias Koutsoupias
• Alkmini Sgouritsa

Mediated Communication with Transparent Motives

• Roberto Corrao
• Yifan Dai

Trading Prophets

• Jose Correa
• Andrés Cristi
• Paul Duetting
• MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
• Jan Olkowski
• Kevin Schewior

Targeting versus Competition in Marketplace Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Internet Ads

• Bo Cowgill
• Cosmina Dorobantu

Equity Pay in Networked Teams

• Krishna Dasaratha
• Ben Golub
• Anant Shah

Communication via hard and soft information

• Sulagna Dasgupta

Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based Screening

• Sulagna Dasgupta

Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination?

• Rahul Deb
• Ludovic Renou

The Privacy Elasticity of Behavior: Conceptualization and Application

• Inbal Dekel
• Rachel Cummings
• Ori Heffetz
• Katrina Ligett

Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees

• Shahar Dobzinski
• Sigal Oren
• Jan Vondrak

Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets

• Battal Dogan
• Lars Ehlers

Purchase History and Product Personalization

• Laura Doval
• Vasiliki Skreta

Blockchain Mediated Persuasion

• Kimon Drakopoulos
• Irene Lo
• Justin Mulvany

Ambiguous Contracts

• Paul Duetting
• Michal Feldman
• Daniel Peretz

Smoothed Analysis of Online Non-parametric Auctions

• Naveen Durvasula
• Nika Haghtalab
• Manolis Zampetakis

Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal

• Paul Dütting
• Evangelia Gergatsouli
• Rojin Rezvan
• Yifeng Teng
• Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis

Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections

• Ran Eilat
• Zvika Neeman
• Eilon Solan

Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual

• Farbod Ekbatani
• Yiding Feng
• Rad Niazadeh

Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility

• Matthew Elliott
• Benjamin Golub
• Mathieu V. Leduc

Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets

• Yuri Faenza
• Swati Gupta
• Xuan Zhang

Graph Ranking and the Cost of Sybil Defense

• Gwendolyn Farach-Colton
• Martin Farach-Colton
• Leslie Ann Goldberg
• Hanna Komlos
• John Lapinskas
• Reut Levi
• Moti Medina
• Miguel A. Mosteiro

On picking sequences for chores

• Uriel Feige
• Xin Huang

Temporal Fairness in Learning and Earning: Price Protection Guarantee and Phase Transitions

• Qing Feng
• Ruihao Zhu
• Stefanus Jasin

On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality

• Diodato Ferraioli
• Carmine Ventre

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions

• Giannis Fikioris
• Eva Tardos

Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing

• Simon Finster
• Michelle González Amador
• Edwin Lock
• Francisco Marmolejo Cossio
• Evi Micha
• Ariel Procaccia

Distortion Under Public-Spirited Voting

• Bailey Flanigan
• Ariel D Procaccia
• Sven Wang

Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignment

• Daniel Freund
• Thodoris Lykouris
• Elisabeth Paulson
• Bradley Sturt
• Wentao Weng

Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals

• Rafael Frongillo
• Eric Neyman
• Bo Waggoner

Quantum Information Elicitation

• Rafael Frongillo

Robust Stackelberg Equilibria

• Jiarui Gan
• Minbiao Han
• Jibang Wu
• Haifeng Xu

Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests

• Abheek Ghosh
• Paul W. Goldberg

Pricing Novel Goods

• Francesco Giovannoni
• Toomas Hinnosaar

Best of Both Distortion Worlds

• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Mohamad Latifian
• Nisarg Shah

Prizes and effort in contests with private information

• Sumit Goel

Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets

• Denizalp Goktas
• Jiayi Zhao
• Amy Greenwald

Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions

• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Ori Heffetz
• Clayton Thomas

Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers

• Mohak Goyal
• Geoffrey Ramseyer
• Ashish Goel
• David Mazieres

Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

• Ronen Gradwohl
• Itai Arieli
• Rann Smorodinsky

Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria

• Lukas Graf
• Tobias Harks

A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms

• Aram Grigoryan
• Markus Möller

Leveraging Reviews: Learning to Price with Buyer and Seller Uncertainty

• Wenshuo Guo
• Nika Haghtalab
• Kirthevasan Kandasamy
• Ellen Vitercik

Which Lp norm is the fairest? Approximations for fair facility location across all "p"

• Swati Gupta
• Jai Moondra
• Mohit Singh

The Power of Menus in Contract Design

• Guru Guruganesh
• Jon Schneider
• Joshua Wang
• Junyao Zhao

Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives

• Isa Hafalir
• Fuhito Kojima
• M. Bumin Yenmez

Location Choice, Commuting, and School Choice

• Minseon Park
• Dong Woo Hahm

Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention

• Rustamdjan Hakimov
• Renke Schmacker
• Camille Terrier

In Defense of Liquid Democracy

• Daniel Halpern
• Joseph Y. Halpern
• Ali Jadbabaie
• Elchanan Mossel
• Ariel D. Procaccia
• Manon Revel

Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased Agents

• Joseph Y. Halpern
• Aditya Saraf

The Wisdom of Strategic Voting

• Qishen Han
• Grant Schoenebeck
• Biaoshuai Tao
• Lirong Xia

A Rational Inattention Theory of Echo Chamber

• Lin Hu
• Anqi Li
• Xu Tan

Estimating Effects of Long-Term Treatments

• Shan Huang
• Chen Wang
• Yuan Yuan
• Jinglong Zhao
• Jingjing Zhang

A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling

• Xin Huang
• Erel Segal-Halevi

Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet Inequalities

• Jiashuo Jiang
• Will Ma
• Jiawei Zhang

Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto Insurance

• Yizhou Jin

Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities

• Zi Yang Kang

Information Design of Online Platforms

• T. Tony Ke
• Song Lin
• Michelle Y. Lu

Generalized Veto Core and a Practical Voting Rule with Optimal Metric Distortion

• Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
• David Kempe

Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World

• Andreas Kleiner

Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs

• Max Klimm
• Maximilian J. Stahlberg

Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment

• Andrew Kloosterman
• Peter Troyan

Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable Alternatives

• Haruki Kono
• Kota Saito
• Alec Sandroni

Dynamic Concern for Misspecification

• Giacomo Lanzani

Description Complexity of Regular Distributions

• Renato Pase Leme
• Balasubramanian Sivan
• Yifeng Teng
• Pratik Worah

Choice Architecture, Privacy Valuations, and Selection Bias in Consumer Data

• Tesary Lin
• Avner Strulov-Shlain

Predicting Choice from Information Costs

• Elliot Lipnowski
• Doron Ravid

Order-optimal Correlated Rounding for Fulfilling Multi-item E-commerce Orders

• Will Ma

Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations

• Mohammad Mahdian
• Jieming Mao
• Kangning Wang

Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constraints

• Ivan-Aleksandar Mavrov
• Kamesh Munagala
• Yiheng Shen

Algorithmic Assistance with Recommendation-Dependent Preferences

• Bryce Mclaughlin
• Jann Spiess

Causal Estimation of User Learning in Personalized Systems

• Evan Munro
• David Jones
• Jennifer Brennan
• Roland Nelet
• Vahab Mirrokni
• Jean Pouget-Abadie

A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

• Lea Nagel
• Roberto Saitto

Incentives for Exploration at Market Equilibrium

• Eren Ozbay
• Vijay Kamble

Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor

• Mallesh Pai
• Philipp Strack

Agreements of Continuous-Time Games

• Mikhail Panov

The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed Points

• Christos Papadimitriou
• Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis
• Manolis Zampetakis

Reputation Effects under Short Memories

• Harry Pei

Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaos

• Georgios Piliouras
• Fang-Yi Yu

Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design

• Marek Pycia
• Kyle Woodward

Graphon Games with Multiple Equilibria: Analysis and Computation

• Kiran Rokade
• Francesca Parise

Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching

• Joseph Root
• Sophie Bade

A Nonparametric Approach with Marginals for Modeling Consumer Choice

• Yanqiu Ruan
• Xiaobo Li
• Karthyek Murthy
• Karthik Natarajan

Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers

• Jan Christoph Schlegel
• Mateusz Kwaśnicki
• Akaki Mamageishvili

Combinatorial Inference on the Optimal Assortment in the Multinomial Logit Model

• Shuting Shen
• Xi Chen
• Ethan X. Fang
• Junwei Lu

Delegating to Multiple Agents

• Suho Shin
• Keivan Rezaei
• Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi

Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences

• Jamie Tucker-Foltz
• Richard J. Zeckhauser

Adwords with Unknown Budgets and Beyond

• Rajan Udwani

A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank Valuations

• Vignesh Viswanathan
• Yair Zick

Modeling and Correcting Bias in Sequential Evaluation

• Jingyan Wang
• Ashwin Pananjady

Regret and Information Avoidance

• Zichang Wang

Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores

• Xiaowei Wu
• Cong Zhang
• Shengwei Zhou

The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections

• Lirong Xia

Information Design of a Delegated Search

• Yangge Xiao
• Zhenyu Hu
• Shouqiang Wang

Extreme Points and First-Order Stochastic Dominance: Theory and Applications

• Kai Hao Yang
• Alexander Zentefis

Help and Haggle: Social Commerce Through Randomized, All-or-Nothing Discounts

• Luyi Yang
• Chen Jin
• Zhen Shao

Deep Learning Based Causal Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical Evidence

• Zikun Ye
• Zhiqi Zhang
• Dennis J. Zhang
• Heng Zhang
• Renyu Zhang

Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation

• Hanrui Zhang
• Yu Cheng
• Vincent Conitzer

Withholding Verifiable Information

• Kun Zhang

The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design

• Banghua Zhu
• Stephen Bates
• Zhuoran Yang
• Yixin Wang
• Jiantao Jiao
• Michael I. Jordan